

Notes

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³ Katyn drama: Kozelsk, Starobelsk, Ostashkov: the fate of interned Polish soldiers / Comp. and general ed. Yasnova O.V. — M.: Politizdat, 1991. — 240 p.

⁴ Ibid. S. 158.

⁵ Abarinov V.K. Katyn labyrinth. - M.: News, 1991. - 208 p.

⁶ Here and below, quotes from Yu. Mukhin's book "Anti-Russian under the line" are given from the Internet edition: http://www.patriotica.ru/history/muhin_antiros_.html

⁷ Katusev A., Oppokov V. Judas. (Vlasovites in the service of the fa shizma) // Military Historical Journal. 1990. No. 6. S. 68-81.

⁸ Semiryaga M.I. Collaborationism. Nature, typology and about events during World War II. — M.: ROSSPEN, 2000. — 863 p.

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¹⁰ History. 2000. No. 31.

— Chuev S. Damned soldiers. - M.: Publishing house "Eksmo", Publishing house "Yau for", 2004. - 576 p.

¹² Ibid. S. 6.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Kovalev B. Nazi occupation and collaborationism in Russia, 1941-1944. - M.: LLC "Publishing house AST": LLC "Tranzitkni ga", 2004. - 483 p. (Military History Library).

¹⁵ Ibid. S. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid. S. 20.

¹⁷ Ibid. S. 22.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid. S. 29.

²⁰ Ibid. S. 482.

²¹ Orlov A. Behind the scenes of the second front. — M.: Veche, 2001. — 349 p.

²² Ibid. P. 10.

²³ Ibid. S. 5.

²⁴ Ibid. pp. 8-9.

²⁵ Ivanov R. Stalin and the Allies: 1941-1945. — Smolensk: Rusich, 2000. - 592 p. (Secrets of the XX century).

²⁶ Ibid. C. 3.

²⁷ Ibid. S. 543.

²⁸ Ibid. C. 3.

²⁹ Ibid. S. 552.

³⁰ Ibid. S. 545.

³¹ Ibid. S. 550.

³² Ibid. S. 551.

³³ Ibid. S. 553.

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VICTOR SUVOROV AS "ICEBREAKER"

To one historical discussion

The purpose of this article is to give Russian readers an overview of the discussions about Viktor Suvorov's books outside of Russia, as well as to present the literature on the subject available in the "west".

"Joseph Stalin was planning an attack on Germany in 1941" is the main point of Viktor Suvorov's books (his real name is Vladimir Rezun, a GRU officer who fled to England). Such a statement has explosive power even today, primarily in the countries of the former military opponents - Russia and Germany. At the same time, debates on the topic of the prehistory of the Second World War, especially those relating to the Barbarossa plan, are more relevant today than ever. In Germany, they resumed in the form of a "battle of historians", in Russia - with the publication of Suvorov's book "The Icebreaker", and also in connection with the partial and temporary opening of archives.

How to classify Suvorov's works from today's point of view? What new things will be revealed to us by declassified documents that were inaccessible to Suvorov?

In recent years, numerous documents from the party, state, military and KGB archives² have become known, which convincingly confirm Suvorov's theses. The most important, no doubt, are the military plans of the General Staff.

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Red Army 1940-1941 In the future, within the framework of this study, we will touch upon party and army propaganda materials. Separately, the role of the Soviet Navy, a topic that Suvorov has not touched on, will be covered separately.

Ideology inevitably plays an important role in assessing the role of Stalin and the prewar Soviet Union. At the very beginning of the Stalinist dictatorship, the Soviet Union was forced to avoid military conflicts with the capitalist states. Stalin needed a breather to strengthen the role of the party and create an industrial base for the massive production of armaments. When the five-year plans were introduced, first of all, it was envisaged to create a heavy industry and an armaments industry, and by the most ruthless methods at that. The labor force released in agriculture as a result of bloody collectivization was literally absorbed by numerous new industries in the field of energy and heavy industry. The leadership of the Red Army jealously followed and

controlled the ever-increasing industry
new power of the state.

The demands of the Red Army on industry were already excessive in 1929: an army of three million men, two thousand aircraft (an additional fifteen hundred reserve aircraft), 9,350 artillery pieces (an additional 3,400 of smaller caliber), one and a half thousand tanks (an additional reserve in the initial stage of the war - up to three thousand pieces). The "extraction" of foreign models of tanks and aircraft began, and not only through official means,

but also through industrial espionage.

It will be seen from what follows that these armament figures, improbable as they may seem for 1929, pale in comparison with the planning and

the aura of the forties.

To begin with, Stalin created an atmosphere of threat from the capitalist states in order to crack down on real and imaginary "enemies" within the country. At the end of the 30s. throughout the Soviet Union

"enemies of the people", "spies" and "saboteurs" were deployed to cover up economic failures, as well as to further strengthen Stalin's power. At that time, there was such a point of view: the USSR should be armed to such an extent as to be able to repel the attack of *all conceivable enemy coalitions* simultaneously. Such a goal demanded from the industry that the lion's share of it was the arms industry, which led the country to decline and economic collapse.

However, by the mid-1930s Stalin felt strong enough that instead of tasks of purely defensive significance, in the event of an attack on the USSR,

orient industry and the party to another goal is offensive. Efforts to create an armaments industry began to bear fruit. Military plants and factories grew and multiplied all over the country, a considerable proportion of which were built with the technical assistance of the capitalist countries. The rapid development of Soviet industry would not have been possible without Western machines and technologies. Preferred technology providers included Germany, the United States, and even Mussolini's Italy.

Even a seemingly "peaceful" industry, such as tractor factories, was created with the aim of producing weapons. "On the basis of tractors or automobiles, tanks will be created at tractor and automobile plants as a "military version" of peaceful vehicles. Therefore, only the capacity of these plants will depend

network of high-quality mechanization of the army," said another June 14, 1932 Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Yegorov.

Indeed, the automobile and tractor factories in Kharkov, Stalingrad, Chelyabinsk and Leningrad, built with Ford's participation, served as the basis for tank production before World War II. Already before the war, 50% of the capacity of these plants was used for military purposes. At the end of the 30s. the number of battle tanks in the Soviet Union exceeded the total number of tanks of Germany, France, England and the USA *combined!*

Stalin did not forget about the air force either. The corresponding industry was created systematically. Airplanes and aircraft engines were bought in the West, on the model of which the USSR built its own. For Stalin, the "procurement" of modern machines was not associated with any ideological problems. They planned to buy them both from the Italian Duce and from the unloved England. Meanwhile, a license was acquired in America for the manufacture of the famous DC-3 aircraft, in the Soviet version - the Li-2 model.

Soviet pilots often flew abroad before the war. So, for example, three TB-3 bombers visited Rome in 1934. At the same time, the Soviet military delegation was received by the Duce himself. The Soviet military were offered excursions to factories producing aircraft⁶. In turn, the Italian military pilots were on visits to the USSR, in particular to Odessa.

German aircraft had a good reputation, and the Soviet Union captured some examples during the Spanish Civil War ("Messerschmitt Bf-109B" and "Heinkel NOT-111").

Therefore, it is not always necessary to talk about the insufficient technical level of Soviet aircraft. Even if numerous authors explain the success of the German troops at the very beginning of the war precisely by their technical superiority over the Soviet Union, Soviet specialists arrive at different results. Here is what the Soviet test pilot Suprun said about the captured Messerschmitt Bf-109B:

The Messerschmidt Bf-109B with the Jumo 210 engine, in terms of its tactical and technical data, is lower than the high-speed fighters that are in service with the Red Army Air Force. The assessment of the Heinkel NE-111 aircraft by test pilot Kabanov sounds very similar: "1. The Heinkel HE-111 aircraft is inferior to domestic aircraft in speed. 2. The takeoff speed, flight range and maximum altitude of this machine are significantly lower than the requirements for a twin-engine bomber"⁸.

After the conclusion of the pact between Stalin and Gilet

rum, joint work with the German air force became official. Stalin gave the order to draw up a list of modern machines and engines that Germany could supply him and which interested him. So, the USSR bought, for example, the Heinkel HE-100 car, on which in 1938 a world speed record was reached in Germany. This machine, according to its aerodynamic data, was probably the most modern German model before the war. But it was not adopted by the German aviation, but sold to the Soviet Union. The aviation industry of the USSR undoubtedly learned a lot from this machine.

In 1939, the Soviet delegation, which included such well-known designers as Alexander Yakovlev and Nikolai Polikarpov, was shown in Germany almost all types of aircraft and the factories where they were produced. Soviet test pilots could even try out the latest machine in the air.

Soviet designers and technicians used German-supplied aircraft to improve their skills. In 1940 alone, more than 3,500 Soviet technicians were trained on German machines. Sobolev summarizes the results of this training and test flights on German aircraft as follows: "From

it becomes clear that the new generation of Soviet combat aircraft in its main parameters not only does not lag behind the German ones, but surpasses similar aircraft, for example, in speed"⁹. The Soviets had another problem - to establish mass production of new types of aircraft in time.

It is worth paying attention once again to the fact that from the assessment of German aircraft in the Soviet Union immediately before the start of the war it is absolutely impossible to draw a conclusion about the lower level of Soviet aircraft. Thus, the Soviet leadership, headed by Stalin, could in no way be terrified of German military equipment. On the contrary, the top military and party leadership considered themselves quite

capable of winning an offensive war against Germany. In the words of Professor Maudsley: "Contrary to the opinion of many historians today, I would argue this way: Stalin and the high military command believed that they could deal with Hitler precisely from a position of their own strength, not weakness."¹⁰ Moreover, the German tanks shown to the Soviet experts made a very bad impression on them. Soviet experts simply could not believe that Germany really did not have the best tanks. Knowing about the capabilities and power of the latest Soviet types of T-34 and KV-1 tanks, they could not perceive German tanks as a serious enemy.

The appearance on the front of the Soviet battle tanks KV-1, named after Marshal Voroshilov, acted as a shock to the German troops. There is an episode from the memoirs of the Austrian General Erhard Raus, which describes the appearance of a single KV-1 tank after the start of the Barbarossa plan: the KV-1 blocked the supply route for the German 6th Panzer Division and blocked it for almost two days. German tank attacks, 50 mm antitank guns, and even dive bomber attacks were unsuccessful. Usually very effective anti-aircraft guns 88 mm worked only at a very close range, and even then not immediately.

TECHNICAL DATA OF GERMAN AND SOVIET TANKS In 1941

	Germany		USSR	
	PzKpfw III	PzKpfw IV	T-34/76	KV-1
Weight, in t	16.0	18.0	28.0	47.2
Front armor, in mm	14.5	14.5	60	110
weapon caliber, in mm	3.70	7.5 (3.7)	7.62	7.62
Engine power, in l/s	230	230	500	600

Soviet tanks were not only equal in technical capabilities to German tanks, or better than them, but also significantly superior in numbers. While the Wehrmacht was armed with only 3350 tanks of all types (next to the captured 35-38-ton Skoda tanks, there were numerous, completely outdated Panzer II and Panzer III models), Stalin's arsenal looked something like this way 12:

Leningrad Military District: 1977 tanks;

Northwestern Front (Baltic Military District): 1646 tanks;

Western Front (Special Western Military District): 3345 tanks;

Southwestern Front (Special Kiev Military District): 5894 tanks;

Odessa Military District: 1119 tanks.

On the example of these few figures, it becomes clear how hopeless the attack on Russia should have been for the Germans. Especially if we take into account that figures for the internal military districts (Moscow, Caucasus, etc.) have not yet been given here.

Now let's turn to a topic that even in the specialized literature has been touched upon very little: Stalin's gigantic program to create a fleet.

Tsarist Russia never played a big role as a maritime power. The vast continental empire focused on arming the ground forces. In any case, Russia did not have to protect the sea routes along which trade would develop. In the USSR, maritime trade routes also did not play an important role. Therefore, the creation of a large fleet, even for defensive purposes, was not necessary. Nevertheless, Stalin developed grandiose plans for the creation of an ocean fleet. If Stalin's plans had come true, the Soviet Union would have possessed a navy that would have surpassed the naval forces of both traditional maritime powers - England and the United States, combined!13

In 1936, the Soviets began to probe the United States for a battleship. The man who was instructed to negotiate was called Sam Karp, he was the brother of the wife of Vyacheslav Molotov. Sam Karp was born in Russia but lived in America.

Stalin even interceded with the American ambassador Steinhardt to obtain permission to purchase the battleship from the US government. Prior to this, Steinhardt, during his tenure as ambassador to Moscow, had never been able to meet with Stalin. In the end, after long settlements, President Roosevelt agreed to the development and delivery of the battleship to the USSR. This work was undertaken in August 1937 by the American firm Gibbs & Cox. In addition to one battleship, the Soviet Union had to receive more parts and weapons for the second to assemble it at their shipyards.

Gibbs & Cox's plans were, in fact, gigantic. Both ships had to displace at least 66,000 tons (option A) or even 74,000 tons (option B). For comparison, the German battleship Bismarck had a displacement of 42,000 tons¹⁴.

The Soviet Union also counted on the technical assistance of Italy. For example, the engine of the Kirov-class cruiser was made according to a model bought in Italy. The engines of other ships of the same class had to be built under an Italian license. In addition, blueprints for the cruiser Raimondo Montecuccoli were bought in Italy.

The Italian destroyers "Dardo" and "Baleno" served as a model for the Soviet destroyers of the "Wrathful" class (Project 7). As early as 1929, the Italian shipyard Cantieri Riuniti dell'Adriatico had already drawn up plans for a Soviet submarine of the Dekabrist class.

Stalin approved the huge program for the creation of the navy, presented to him by Voroshilov on September 7, 1937. This program provided for the construction of at least eight battleships (four - type B / project 25 and four - type A / project 64), 10

yellow cruisers (project 22), 22 cruisers (project 68), two aircraft carriers (project 71), 20 leading destroyers, 144 destroyers, various minelayers, mine trawls, 85 large, 175 medium and 116 small under

water boats.

Construction programs for 10 destroyers, eight battlecruisers, 14 cruisers and two aircraft carriers were approved on 27 July 1940.

These are just two examples from the vast Soviet fleet building program, clearly demonstrating its grandiose scope. What was the meaning of this program for the continental Soviet Union?

Such a program could not have been defensive in nature, since it was too large and too ambitious to protect the coasts. If it was about following the defensive doctrine, it would be necessary to design and build a completely different fleet.

The role of the Soviet navy was predetermined by the offensive doctrine. The description of the role of the fleet in the "Provisional Naval Regulations of 1937" ("Provisional Regulations on the Naval Service of 1937") begins with offensive missions: "Offensive battles on the high seas

and in the airspace over the sea, in addition, enemy coasts and near enemy naval bases in order to achieve the operational objectives of the war at sea ... "Naval commanders had to carry out offensive operations in order to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy¹⁵.

Molotov, Stalin's closest confidant, said on February 14, 1938: "The mighty Soviet state needs a sea and ocean fleet that corresponds to its interests and is worthy of its great goals."¹⁶

Stalin's plans for the construction of the fleet exceeded the capabilities of the Soviet shipyards. Therefore, often the timing of launching ships on the water was delayed. Ultimately, this whole gigantic arms program

could not be completed in time, before the start of Operation Barbarossa.

This short digression into the field of naval armaments should serve as another touch in the study of Stalin's intentions before the Second World War.

Another very controversial point in substantiating the expansionist plans of the Soviet Union is Stalin's speeches at a meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, and before graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941.

The authenticity of the speech of August 19, 1939 is questioned by many historians. In this speech, Stalin prepares the top leadership of the party for the conclusion pact with the German Empire. Unusually frank, this speech can in no way correspond to the concepts of historians who have remained true to the Soviet line.

Stalin openly admits that he intends to use the pact with Hitler in order to drag the German Empire into an exhausting war with the Western countries. In this case, the Soviet Union will be able to determine the moment of its entry into the war, that is, to set the time for the attack itself. Weakened opponents will then fall into Stalin's hands like "ripe fruit". Traditional historical science, of course, cannot use such a frank statement by Stalin about his own plans. The historical version, according to which Adolf Hitler was the only aggressor, if Stalin's speech is recognized as genuine, collapses.

However, was Stalin's speech really as extraordinary as it is commonly believed, or are other similar documents from Stalin's inner circle simply not available to us? In fact, we can cite many other proofs of Stalin's aggressive intentions.

One of the most important witnesses can be considered the leader of the Communist International, Bulgarian Georgy Dimitrov, whose diaries were found in one of the archives in Sofia.

The entry dated September 7, 1939¹⁷ deserves special attention :

"The war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (poor and rich in terms of colonies, raw materials, etc.). For the redivision of the world, for domination over the world! We don't mind if they fight well and weaken each other. It would not be bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) were shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler himself, without understanding or wanting to do so, shakes and undermines the capitalist system. <...> We can maneuver, push one side against the other, so that we are better torn apart. **Non-aggression pact to some extent**

helping Germany. The next step is to push the other side. <...> What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we **extended the socialist system to new territories and populations?**

These diary entries of Dimitrov fully correspond to the text of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, which got to the West! Witnesses to Stalin's statements were, in addition to Dimitrov, Molotov and Zhdanov.

Let us now turn to Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin's overseer of ideology and art, secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Politburo. Could Stalin's statements, such as those quoted in Dimitrov's diary, be unexpected for Zhdanov? No way ¹⁸.

A few years ago Zhdanov's secret speech in 1938 before the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Prague became known. Zhdanov said that although it is the duty of every communist to fight the fascist aggressor, the communists must at the same time try "with all their might to use the economic and political crisis generated by the war in order to mobilize the masses and hasten the decline of capitalism in Czechoslovakia." In their struggle against Hitler, and later against capitalism, the communists would be supported by the Red Army, which would become "an important political factor in this conflict."

Another document sheds light on Stalin's political games. The document, which fell into the hands of the American consul in Prague, tells of a trip by Czech communists to Moscow in 1939. The Soviet motives for the Hitler-Stalin pact were explained to the delegation as follows:

"If the USSR had concluded a pact with the Western countries, Germany would never have been able to start a war, the result of which would be a world revolution, which we have been preparing for so long ... Encircled Germany would never have started a war ... We cannot allow Germany lost the war because if it falls under the control of the West and Poland is recreated, we will be cut off from the rest of Europe. The present war should last as long as we want... Remain calm, because the time has never come so favorable to our interests as it is now."20

Another quote from Comrade Zhdanov, this time from a speech in Leningrad that was not intended for publication: "The policy of the socialist government is to take advantage of the contradictions between

imperialists, in this case the military counter

speeches, to strengthen the positions of socialism wherever there is an opportunity for this"21.

And here is Zhdanov's statement in November 1940: "Our neutrality is an unusual neutrality. We acquire territories without fighting (laughter in the hall). To maintain this neutrality, strength is essential... We must be strong enough to defend the positions of socialism by both diplomatic and military means." Further, Zhdanov calls on his listeners "not to lose a single day, not to lose a single hour to improve military technology, military organization, while modern offensive experience with all its methods and means of attack must be taken into account"22.

And these are just a few of the quotes that give out expansionist goals of the Soviet Union under Stalin.

The credibility of Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies on the evening of May 5, 1941 was also in doubt for a long time²³. Subsequently, the content of this speech became known, including the three toasts that Stalin delivered at the subsequent banquet. Stalin declared that the German Wehrmacht should no longer be regarded as invincible. He praised the Red Army, which already consisted of 300 divisions, a third of which were mechanized. With these words, he ended his speech: "The Red Army is a modern army, and the modern army is an offensive army."

After Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, propaganda became even more outspoken and aggressive, primarily within the Red Army. For example, the draft directive "On the Tasks of Political Propaganda in the Red Army for the Near Future" contained, among other things, the following wording: "All forms of propaganda, agitation and education should be directed towards a single goal: the political, moral and combat training of personnel to waging a just, offensive and all-destroying war..."

And finally, from the report "The Current International Situation and Foreign Policy of the USSR" (May 1941): "The German army has not yet encountered an equivalent enemy, equal to it both in terms of the number of troops, and in technical equipment and combat training. Meanwhile, such a clash is not far off. And further: "The experience of military operations has shown that a defensive strategy

did not give any success and ended in defeat.

Therefore, against Germany, the same offensive strategy, backed up by powerful technology, must be applied. To the first quote by G.F. Aleksandrov, head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee, made the following significant note: "Such a formulation must by no means be allowed. That would mean showing the cards to the enemy." Note on the second quote: "War with Germany"]".

I think there is no need to quote further,

to draw an unambiguous conclusion about the Stalinist policy in 1941.

In conclusion, let us touch upon the offensive strategy of the Red Army and its military preparations²⁶ against Germany in the summer of 1941.

Even Viktor Suvorov defined the military preparations of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 as offensive. Airfields were located near the borders in order to be able to deliver a surprise attack on Germany. At the beginning of the war, this played a fatal role for Stalin's air force. Hundreds of aircraft were destroyed by German aircraft directly on the ground or during

trying to fly.

This is how the well-known American historian E.F. Tsimke assesses the situation: "After an irreparable mistake was made and the main forces of the Red Aviation were deployed near the border in anticipation of offensive operations, it was almost completely

destroyed on the ground and in the air before the onset of darkness on June 22, 1941, and did not fully recover until the very end of the war"²⁷.

The same thing happened with the tank troops of the Soviet Union concentrated in the Lvov and Belostok salients. The shock tank wedges concentrated there were bypassed by the Wehrmacht, surrounded and destroyed.

For defense against a German attack, these military preparations were completely unsuitable. Thanks to them, these tank units were presented to the Germans for destruction as if on a plate. But the Red Army was not preparing for an attack, but for carrying out a sudden deep blow against the German troops in Poland occupied by the Germans. This is recognized even by A. Koko Shin (First Deputy Defense Minister and former security adviser to President Yeltsin) and Major General V. Lavrinov, authors of the preface to a book on Soviet military strategy²⁸.

Evan Maudsley also comes to a similar conclusion: 29 was the attacker

naya doctrine of the Red Army. "The offensive Soviet doctrine meant not only that the forces of the Red Army were brought far ahead. It also meant that they were concentrated in the wrong region of the border"³⁰.

The Soviet military plan of 15 May 1941 called for an attack on southern Poland from the Ukraine in order to cut off Germany from the Ploiesti oil region. Therefore, the strongest Soviet tank units were concentrated in Ukraine³¹.

The war plan of May 15, 1941 can be regarded as the most sensational document of the prewar period. The fifteen-page document, entitled "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies," contains proposals for a pre-emptive strike against Germany.

The corresponding wording reads: "In order to prevent this, I consider it necessary in no case to give the initiative to action to the German command, to preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the stage of deployment and will not have time to organize the front and interaction between military branches.

This plan was proposed to Stalin by Marshal Timoshenko, People's Commissar of Defense, and General of the Army Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff. The document was written by the hand of General Vasilevsky, head of the planning department of the Soviet General Staff.

Although this plan was not signed by Stalin, the measures proposed in it were implemented right up to the very beginning of the war. Stalin usually did not sign such documents in person, on previous military plans (for example, November 1940 and March 1941)

Also, there is no signature.

These plans were by no means mere games of the General Staff, as some experts readily assert. So, for example, on the military plan of March 1941, you can find a note by Lieutenant General

Nikolay Vatutin: "Offensive to begin 12.6.". As you know, Vatutin was not just a lieutenant general, but the deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

Also absurd is the opinion that the offensive plans were developed without Stalin's knowledge or against his will. The General Staff would have decided in 1940-1941. to put into action such a far-reaching plan without Stalin's knowledge or without his order? Naturally, in the Soviet Union of 1941 this was impossible. Whoever insists on this pretends that there has never been a bloody purge that has just ended among the officers of the Red Army. Stalin would have thrown the recalcitrant generals into the cellars of the Lubyanka, not once thinking for a second.

An interesting position in relation to the theses of V. Suvorov, two well-known authors in the West - Colonel David E. Glantz³² (publisher of the journal "Journal of Slavic Military Studies"), and Gabriel Gorodetsky³³ (Tel Aviv University).

Although hardly anyone has published more material on the subject of the Barbarossa Plan than David Glantz, there is practically nothing in his books concerning the Soviet military plans of 1940-1941. If he mentions it, it is at best in one or two short paragraphs. He also stubbornly avoids citing key documents on Soviet military planning, although on other occasions he publishes every little thing imaginable.

put.

Gabriel Gorodetsky also seems to be behaving. Gorodetsky not only does not recognize the authenticity of Stalin's speech of August 19, 1939, but also considers the Soviet offensive plans of 1940-1941 completely harmless. He argues that these plans are at best internal documents of the General Staff, which are available in any General Staff of the world. Even the occupation and annexation by Stalin of Bessarabia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are presented by Gorodetsky as a purely protective measure! The role of Stalin

during the division of Poland, he is also not particularly upset. The expansion of the borders of Germany by Hitler always looks like an attack, the expansion of the borders of the USSR by the Red Army, according to Gorodetsky, pursued only defense.

body goals.

One can only hope that new documents from the former Soviet archives will become available in the future.

that will enable future generations to

torikov to come to more informed conclusions.

Notes

1 The following books by Viktor Suvorov were published in German: *Der Eisbrecher: Hitler in Stalins Kalkül* (1989), *Der Tag M* (1995), *Stalins verhinderter Erstschock. Hitler ersticht die Weltrevolution* (2000) and *"Marschall Schukow. Lebensweg über Leichen*.

2 Examples of such publications include: "1941 year" (in 2 volumes, M., 1998), ed. A. Yakovleva; A. *Kolpakidi*, D. *About choruses*. GRU Empire (in 2 volumes, M., 2001); State Security Organs of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War (in 2 volumes, M., 1995).

3 Stone David R. Hammer and Rifle. The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926-1933. Kansas University Press, 2000.

⁴ Reverse translation from German. RGVA (Russian State Military Archive), 33988/3/301. Cit. Quoted from Samuelson Lennart. Plans for Stalin's War Machine. Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925-1941. Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000. S. 163.

5 See: Sutton Antony C.: *National Suicide. Military Aid to the Soviet Union., The Australian League of Rights*, 1973. S. 101ff.

6 J. Calvitt Clarke III. Italo-Soviet Military Cooperation in the 1930s" in: Donald J. Stoker jr. und Jonathan A. Grant: "Girding for Battle. The Arms Trade in a Global Perspective, 1815-1940. Praeger Publishing, 2003, S. 181.

7 RGVA (Russian State Military Archive). F. 24.708. Op. 9. D. 142. S. 26. Cited. after Sobolew Dmitri: "Deutsche Spuren in der sowjetischen Luftfahrt", ES Mittler und Sohn, 2000, S. 101.

8 RGVA (Russian State Military Archive). F. 24.708. Op. 9. D. 142. S. 26. Cited. after Dimitri Sobolew: "Deutsche Spuren in der sowjetischen Luftfahrt", ES Mittler und Sohn, 2000, S. 102.

9 Sobolew Dimitri: "Deutsche Spuren in der sowjetischen Luftfahrt", ES Mittler und Sohn, 2000, S. 118.

10 Mawdsley Evan: "Thunder in the East: "The Nazi-Soviet Struggle 1941-1945", Hodder Arnold, 2005, S. 34.

11 Newton Steven H. (Hrsg.): "Panzer Operations. The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945, Da Capo Press, 2003, pp. 26-34.

¹² Data taken from the following obscure publications: *Crofoot Craig*: "The Order of Battle of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Sleeping Bear. Volume 1: 22 June 1941. Part one. An extraction of the Official Soviet Order of Battle. For the entire Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the Great Patriotic War", The Nafziger Collection, 2001.

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*Richard C. Raack**

THE ROLE OF STALIN IN UNLEASHING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

"Viktor Suvorov" is the pseudonym of a former Soviet military intelligence officer who has lived in England for many years. In the 1980s, he published a study of Stalin's war plans that, if Suvorov's account is credible, should have shaken the historical establishment. In 1990, a British publishing house finally released an English translation of his book *Icebreaker*. Suvorov offers in it a new understanding of Stalin's goal in the war, justifying in detail

inspired by quotes from Soviet military memoirs and other important documents. An American publishing house in the same year published Suvorov's book in New York. The subtitle of the London edition was "Who Started World War II?" Naturally, this was to attract the attention of readers. But, despite the constant interest, especially in those anniversary years, in the history of the war of 1939-1945, the London and New York editions did not receive reviews either in general periodicals or in professional historical journals in the USA. Of course, Hamish Hamilton and the New York Viking Press are interested in the success of their publications - and therefore sent out copies for review. Why the strange silence?

A book with a similar title, *How the War Came*,

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London professor D. Watt was published in England and the USA in 1989. It received reviews—mostly positive—in at least fifteen journals (counting only reviews from *the Digest of*

American Book Reviews and Index of Book Reviews)². Professor Watt presented the generally accepted version of the outbreak of war, overwhelmingly based on Western and German material and ignoring the many new sources that emerged from behind the former Iron Curtain in those early days.

publicity.

In fact, the two books are similar only in titles. Watt's book is broader, its approach to the subject covered is much more traditional. And Suvorov's book has only one focus - Stalin's war plans, ignored by most historians, and it uses completely different sources, mainly military history.

Suvorov builds his argument on a historical ground that has been left unattended: the plan for a Soviet attack in a westerly direction. According to Suvorov, Stalin deployed his troops to carry out precisely this plan, but was taken by surprise by the German attack that preempted him. There is not the slightest hint of this Soviet war plan in Watt's text.

Suvorov also offered a fresh look at Stalin's earlier designs when he signed a "non-aggression pact" with Hitler in 1939, setting the stage for a German and Soviet attack on Poland. This pact, given the existing British guarantees to Poland, made a general European war inevitable and brought the Wehrmacht to the Soviet border within a month. Without this common frontier, which Stalin deliberately helped create in 1939, there could not have been a direct German attack on the USSR in 1941.

As stated earlier, Watt is not alone in not looking ahead to better see what happened in the past. Countless authors, just like him, are completely and incomprehensibly ignored

Valid Hitler's words on this matter, although it was Hitler who was the main participant in the events.

Hitler said many times that he had to attack the Soviets before they attacked him. Was he right? Did Stalin have plans to use the war, especially the war of 1939, for the benefit of the USSR and Bolshevism, whose interests were, from Stalin's point of view, identical? The widely disseminated Marxist-Leninist theory, which declared wars between the "imperialist" powers to be the necessary route to their inevitable death in proletarian and colonial revolutions, should have sharpened the attention of both contemporaries and historians on the connection between this war and Stalin's likely interest in

extracting benefit from it.

These clear connections, as well as the prophecies of Hitler and Lenin, have been almost completely ignored by historians who have not asked the obvious question: what exactly did Stalin expect from a second "imperialist" war? They clearly preferred to believe Stalin that his intentions in signing the pact were purely defensive, just like his plans on the eve of Hitler's surprise attack in 1941.

In fact, for the most part, "informed" Western public opinion fully accepted then the dubious assurances of the USSR that it had allegedly lost interest in the central principles of international adventurism driven by Marxism-Leninism⁴.

Will the above-described attention of the reader which there are now well-founded reasons to be suspicious of all sorts of fantasies generated by the media? And is there any reason to be suspicious of a book published by well-known publishers containing a completely new historical concept, but left without reviews? Even in Britain, only one prominent journal published a review of Suvorov's book - positively, by the way. John Zametica, Reviewer

Obozrevatel, suggested that Suvorov's book would be attacked by "many academic historians, whose previous works would be meaningless if Suvorov is right." It would be natural to see among such critics many academic authors who studied the events of 1938-1941, beginning with Hitler's seizure of Austria and the Sudetenland and ending with the German attack on the USSR. But Suvorov was treated differently: he was not reviewed, which would notify the general public about him, but ignored, allowed to quietly disappear from the field of academic public opinion. It was practically isolated, leaving out of the attention of the intelligentsia of the western coast of the Atlantic Ocean, which receives information from interregional newspapers and leading social and political journals⁵. Did Suvorov become a victim of an intellectual "purge" in our area?

What kind of historical concept could be destroyed by Suvorov's version, if his arguments are justified?

The modern reader interested in World War II is likely to be familiar with the following commonly accepted concept (set out here in a simplified way for the sake of brevity). It is based on a system of opinions widespread in the West, which for many years provided at least a favorable explanation for Stalin's behavior in the war and post-war years. General

the accepted story looks like this.

Stalin's distrust of the Western democracies, Great Britain and France, grew sharply after they practically stopped supporting the Czech President Benes, to whom Hitler presented his demands on the eve of the Munich crisis in September 1938. The Soviet Union was then bound by bilateral defensive pacts with Czechoslovakia and France. Both of these agreements were part of the collective security system that the European powers were slowly building up against Nazi Germany. But when the British and French agreed

Were in Munich with Hitler and allowed him to annex the German-populated areas of Czechoslovakia to Germany, Stalin lost faith in these democracies. He believed that their desire to appease Hitler by satisfying his demands on Czechoslovakia, and also that they did not consult the Soviet Union on this issue, indicated a willingness to let Hitler seize whatever he wanted in eastern Europe. After that, Hitler would be ready to attack the Soviet Union⁶.

Hitler loudly proclaimed his hostility to what he called "Judeo-Bolshevism" and his determination to obtain "living space" for the German people in the East. Given Hitler's inclinations, it would be hard to believe that this vague expansionist goal did not include at least most of the western Slavic lands of the Soviet Union.

According to this version, Stalin, anticipating a war with Germany, intensified the fight against what seemed to him the intrigues of the West. He allowed Hitler to move east and occupy half of Poland in exchange for Hitler's agreement to allow him, Stalin, to move the Soviet border west, occupying the other half of Poland. In this way, Stalin was able to create from eastern Poland and other Eastern European states and the territories he received as a result of this deal, an earthen rampart, a buffer between the USSR and the Germans, covering eight million square miles of original Soviet territory. As a result, Hitler found himself in a state of confrontation with the Western powers. Thus Stalin won both the space and time he desperately needed to build his own defenses, for he knew that Hitler was adamant in his decision to move against him in the near future. Therefore, Stalin's pact with the Nazis and his agreement to supply Germany with many of the raw materials that she then needed for the war in Western Europe against England and France were defensive measures,

part of a plan to delay the conflict in order to gain vital space and time
me.

As follows from this version, which declares Stalin's defensive aims, Stalin's version of Bolshevism was not aggressive, despite the wars he waged against Poland and Finland after the pact, and despite the subsequent brutal seizure of the small Baltic states. One often has to read that by that time the bloody Bolshevik expansion had already begun to wane.

Zionism, the original creators of which in the days
revolutions were Lenin and Trotsky, and one of the unsuccessful manifestations of which was the catastrophic (for the Bolsheviks) invasion of Poland in 1920. Although Stalin himself was one of the political leaders of the Red Army and one of the main culprits of that invasion, believers in this version nevertheless prove, contrary to evidence, that later Stalin refused such expensive foreign adventures according to the recipes of his deceased teacher Lenin. Stalin, as follows from this version, was mainly concerned about internal security, feared for the future of the Soviet Union. Many historiographers have thought so, and very many over the past fifty years have sympathetically

perceived the foreign policy of the Soviet leader. They believe that Stalin had little choice but to make a pact with Hitler and play his own part in destroying what was left of independent Central and Eastern Europe.

Further, according to this version, Stalin fatally miscalculated, since soon after the unexpected and quick defeat of France, the entire European continent fell into the hands of Hitler. Having no serious enemies in the west of the continent, the Fuhrer began to concentrate his armies against the Soviet Union. The Soviet dictator, whose plans to win time and build his country in safety, were interrupted by German victories throughout Europe, did not foresee this turn of events. And although after the pact with the Germans he

hastily rearmed, strengthened its defenders position in the west and gained two years in preparation for war, his armies nevertheless failed to hold back the initial German attack in June 1941. The Red Air Force was practically destroyed at its airfields along the entire front of the German offensive. All this happened despite the fact that Stalin received countless warnings about the impending attack. From the very beginning of the German

Russian invasions retreated in panic almost everywhere.

Their losses were enormous: millions of soldiers were killed or captured by the Germans and their allies, who soon captured the main cities and industrial centers beyond the west of the USSR. An incredible political disaster was followed by an incredible military one.

The above version (which often glosses over the extent of the catastrophe to which Stalin, "the greatest genius of mankind," as he was, to his own pleasure, called him, condemned his country) contains more than isolated errors. However, as unbelievable as it may seem, it is the one that is heard most often. Those who do not believe can read historical works on this subject or look into

university textbooks or in the New Yorker - one of the many popular magazines that regularly bombard readers with amateur historiography on various aspects of the war against Hitler, usually confirming, though not always outright, the Stalinist version of the Soviet defensive

plans.

Even during the war, this version convinced many of the policy makers in London and Washington who were looking for historical evidence to predict what the Soviets would do after the war. It was clearly taken at face value by our wartime leaders, Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. It formed, as a generally accepted historical truth, the basis of many critical decisions and post-war planning during WWII - decisions,

adopted in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam. At these pivotal conferences, the West decided how to deal with the Stalinist Soviet Union, its ally in the war, based on its own hopes for Stalin's behavior in the years after the war. And often the decisions of the West, due to ignorance and misunderstanding of what really happened, helped Stalin. This version has long been presented to the Western population as a justification for mistrust in the Soviet Union after the start of the Cold War, when the Soviet armies were conveniently located in the center of Europe, and Stalin's borders and spheres of influence were seriously expanded in Asia. Just a few years ago, former communist leader Mikhail Gorbachev was still telling this tale to reinforce his current justification for Stalin.

Behind this version, various versions of which have never deviated far from the above, one hears the voice of Stalinist propaganda and the desire of the public in the West, gullible journalists and politicians, as well as numerous historians, to believe the defenders of Stalin and take propaganda at face value. Today it is surprising, but it should have been surprising from the very beginning. After all, Stalin's contemporaries in the West never had serious reasons to expect anything good from an unexpectedly acquired military ally - a former military ally of Hitler! There were no serious reasons for their successors either. In fact, they had even less reason to see anything in him at all.

good - although many have chosen to do so for many years. Today we must admit that the long-term popularity of the above tale is the brilliant product of the best propaganda campaign ever made. But the current access to many archives of the former Eastern Bloc, previously closed to independent researchers, means that this version can no longer remain without criticism.

If so long spread historical

the tale is false, what story will replace it? According to Suvorov, Stalin did not want peace at all, neither during the Sudeten crisis in 1938, nor in 1939, nor in 1941. His stance was neither defensive nor reactive. He did not take time to prepare defense

us, but was preparing an attack, waiting for the right moment for his own trip to the west. He saw in Hitler an "icebreaker" who would break the way for the Bolsheviks to the West, a demonic nihilist who would tear apart the fragile fabric of post-Versailles Europe, destroying governments, economic and social order everywhere, setting the people against the people, the state.

a gift against a state, a group against a group.

Thus, it was assumed that the "icebreaker" - Hitler will open wide the gates of the continent for the invasion of the Marxist *terribles simplificateurs* ("terrible simplifiers" (French). — Approx. and help realize their dreams of ending the imperialist wars with the universal triumph of proletarian revolutions, during which the masses, despairing of the hardships and hardships of the war with Hitler, will finally rise up against the capitalist warmongers.

Suvorov proves that the Stalinist invasion of the West with the help of the Red Army was scheduled for the beginning of the summer of 1941. If his evidence were widely discussed, then readers, faced with a well-developed system of quotations from Soviet military historical sources, could begin to revise the entire previous history of the beginning of the war. And if the Suvorov evidence were subjected to verification, then

the above pseudo-historical version could be eventually refuted. For if Stalin really intended to attack the West at a moment of his own choosing, the reason he made the pact with Hitler in 1939 was not defensive, but part of an elaborate plan to end the European war of attrition with a political, social and economic destruction of the European powers.

Suvorov wrote military history and did not delve into the documents available at the time to find out the political reasons for Stalin's war plan. But in reality this plan of war had to have, and had, a political foundation.

It is obvious that the authors of the policy of aggressive war were Stalin and his closest associates in the Kremlin. The path they were following had been charted by Lenin, and it fell to their lot to put into practice the scheme of war and subsequent all-European revolution described above. We find reports of this in reliable sources from the Comintern. Besides the fact that Stalin was a member of his presidium, the leader of the Comintern, Georgy Dimitrov, was a frequent visitor to the Kremlin and was in regular contact with Stalin and with those representatives of his inner circle who personally conveyed the leader's decisions to the organs of political control, and in the case of Dimitrov, international political control. Long before Hitler attacked the USSR in June 1941, Stalin and his inner circle planned the outcome of the European war exactly as Suvorov described it almost fifty years later: the destruction of the warring powers from within as a result of mass discontent (which the Red Army would be able to encourage force) arising from war and its inevitable hardships. He prepared the Red Army to go into action as soon as the expected civil conflict—repeating the internal unrest and revolutions in the warring countries in 1917 and 1918—erupted in Western Europe behind the fronts of the warring armies of both the Allies and Germany.

Suvorov only sketched out a sketch of this risky plan. But now we have received information about him from three independent sources, each of which confirms the words of others, each tells what he himself heard from the lips of the Kremlin leaders and from other high-ranking Soviet figures.

Information from the most detailed of these sources

is simply ancient, by the standards of modern historiography. The most recent evidence (from the Comintern itself) supporting this plan has come to light quite recently, thanks to the opening of the party archives of the former Eastern Bloc. This terrifying plan for a march to the West was described by the leader of the Communist Party of Germany in exile in Moscow, a loyal Stalinist close to the executive committee of the Comintern. The message of this leader, copied in February 1941 by another source who knew Stalin, outlined the possible and then assumed by the Kremlin consequences of a war raging in the West, in which the Soviet Union was not then directly involved⁹.

Then, in February 1941, Walter Ulbricht, the German communist leader (later builder of the infamous Berlin Wall), told his comrades

about the exile about what I just learned: about the cry the Kremlin-specified possible scenarios for ending the war then going on in Western Europe¹⁰. One of them was the crazy undertaking of the world revolution, described above, supported by the Red Army. It is obvious that this outcome was the most favorable in the eyes of the Kremlin, since it was the only one of all those proposed that brought the Soviet Union the closest to achieving the outwardly political goals of the Bolsheviks.

We do not know how long this plan was developed by Stalin and his Kremlin gang¹². He envisioned Bolshevik agitators exploiting the crisis of civil society within the warring powers. The Kremlin was counting on the Red Army, following the model of 1917-1922, to come to the aid of the warring proletariat (or perhaps the imaginary warring proletariat) and the workers' and soldiers' revolutionary councils in the West. Revolutionary governments will be established throughout Europe. Lenin's plans for an international revolution as a consequence of the First World War will thus be carried out in the course of the Second World War.

Apart from the lack of convincing documentary

source of this political design, as evidence

There is another possible flaw in Suvorov's works. This dramatic scenario, given the preconditions implied by the plan for the Red Army's march to the west, does not at all coincide with the wartime conditions that existed during the period when Stalin, according to Suvorov, planned to attack Hitler: July 6, 1941. The fact is that at that time Hitler, who had not yet attacked the Soviet Union (which he actually did on June 22), must have been at the zenith of his military power. It was occupied, but only on a few minor battlefields due to the ongoing war against Britain. Based on this, one can doubt the validity of a number of important arguments of Suvorov, especially in the sequence of military actions he proposed. But today the general plan for the Red military invasion of the West is well known on the basis of historical evidence. So there is no reason to doubt him, without a preliminary refutation of these testimonies. In any case, the two historical concepts, one establishing the Kremlin's political intent and the other its military implementation, must be considered separately. The existence of the plan itself can today be considered proven thanks to the statements of its authors and their closest collaborators, although in the works of Suvorov it is not sufficiently substantiated¹³.

Today, the main military-historical aspect of Suvorov's arguments is confirmed by data that were not available to him at the time of writing *The Icebreaker*. And these data, obtained from the Soviet military archives and from other hitherto closed archives of the Eastern Bloc, deserve very close attention. It makes sense to cite the opinion of another Soviet military historian, V.I. Semidetko. When he began his study of the behavior of the Soviet army in the early summer of 1941, *The Results of the Battle in Belorussia*, he hardly imagined that he would come to the following conclusions.

Semidetko, most likely, did not know anything about Suvorov's work at that time. But, publishing in the Soviet *"Military toric journal"* the results of their searches in long-open Soviet military archives, he concluded that the reason why the German army so easily passed through the positions of the Red Army on the central front in Belarus in June 1941 (where both armies, attacking and defending, had approximately equal forces), was that the position of the Red Army was attacking¹⁴. This discovery, of course, is the main component of Suvorov's concept, formulated a few years earlier, explaining that very rout. Suvorov then said that the Red Army had been deployed to attack the west and was therefore positioned outside the defensive positions abandoned by the Kremlin's offensive doctrine. Therefore, the Red Army turned out to be very

vima during the offensive of the Germans, who, preempting Stalin, attacked first.

Other materials came into my hands, confirming the conclusions reached by Suvorov and Semidetko independently of each other (this independence is important in itself). One material is of Soviet diplomatic origin, completely independent of the military sources cited by Russian authors. The second, very different source contains the same amazing information! It is from the Czech archives, closed until recently to independent researchers.

Before the German attack, Moscow received warnings of German military preparations on the western Soviet border (many of them British of German and American origin, and one from Ger the Mannese ambassador in Moscow¹⁵), and Stalin apparently decided to calm the diplomatic circles and quiet the talk of a German invasion. Today we can only guess what his goals were.

The Kremlin sent an emissary, a leading Soviet magazine, to the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky

sheet (the source does not name him). Maisky, acting no doubt on instructions from Moscow, had long pretended to be independent, flirted with many political groups and individuals throughout democratic London, and conveyed to the British various, probably soothing, messages from Stalin. We know that on June 15 Maisky had a very lengthy meeting with a very senior British Foreign Office official. There they insistently urged him to convey to Moscow urgent warnings of an impending German attack. (The reader will remember how successful British interceptions of German communications were then.) The evidence that the British diplomat presented this time clearly shook Maisky's belief in his own superior's assertions for the first time. (The ambassador, who might have been recalled home to Moscow, certainly did not often question the words hailed as "the greatest genius of mankind.") After that, the British passed on to their allies as political intelligence a Stalinist message denying the possibility of a German attack. Three days later, a message from Moscow was recorded by at least one of them, Karel Erban, an analyst at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak National Committee (in exile), and handed over to the Czech leadership in London.

Erban reported that the Soviets were not afraid of the Germans, explaining the German concentration of forces on the Soviet borders as simply a test of the vigilance and readiness of a potential enemy. However, the Moscow emissary said, if necessary, they are ready to make many political and economic concessions in order to pay off Hitler, even with a temporary effect. There was open talk about allowing German military aid to be given to neutral Turkey (and consequently hinting at what Berlin had long wanted: Turkey's entry, voluntary or forced, into the German camp). Such a move, quite possibly expected after Hitler's recent successful campaigns in

Balkans, will not raise objections from Moscow. This meant Stalin's abandonment (at least temporarily) of traditional Russian interests in southeastern Europe, especially in Bulgaria and in the straits - interests that Stalin, with the help of Molotov, had recently sought to realize at the Soviet-German negotiations in Berlin in November 1940, to the obvious disgust of Hitler.

Stalin probably imagined that this kind of a German advance to the southwest would divert Hitler's attention away from the Soviet borders for some time (and stretch the Wehrmacht far to the southwest, creating a vulnerable Balkan flank), which had already happened in part during his Yugoslav, Greek and Cretan campaigns. (The rapid Soviet advance southward into Romania, which Suvorov considers necessary for Stalin's plan for an impending attack on Germany, would not only cut off Hitler's oil supply, but would trap the German armies in the south and east, preventing them from returning to home front to meet the forthcoming main Soviet attack in a westerly direction, through the former Poland.)

The emissary said that Stalin's plan to divert forces from a potential Nazi adversary and delay, for at the expense of Bulgaria, his advance directly to the east was also aimed at weakening both sides in the war, making sure that it lasted as long as possible. It is clear that if Hitler had accepted this bribe from Stalin, the British would have been further involved in the war in the Balkans and in the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet concessions in Turkey to lure the Germans to the southeast would have required Hitler to delay the attack until autumn. This would mean a postponement, for climatic reasons, until next spring. This would give the Red Army a chance to start first—if indeed, as Suvorov believes, Stalin had in mind to attack in 1941 (or even in 1942, according to another historian). The one who reported from the Kremlin reported that in Mo

The Swe had so little fear of the Germans that the Red Army had already taken up offensive rather than defensive positions.

There is a lot of startling information in this report, definitely unknown to the vast majority of students of the history of the Second World War and confirmed by other sources. This confirmation adds to the credibility of the source itself, which is thus a completely credible account of the amazing - and vulnerable - position of the Red Army in the week before the German attack on June 22, 1941.

Such data on the behavior of Soviet troops on the eve of Hitler's attack should certainly arouse renewed interest in Suvorov's controversial conclusions. Therefore, I consider it important to touch on Suvorov's work in more detail and I hope to explain why the majority of English-speaking readers interested in this war,

nothing is known about his point of view.

In fact, Suvorov's conclusions were disputed in the English press by only one author, Professor Gabriel Gorodetsky of Tel Aviv University. The exchange of arguments between Suvorov and Gorodetsky took place for the first time as early as 1986 in the Journal of the British Royal Services Institute [RUSI], a military periodical. Suvorov's concept was published outside Russian émigré circles only shortly before this exchange of opinions.

In deciding to publish Suvorov's article, the editors of RUSI magazine may have decided that its controversial nature required a quick rebuttal. Editors sometimes use this technique to absolve themselves of responsibility for a particularly unusual publication, in this case potentially pro-German in a certain sense. For Hitler himself, as was said before, justified his attack on the Soviet Union by saying that he had to strike east before the Soviets struck west. And what could be less politically correct, then and now, than to agree even in anything with the Nazi Fuhrer, about whom no one

(among adults and mentally fit) will not regret.

Another explanation is also possible: Gorodetsky read Suvorov's article and offered the editors his own to water as a refutation. By the way, Suvorov's arguments were disputed more than once on various grounds (for example, by the author of these lines, who wanted to know how the Kremlin's plan for a strike to the west, following the expected internal collapse in the warring countries, could be scheduled, according to Suvorov, for July 6 1941, when Hitler was at his most militarily strong and his empire relatively docile)²⁰. But the historian Gorodetsky did not then try to refute Suvorov's arguments, even his strange timing of the Soviet attack, using his own sources as a counterbalance to Suvorov's military historical sources. Instead, he quoted diplomatic notes of Soviet origin, which, of course, were carefully selected and edited - and extremely unreliable. And he didn't use

shaft no arguments to refute suvo

Rov's judgments about the Kremlin's political plan behind the military plans. So, Gorodetsky never really challenged Suvorov's claim that Stalin had, above all else, a political plan to go west. He simply ignored the political aspect. It follows that, although some of Gorodetsky's diplomatic arguments are informative and interesting, he did not cross intellectual swords with Suvorov on any of his most important arguments. Gorodetsky, and in his later writings on the same subject, did not show the slightest awareness of the existence of published documents indicating that there was a thorough political plan for the intervention of the Soviets in the situation in the West.²¹

In contrast to the almost complete silence of the English-speaking reviewers, who may have played a role in the belated appearance of the English translation of Suvorov's book (five years after his article in RUSI), the German translation of *The Icebreaker*, published in 1989,

My early book version of his research (with a somewhat different subtitle, "Hitler in Stalins Kalku22") received very serious reviews. Among the reviewers were two very knowledgeable scholars of the period, Alexander Fischer, professor at the University of Bonn (recently deceased, formerly a member of an important parliamentary commission for the re-study of the German past), and Günther Gillessen, long-term historical editor of Germany's most prestigious newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemei Ne zeitung". Professor Fischer, author of many books and collections of documents on the diplomacy of the period, including Soviet diplomacy, found Suvorov's book bold - but not convincing. However, he tactfully refrained from making a final verdict, correctly noting that a real decision required an examination of what the Soviet archives might reveal. Editor Gil

lessen described the book as too polemical and, echoing

Fisher, which is not convincing enough, as based on exclusively circumstantial evidence²³.

The reader who is familiar with the tragic modern history of Germany and understands what a huge responsibility is imposed by the need for a historical and legal explanation of events that burden the past of several generations of the German people will understand how careful German authors must be when evaluating historical works that can in any way positively highlight the actions of the former German Fuhrer.

The essence of what might be called an unspoken agreement between serious German writers is the assertion that attempts to reduce the responsibility of the Germans for the war should not be treated lightly. At all costs, the method of reducing historical responsibility should be avoided, which could lead to a too literal perception of Suvorov's arguments and reasoning close to them. The recent long, at times merciless, discussion in the German press about the sources of Hitler's criminal behavior (including

attempts to find these sources outside of Germany), the so-called "battle of the historians" (Historikerstreit)²⁴, clearly showed how painful historical discussions can be in a German society tormented by feelings of guilt, reaching almost spiritual self-destruction. From this point of view, one can consider the critical reserve of both German reviewers regarding the validity of Suvorov's arguments (which undoubtedly deserve considerable skepticism). Thus, in Germany, extreme caution, dictated by the terrible events of the German past, had the same censoring effect as in the English-speaking

countries has produced a marked lack of interest in revisiting this part of the past.

The very fact that the first translation of Suvorov's research appeared in Germany is important not only for historiography. The publication of Suvorov's work in German as a book indicates that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact plays a central role in the ongoing, albeit limited, German public discussions on the history of the Second World War. The publication of the book made it possible to rediscover a topic that had almost never been discussed and seemed to be completely resolved thanks to the many years of domination (and in Germany too) of a single interpretation of the events of the beginning of World War II²⁶.

How could Hitler start the war he so desperately wanted in 1939 if the Soviet Union had actively supported military aid, or at least

military supplies and food of the country on their western flank, which blocked German aggression directed eastward into the Soviet Union? Even Hitler would most likely not have taken such a risk, having strong opponents from the West. But if this eternally risky adventurer had gone on a campaign anyway, it would have been a completely different war, different allies, different terms, and not those that we know.

Recently, a new book by Suvorov has appeared with new, carefully developed proofs of his argument.

dov, and there is ongoing international discussion on topics related to its work. The evidence for his version is getting stronger. Therefore, these topics are being discussed more and more widely, although, oddly enough, so far outside the front pages of historical forums in English-speaking countries. The current discussion in Europe was stimulated by the appearance of Suvorov's first book in Poland and Russia²⁷. One could imagine the popularity of the Polish edition in post-communist, newly liberated Poland. After all, the Second World War is a central event in the recent history of Poland. The Poles were the first and ultimately the most unfortunate victims of the Soviet-Nazi alliance from 1939 to 1941. Half of their pre-war territory was taken over by Stalin, countless Polish citizens ended up in Stalin's and Hitler's camps (most of the many millions of Jews killed in German death camps were citizens of Poland), from 1944 to 1989 they were prisoners of a tyrannical regime invented by Stalin and his friends for them - and intended for everyone and everyone whom the Red Army was able to drive into their camp. That the Poles have shown great historical interest in their longest-running—for centuries—traditional tormentor, Russia, will come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the history of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Russian edition of Suvorov's 1992 book *The Icebreaker* is especially important for discussing the fate of his ideas, as it has clearly helped to bring the discussion of Stalin's supposed war plan to the center of the historical debate about Stalin and Stalinism in Russia today.

The Russian edition of Suvorov appeared only in 1992, and after that, three articles on the same topic appeared in post-Soviet historical journals. The leading journal *Otechestvennaya Istoriya* published a Russian translation of an article by the German military historian Joachim Hoffmann "Preparation by the Soviet Union for an Offensive War in 1941"²⁸. Approximately at the same

At the same time, a second article appeared in *Modern and Contemporary History*, "Did Stalin Prepare a Preemptive Strike against Hitler in 1941?"²⁹. Its author, Colonel General Yu.A. Gorkov, considered a plan called "Considerations for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies", found some time before in the former Soviet archives. This plan, prepared in May 1941 by General of the Army (later Marshal) G.K. Zhukov, was published in a short form in the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, avid for sensation.

Hoffmann's article is a study, completely independent of Suvorov's, proving that Stalin was going to attack the West in 1941. It appeared for the first time in 1991 in a collection of articles in German called "Two Ways to Moscow" [*Zwei Wege Nach Moskau . Vom Hitler-Stalin Pakt zum "Unternehmen Barbarossa"*]³¹. Professor Gorodetsky was included in the same collection, sitting next to Hoffman in printed form, with the intention of refuting Suvorov (and reinforcing the impression that some editors fear that historians who suspect Stalin of aggressive intentions would not be left alone and undisputed). Oddly enough, essentially the same article of his, with some additions, had been published two years earlier in the German historical journal *Vierteljahrshäfte für Zeitgeschichte*. There Gorodetsky once again spoke about Suvorov and, just as passionately as in his previous attacks on him, undertook to smash Suvorov's assumption that Stalin had an offensive plan (this time calling it "the latest, most extreme and most inaccurate description of those events")³². But again the attack was directed at the Russian emigrant, and not at the nearest neighbor in the Hoffman collection, whose article remained unmentioned.

Hoffman's work supports many of Suvorov's discoveries. But Gorodetsky clearly did not see it, with the exception of the much earlier (1983) and less finished

versions. Gorodetsky again comes to his anti-Suvorov conclusions without considering any military-historical sources of Hoffman (in the last

article - mainly German reports on interrogations with Veteran prisoners of war) and also without criticizing the military historical sources cited by Suvorov. Moreover, Gorodetsky wrote, obviously unaware of the long-published materials of the Kremlin war³³. These plans (which, as noted above, Suvorov also omitted) have been widely available in English since ^{plans} 1954. Instead, Gorodetsky rejected the very idea that such thinking—not defensive—existed in the Kremlin, identifying it with the ideas that were created (by anti-Stalinists, presumably) “at the height of the Cold War.”³⁴ And in the area where new historical sources and

surprises appeared almost daily, he brought in support for his last refutation of Suvorov only materials published at least two years before the German publication of "Two Ways to Moscow". And, relying on such a fragile base, Gorodetsky nevertheless declared "absurd" the assertion that Stalin was planning an offensive in a westerly direction. Without noticing a few recent posts putting

On the basis of Soviet sources, the assumption that Stalin's political intentions from 1939 to 1941 were kind and defensive is called into question, reports provided back in 1989 and 1990 by Soviet historians V.I. Dashichev and M.I. Semiryaga, Gorodetsky came to the conclusion (not true, as the reader already knows) that “there are absolutely no witnesses [testifying] about Stalin's intentions”³⁵.

Gorodetsky linked interest in Suvorov in Germany with an attempt to exonerate Germany. He claimed that the book's popularity in Germany (as opposed to its virtual obscurity in England, France and, he might add, the US) stemmed from covert neo-Nazi support for it. In fact, if Professor Gorodetsky followed the solid German bibliography in

this area of research, he would have known that the German historical interest in the war on the Eastern Front (and in Eastern Europe in general, judging by German academic works on Slavic topics - in contrast to, say, French ones) for many years was greater than somewhere in Europe, if for no other reason than for obvious geographical reasons. So, the position of Gorodetsky as a historian is very strange. The researcher might be expected to be committed to the idea of an open exchange of opinions, rather than keeping them quiet. This fate, which befell Suvorov's English editions, is indirectly welcomed by Gorodetsky³⁶.

Colonel General Gorkov's article is interesting in that he denies that the plan for the Soviet attack on the West in May 1941 (which he himself publishes) was something more than just a counterattack plan, in view of the well-known German preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. While emphasizing the defensive nature of the Soviet war plan, Gorkov denies that the Soviets had an additional plan to seize territory after the planned thrust to the west, a thrust whose success would have taken them inside Germany, as far as Breslau and Danzig.

It is impossible to imagine that this additional Soviet plan did not exist. How could both sides have left the Red Army in its positions inside Germany after such initial military achievements - if Zhukovsky's plan had succeeded? Would the Red Army be left to simply occupy most of East Germany and what had previously been Nazi-occupied central or even western Poland? Should the Red Army, after successfully advancing westward, hold fast to the new line of defense, waging a war of attrition against the Germans—a war backed by the Kremlin's enormous manpower and raw materials—until the German home front collapsed and the Red Army will not move west again, this time almost unhindered?

But even in the unlikely event that Stalin meant peace rather than international revolution, the Soviets would certainly need a military-political plan for a final, negotiated retreat from the front in central-eastern Europe to the Soviet borders, after Hitler will be beaten and peace will reign. The Red Army could not simply march a few hundred miles into well-armed Nazi Germany, as suggested by Zhukov's plan, and then return to their original positions. What for? Somewhere, at some level, there must have been other plans with some political result of a successful invasion, provided for by the plan that Gorkov reported.

However, Gorkov shows no understanding that the military plan he is discussing could have anything to do with the Kremlin's plans for the time that follows the supposed success of the Western campaign. He also appears ignorant of Stalin's penchant for political adventurism, a penchant discussed even in Soviet historical publications (and elsewhere) by Gorkov's Russian colleagues Dashichev and Semiryaga (and a few others).

Gorkov's 1993 article is nonetheless important because, like the Russian translation of Hoffmann's article, it placed the issue of Stalin's war plans right at the center of Russia's lively discussions of a key period in the Soviet past. Gorkov's work concerns both Suvorov and a number of journalistic articles in the Russian press about Stalin's military plans,

and a round table on the subject, held in May

1992 in Moscow at the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation³⁷.

The third article, placed in No. 1 of the *"Patriotic history"* for 1994, also focuses on Suvorov. The purpose of the author is obvious: to present mainly the opinions of numerous German critics of Hoffman and Suvorov (ignoring, like almost all other such authors,

post-Soviet historians proving Stalin's aggressive intentions). But the author, A.I. Boroznyak, however, notes that some of the critics, such as Professor Fischer, argue that the issue cannot be resolved until the Soviet archives, many of

which even today are closed to independent researchers for obvious political reasons, will not be carefully studied³⁸. Recently, the same *Otechestvennaya istoriya* published several articles by Russian historians, which were released into archives open to independent researchers, while the Central Presidential Archive is inaccessible. The gist of the findings of three of them is that Soviet military doctrine encouraged "imperialist" wars and that Stalin radically changed the direction of Soviet propaganda in the winter of 1941 (when Walter Ulbricht broke news to German party comrades about the possible Red Army support for the revolution in the West) : from condemning all "imperialist" wars to supporting an offensive war³⁹.

Discussion of Stalin's role in unleashing the war is now going on both in the West and in the East, although some historians are determined to interrupt this discussion, calling it "absurd" to challenge the traditional vision of Stalin's plans as peace-loving. A discussion of the arguments of Suvorov and other researchers about Stalin's aggressive plans should help in the coming years.

return this topic to the mainstream of world scientific disputes. Their place is there, especially given the tendency of some post-Soviet historians, as well as Stalin's defenders in the West, to preemptively dismiss his responsibility for the misfortunes of World War II.

The time has come for conscientious historical discussions based on open access to the archives and leading to an honest understanding of the Soviet past and the Soviet policy that led the USSR to disaster both on the domestic and international arena. This is especially important given the tendency of the current Russian government towards military solutions to crises and

to the shameless use of threats, both with weaker neighbors and even with the United States.

Translation from English by Misha Shauli.

Notes

1 A brief review of Suvorov's book was written, along with a review of D. Watt's (see text and footnote 2) and other books of the same period, in the New York Review of Books, October 12, 1989, 11-16, retired professor Gordon Craig of Stanford University. But Craig was writing for the American reader about the German edition—the English edition had not yet been published. Craig, who had worked for many years in the field of German history but had little interest in Soviet or East European topics, both military and otherwise, of the Stalinist period, found Suvorov's arguments insufficient. Craig expressed the opinion that if Stalin was really going to attack in a western direction in 1941, as Suvorov believes, then Western military attaches and diplomats in Moscow would have reported it. He did not find "any record of this in the documents of foreign embassies or in the reports of their military attachés." Even if we assume that Craig rummaged through documents and reports in many relevant archives, he must have had Western documents and reports in mind, since in 1989 many archives of the former Eastern Bloc were not yet open to Western and other independent researchers. Moreover, a researcher who has worked with Western diplomatic documents from Moscow should be aware that in Stalin's paranoid and far-flung secretive state, foreign diplomats and military observers could not move freely around the Soviet Union, and especially its newly occupied western border regions. To make your observations. Many Western diplomats mentioned these distressing circumstances in their reports. Therefore, this argument against Suvorov is hardly effective.

2 New York, 1989.

3 See Ralf Georg Reuth, Goebbels (translated from German, New York), entry in Goebbels' diary, June 16, 1941. In February 1945, Hitler repeated that Stalin was going to attack in a westerly direction. See Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin* (translated from English, Berlin, 1991), SS. 924-26, 939, 941.

4 Apparently, many authors took advantage of the commercial opportunity presented by the fiftieth anniversary of the war in 1989 to write books about 1939. When the whirlwind of disclosures broke out in early 1988 in the USSR, and shortly thereafter in the rest of the Eastern Bloc, they apparently did not know what was happening there, or were bound by treaties or other obligations that forced them to complete the work by the anniversary of the end of wars (i.e.

almost by 1989). New materials, vital for understanding the history of the origin of the war, were left out of consideration.

For leaders of Western diplomacy campaigning to believe in Stalin's defensive intentions, see RCRaack, *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945. The Origins of the Cold War* (Stanford, 1955), 55, 89.

5 *Observer*, May 5, 1990, 30. The book was ignored by major academic and specialist (Slavic) journals. In the US, there were reviews in only two relatively obscure military journals. In both cases, the reviewers rejected Suvorov's arguments: one very emphatically (*The Journal of Soviet*

Military Studies, 4[1991]:195-97); the second review was brief, in *Air Force Magazine* 7[1991]:55. The *JSMS* reviewer wrote that the German military documents did not support Suvorov's conclusions that the Soviets were unprepared, and that Stalin rejected Zhukovsky's pre-emptive strike plan. See footnote 26 for a discussion of the work of the German military historian Joachim Hoffmann, whose arguments partly support Suvorov on the basis of the same German sources. See also the discussion of Zhukovsky's plan in the text. In Britain, the book was not peer-reviewed in two of the most important academic

journals specializing in Slavonic studies.

6 Igor Lukes successfully disproved in several articles the notion that Stalin wanted to provide the Czechoslovaks with serious military assistance in 1938. See articles by Lukes "Did Stalin Want War in 1938? A New Look at Soviet Behavior During the May and September Crises, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 2 (1991): 2-53; and Benesch, Stalin und die Komintern 1938/1939. Vom Munchener Abkommen zum Hitler-Stalin Pakt, *Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte*, Jg. 1993 Heft 3 325-353.

7 Gorbachev in *Pravda*, November 3, 1987. What follows is a small but representative selection of works by both popular and academic authors who support the view of Stalin on the defensive. Not all authors agree with each other on all the details of the above version. But the essence, i.e. that Stalin's intentions in 1939 were defensive is present everywhere, explicitly or hinted at. See Winston S. Churchill, "The Gathering Storm" in *The Second World War*, I (Boston, 1948), 391-94; Arnold J. and Veronica Toynbee, eds., "The Eve of War, 1939" *Survey of International Affairs* 10 (London, 1958): 23, 25, 504; AJP Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (New York, 1968), 163-64, 241, 261, 263, 267, 278; DC Watt, *How War Came. The Immediate Origins of the Second World War* (London, 1989), 112-113, 117-119, 369-370, 372-373; Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, *Total War. The Causes and Course of the Second World War* (second ed., Harmsworth, 1989), 71, 96-100, 106; Hermann Graml, *Europas Weg in den Krieg. Hitler und die Machte 1939* (Munich, 1990), 251. Contrasting with the authors above, James E. Macsherry, (Stalin, Hitler and Europe. *The Origins of World War II, 1933-1939*, vol.

II (Cleveland, 1970) paid due attention to Soviet sources, existing at the time he wrote, but nonetheless optimistically concluded (long before the recent discovery of sources and archival

of the former Eastern Bloc) that "it is relatively easy to formulate a clear picture of Soviet foreign policy in 1938 and 1939." Until recently, Stalin's defensive intentions in 1939 were presented as undeniable by Jonathan Haslam: Jonathan Haslam, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1939-1941: Isolation and Expansion*, Soviet Union 18 (1991): 106.

8 See my article "Stalin's Plans for World War II" in *Journal of Contemporary History*, 26 (1991): 215-27.

9 Report by Walter Ulbricht in the *Stiftung der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv* (Berlin), Wilhelm Pieck Nachlass 36/528: "Politischer Informationsabend am 21.2. 1941". Pieck also noted that Ulbricht had spoken at the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern just before that. See also *Did Stalin Plan a Drang nach Westen?* in *World Affairs*, 155 (1992), 13-22; especially important - "Afterword", 22.

10 The reader will probably remember that in February 1941, when Ulbricht recounted this, the Soviets were involved in several undeclared wars connected with the general European war formally declared by Britain and France after the German invasion of Poland in September 1939- go. The Soviets had several serious skirmishes with Japan on the Manchurian border in the late summer of 1939. They invaded Poland in late summer and early autumn of that year, in collaboration with Hitler, then did the same in Finland without his help. A few months later they annexed the Baltic countries and the Romanian provinces of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union by military threat. But too many historians, often seeing events from

From 1938 to 1945, exclusively through glasses made in Western Europe and the USA, they saw the connection between Soviet adventurism in the east and the German war in the much more familiar west of Europe.

11 The most accessible of several reports, if the reader does not understand Lithuanian, is the testimony of former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Vinkas Kreve-Mickevicius, translated into English by the US Congress, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Communist Aggression, Third Interim Report (Washington , DC, 1954), 340-45, 451-63. J. Edgar Hoover provided an apparently independent account of him from one of the "highest Russian sources", A.A. Berle on June 17, 1940 in United States National Archives, M982, R25. See also Grigorii A. Tokaev, *Stalin Means War* (London, 1951), chapter 2, *passim*.

¹² Most likely from the very first days of the Bolshevik rule in Russia, since this plan generally duplicates the recently published Leninist idea of a war against Poland: V.I. Lenin, "I ask you to write down less: this should not get into print," Historical archive, no. 1/1992, 12-30; see also Joachim Hoffmann, *Stalins Vernichtungskrieg, 1941-1945* (Munich, 1995), 18.

13 See RC Raack, *Stalin's Plans for World War II*, *passim*, and the same author, *Stalin's Plans for World War II Told by a High Comintern Source*, *The Historical Journal* 38 (1995).

14 V.I. Semidetko. The origins of the defeat in Belarus, No. 4/1989, 1-30.

15 S.A. Gorlov in *Novoye Vremya*, No. 8/1991, 38-39 and V.V. Sokolov, "A diplomatic move in the name of peace", *Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR*, No. 20/1990, 57-58.

16 Gabriel Gorodetsky, "Was Stalin Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941", *RUSI Journal* (June 1986): 71-72.

¹⁷ Dated June 18, 1941, found in the Archiv ministerstva zahranicnich veci' in Prague, file 4-70-114.

18 Joachim Hoffmann, "Die Angriffsvorbereitungen der Sowjetunion 1941" in Bernd Wegner, ed., *Zwei Wege nach Moskau. Vom Hitler-Stalin Pakt bis zum "Unternehmen Barbarossa"* (Munich 1991), 367-388.

19 Viktor Suvorov, "Who was Planning to Attack Whom in June 1941, Hitler or Stalin?" *RUSI Journal*, (June 1985): 50-55; Gorodetsky, *ibid.*, June 1986, 69-72; and again, Suvorov, "Yes, Stalin Was Planning to Attack Hitler in June 1941", *ibid.*, 73-74.

20 At a conference in the Italian resort of Bellagio to commemorate the anniversary of the German attack, at least four historians touched directly on the subject, but only two spoke of Stalin's plan for an attack on the west—and both rejected the idea. The German Gerd Ueberschar spoke of "Hitler's Decision to Attack the Soviet Union in Recent German Historiography" (published in *Soviet Union 18* [1991]: 297-316). He cited Suvorov's articles in *RUSI* magazine, Suvorov's and Hoffman's book (on the latter, see footnote 18) and criticized the arguments of both. Alexander Dallin's report was entitled "Stalin and the German Invasion" (printed in the same issue of *Soviet Union 18*, 19-37). Dallin remarked that "the notion of a possible Soviet attack on Germany in 1941 (or 1942) is absurd ... a completely untenable hypothesis" (*ibid.*, 20). He cites Suvorov's articles, but not Hoffman's book or article. Dallin called Gorodetsky's article in Wegner's collection (see footnote 21) "a masterful rebuttal" (*ibid.*). He did not say anything about the arguments and evidence in favor of his assertion. Karl Drexler

(Karl Drechsler), a historian from the former East Germany, in his report "Germany and its Allies and the War against the Soviet Union, 1940-1942", (*ibid.*, 39-58) did not address this issue, which is obviously important for the topic of his work. So did the British scientist Jonathan Gaslam (see footnote 7).

²¹ Gabriel Gorodetsky, "Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion", in Wegner, 347-366.

²² Stuttgart, 1989.

23 Fischer in *Das historisch-politische Buch*, 1989, 117; Gillissen in "Politische Bücher", *FAZ*, 27 April 1989.

24 See discussion in Charles S. Maier, *The Unmastered Past* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).

25 In Ernst Topitsch, *Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory on the Origins of the Second World War* (translated from German, London, 1984), containing early versions of theses similar to Suvorov's, there is no research material based on military documentation

or other sources that can convince the author of these lines that it presents something more than a hypothesis.

26 The apparent self-censorship of German historians writing on this subject, and harming historical research, is described by Günther Gillessen in his review of Joachim Hoffmann's *Stalin's War of Annihilation* (see footnote 12) as "linked to political interests and manifested in a voluntary denial of professional knowledge".

27 *Lodolamacz* (Warsaw, 1991) and *Icebreaker* (Moscow, 1992).

28 Issue 4/1993, 19-31, published a translation from the German of this article from Wegner, 367-388.

29 In Issue 3/1993, 29-45. An excerpt from a 1970 book by two German authors, published in VIZH ("Did Stalin plan a war against Hitler?" 6/1991, 26-33), also belongs to the same topic, writing at a time when important materials were not yet known, and rejected the version that Hitler was forced to start a preventive war. It seemed to me that the editors of the magazine were very eager to publish anything they wanted to refute this view.

30 "Schukows Angriffsplan", *Der Spiegel*, 24/1991, 148

31 See footnote 15. The collection was recently published in English.

32 Wegner Miscellany, footnote 1. Gorodetsky also attacks in the same Wegner Miscellany Hoffmann's article from 1983 ("Der Rote Armee bis Kriegsbeginn 1941", in Horst Boog et al., *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, IV* [Stuttgart, 1983], 56-75) as having "no substantive evidence".

33 See footnote 11.

34 An article by Gorodetsky under a heading similar to that which appeared in Wegner's collection *Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Legende vom deutschen Praeventativschlag*, in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg. 37 (1989): 645-72. Attribution of guilt to Gorodetsky on the basis of chronological commonality - in the collection of Wegner, footnote 13.

35 VI Dashichev, "Der Pakt der beiden Banditen", and "Stalin hat den Krieg gewollt", in *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, 21 and 28 April 1989; and M.I. Semiryaga, "September 17, 1939", *Soviet Slavonic Studies*, 5 (1990): 14, and "The Soviet Union and the Pre-War Political Crisis", *Questions of History* 9 (1990): 54-61. Two famous American experts, Robert Conquest and Robert Tucker

(Robert C. Tucker), also skeptical of Stalin's supposed defensive plans, were, like Hoffman, under attack in a journal article (p. 646, note 3, p. 658, note 40). Gorodetsky states that the notion that Stalin had expansionist plans and that he was going to take over Central and Eastern Europe is long outdated (Wegner Miscellany, p. 363, footnote 13). In 1977, Tucker expressed the opinion that Stalin's territorial plans for international Bolshevism date back to Lenin. See "The Emergence of Stalin's Foreign Policy", in *Slavic Review*, 36 [1977]: 588-589).

36 In an article published in a journal (footnote 34, pp. 645-648), Go

Rodetsky clearly rejoices at Suvorov's obscurity in English-speaking countries (p. 646); Gorodetsky outrageously links Suvorov's popularity with the "revisionist" part of the participants in the "battle of the historians" in Germany (ibid., 645-646). It seems quite obvious that historians must extract facts, set out in writing

them and critically examine arguments based on them without attributing "politically incorrect" motives to those with whom they intellectually disagree.

37 Gorkov, p. 29.

38 "June 22, 1941: a view from the other side," in issue 1/1994, 148-156. The author Borozniak, who openly admires the fact that the Germans (at least some) are so eager to justify Stalin (and the Russians), clearly does not understand that some German critics of the idea of Hitler's preventive war are making the same fatal mistake as American "revisionist" historians writing about the Cold War: they are trying to unravel Stalin's plans by studying only their own archives. But this is obviously a vicious method, although its inevitably detrimental results have not prevented their publishers from selling many books.

39 See issue 1/1995, L.H. Nezhinsky and I.A. Chelyshev, "On the doctrinal foundations of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War", 3-27, and in issue 2/1995, V.A. Nevezhin, "Stal's speech on May 5, 1941 and an apology for an offensive war", 54-69, and M.I. Meltyukhov, "Ideological documents of May-June 1941 on the events of the Second World War", 70-85.

*Jahangir Najafov**

HOW G. GORODETSKII REFUTES
V. Suvorov, OR A REMAKE
OF "FALSIFFERS OF HISTORY" (1948)

1. "A vital task"

The book by the Israeli historian G. Gorodetsky "The Myth of the Icebreaker"¹ attracted my attention in connection with my work on the topic of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. Representing, in the words of the author, the "crown" of his fifteen years of efforts to study international relations in 1939-1941 (p. 4)². With a promise to say a non-trivial word in the historiography of the Second World War. And - what is remarkable: the events described are considered from the angle of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, but the actual basis of the book is British archival materials and literature. With a noticeable shortage of sources of the Soviet and post-Soviet times, even official publications of documents.

Coverage of issues that form the theme of the council of the German-German pact, the subject of my research interest, is narrowed down to the limit in The Myth of the Icebreaker, as was practiced in Soviet historiography. We have to recall the facts and documents omitted by its author.

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¹Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker": On the eve of the war. Translation from English. M., 1995.350 p.

²hereinafter, references to the book by G. Gorodetsky are given directly
directly in the text of the article.

The strangeness of the "Myth of the Icebreaker"¹ is due to its purpose to substantiate a special historical vision of the Second World War. Rejecting the idea of V. Suvorov's *The Icebreaker* that the Stalinist Soviet Union hoped to take advantage of Germany's anti-Western aggressive potential to undermine European capitalism², G. Gorodetsky hastily, without

due attention to cause and effect relationships

events, moves on to the peculiarly interpreted circumstances of the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Behind the individual "actual events" with which he operates, global phenomena are not visible, the historical process as such disappears.

G. Gorodetsky tries to achieve his goal in two ways:

First, by ignoring the prerequisites and underlying causes of the general conflict on the grounds that this leads "far away from the actual events that led to the war in the East" (p. 13). The search for historical truth within the framework of the diplomatic aspect of the topic is opposed to painstaking work on identifying the "theoretical foundations and ideological roots" of the world war (ibid.), of which the Eastern Front was an integral part. The kind of work that V. Suvorov decided on. In general, the entire exposition is based on the antithesis of the world and Soviet-German wars. As a result, the official Soviet concept is actually reanimated, which reduces the essence of the world war primarily to a military confrontation between the

socialism and capitalism.

Secondly, by the assertion that in the critical period

¹ The oddities of the "Myth of the Icebreaker" have already been the subject of public analysis: See, for example: *Nevezhin V.A.* Stalin's choice of 1941: defense or ... "the slogan of an offensive war"? (Regarding the book by G. Gorodetsky "The Myth of the Icebreaker"). // National history. 1996. No. 3. S. 55-73.

² *Suvorov V.* "Icebreaker. Who started World War II? M., 1992; M day. When did World War II start? Continuation of the book "Icebreaker". M., 1994.

After the outbreak of the world war, the only concern of the Stalinist leadership was "to protect the Russian revolution" (p. 47). I.V. Stalin is credited with the dubious honor of a conductor of such a foreign policy, which "*was dictated by national interests, and not by principles or moral factors, like policy of his Western partners*" (p. 57. *My italics.*).

The preference given to the foreign policy of the Stalinist Soviet Union is reinforced by doubts that the Western slogan of "destroying Nazism" reflected the true aims of England in the war (p. 86). Recalls the characterization of this slogan as "criminal stupidity" voiced by V.M. Molotov during the years of Soviet-German cooperation¹. Although later the Soviet Union acceded to the F. Roosevelt-W. Churchill Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, with its demand for "the final destruction of Nazi tyranny"². The question also arises: was it possible to effectively defend the national interests of the Soviet Union, discarding both principles and morality?

In the author's scheme, Comrade Stalin is given the role of an extra at the stage of both preparation and unleashing of a general armed conflict. Consideration of the system of world coordinates of the Stalinist leadership is replaced by a bold statement that "*from the very From the beginning*, Soviet foreign policy was characterized by a gradual but consistent transition from outright hostility towards capitalism

¹ On the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Report of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

October 31, 1939 // Pravda. November 1, 1939 The fact that this assessment belongs to Stalin became known from his editing of the text of the article "Peace or War?", Which was published in the newspaper Izvestia on October 9, 1939 in support of Hitler's "peace proposals", in his speech in the Reichstag on October 6, 1939 // Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). F. 558. Op. 11. D. 1123. L. 35.

² Declaration of the Government of the USSR at the Inter-Allied Conference in London. Foreign policy of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War. Documents and materials. T. 1. M., 1944. S. 144-148.

countries to peaceful coexistence with them, based on mutual benefit" (p. 33. *My italics.*).

In this case, it is not clear why the Soviet leaders, more than twenty years after the October Revolution, continued to consider themselves in a "hostile capitalist environment" and why the outside world did not notice this transformation, still seeing the USSR as a threat to itself. It is also not clear how to evaluate

such Leninist-Stalinist definitions that served to characterize the place and role of the Soviet state in the system of international relations, as the incompatibility of the long coexistence of the "two systems" and the regularity of the permanent aggravation of the "ideological struggle" between them. It was as if there had never been a total confrontation between Soviet socialism and Western democracy that had been growing for decades, which reached its climax in the Cold War and led to the collapse of the Soviet communist empire and the collapse of the USSR itself¹.

It is not surprising that G. Gorodetsky is not limited to the proclaimed goal - the refutation (as it seems to him) of V. Suvorov's "Icebreaker". The Israeli historian disputes - *and this he emphasizes time and time again* - the key provisions in the works of "most historians", even more often - all "other historians" (pp. 3, 12, 45,

50-51, 94, 98, etc.). Therefore, in interpreting the political and diplomatic events on the eve of the World War, V. Suvorov most often finds himself together with "other historians", while G. Gorodetsky is against it.

The rejection of the author of the "Myth of the Icebreaker" is caused by the works of Russian historians, who in recent years have paid great attention to the problem of the origin of the Second World War and its initial stage. However, he believes, this has only led to the fact that "the former" blank spots "are now filled with a set of lies, tendentious collections of facts that the public

¹See more details: *Najafov D.G. On the historical and geopolitical legacy of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. // The truth of Viktor Suvorov. Restoring the history of World War II - 2. M., 2007. S. 33-80.*

inclined to take it for truth" (p. 3). Therefore, G. Gorodetsky considered it "*his vital task*" to give such a description of the critical events of 1939-1941, so that the Russian reader would get "the opportunity to navigate in all the variety of facts of the past, to see them exactly as they were ..." (pp. 4. Italics mine.). All this, mind you, is about the period of Gorbachev's perestroika and the first years of the existence of democratic Russia, when domestic scholars got the opportunity to rethink the legacy of historiography, forced for decades to serve the needs of a totalitarian system.

He reinforces his vision of the fateful changes that have come in our country - for an Israeli historian this is a "time of troubles" - he recommends not abandon the "Soviet period", not opposed to to challenge the historical experience of the Soviet Union with the archaism of pre-revolutionary Russia (p. 18). He also urges our historians not to disturb the memory of those who died in the war against Nazi Germany, to close for the time being (it is not specified until when) the topic of Soviet foreign policy of the period under consideration (p. 3). As we see, G. Gorodetsky does not refuse himself in this occupation. Such an understanding of the purpose of his book does not fit well with the proclaimed readiness to be guided by the principle of objectivity, and not by political or ideological interests.

Thus, the "Myth of the Icebreaker" was conceived and realized with the Russian reader in mind. The participants in the action are, on the one hand, our public, which tends to take for truth a "set of lies" and "tendentiously selected facts", on the other hand, a historian-educator, a guru in his field.

At the same time, the abundance of inconsistencies and inconsistencies in the text of the book leaves a lasting impression of English Wishful Thinking: the formation of ideas based not on objective analysis, but in accordance with one's own preferences. Before us, at best, is a version of Anglo-Soviet relations, that is, a fragment of international

relations between 1939 and 1941 are outside the diversity of the historical process.

Be that as it may, "The myth of the Icebreaker did not produce the effect that its author had hoped for. More than once I have heard and read opinions that the book of the Israeli historian is in no way a refutation of V. Suvorov's Icebreaker. To refute his work, says one of his fellow historians, one should

to call the inconsistency of hundreds and hundreds of facts. According to some evidence, on one of his visits to Moscow, G. Gorodetsky expressed dissatisfaction with the way his book was being distributed - not as widely as the work of V. Suvorov. Apparently, therefore, he continued his criticism, reissuing under a different title, in fact, the same opus, which did not add any persuasiveness to his position. Moreover, the oddities of the first book carried over into the second.

Finally, *the most amazing*. Imagine, The Myth of the Icebreaker frankly defends the provisions of the 1948 pamphlet Falsifiers of History, a memorable propaganda product of the escalating Cold War. Provisions on the purely defensive pre-war foreign policy of the Soviet Union, on its invariable commitment to collective security, on the Western policy of provocative inciting Germany against the Soviet Union, on the double game of the Western powers in the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, on the international isolation of the USSR on the eve of world war, which forced him to agree to a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, and so on. Before us is the printed legacy of an official publication that for many years imposed on Soviet historians Stalin's foreign policy guidelines. So G. Gorodetsky realizes his call not to abandon the "Soviet period".

But did he succeed in exposing the author of the Icebreaker and in

¹ See Gorodetsky G. Fatal self-deception. Stalin and the Ger attack mania for the Soviet Union. M., 2001.

² History falsifiers. (Historical reference.) M., 1948.

the same time to refute the work of "other historians"? To reinforce the theses of Soviet historiography controlled by the authorities on the role of the USSR on the eve of and with the outbreak of World War II? What is the result of the challenge thrown down to almost the entire community of historians, with a claim to reconsider the critical version of the pre-war foreign policy of the Stalinist Soviet Union, established in world historiography - critical for its role in unleashing the world war? And isn't this the reason for the original techniques and style used in *The Myth of the Icebreaker*?

2. "Ignorant" V. Suvorov

G. Gorodetsky, who calls himself a professional historian, allows himself perplexing accusations against V. Suvorov and his book.

Based on his own ideas about the criteria of scientificity, he characterizes V. Suvorov as the author of "absurd", "ignorant writings"; not a serious historian, but an "amateur" and "intelligence officer", showing "promiscuity in means"; an author whose "free handling" of sources has "become his trademark", not burdening himself with evidence, resorting to "clumsy arguments", "absurd" and "absolutely ridiculous" statements; "non-returner", "defector", "traitor", "small fry" in the GRU, a morally unscrupulous person, etc. (p. 4, 9, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 34, 48, 71, etc.).

V. Suvorov, who uses exclusively open materials, is accused of writing in the "flourishing genre of conspiratorial psychology" (p. 15). According to G. Gorodetsky, this is connected with the transition of Russia from totalitarianism to democracy, when "the conspiracy theory, being exceptionally attractive to the inhabitants, promotes myths, deliberately and persistently hides the truth, simplifying complex situations" (ibid.). According to this classification, the Soviet-German pact fell into the category of "fundamental

fov"1 (ibid.). However, it seems that the accusation of "conspiratorial psychology" is just a pretext to avoid considering such an issue as the international strategy of the Stalinist Soviet Union, programmed by its socio-political system.

V. Suvorov's book is credited with a negative impact on nationalistic feelings, in particular, indulging Polish nationalism and even rehabilitating Nazism (pp. 8-9). Moreover, its goals, it turns out, were "above all" to "undermine the process of détente" (p. 9), "ignite the 'war psychosis' and warn public opinion in the West against resuming detente" (p. 15). . Does this mean that V. Suvorov managed to "undermine" international detente, and then switch over to preventing its "resumption"?!

Despite the promise in the introduction not to "cross swords with Suvorov" anymore, but "only to give an alternative interpretation of events" (p. 28), G. Gorodetsky enriched his research toolkit by constantly mentioning his name right up to the conclusion:

discredited name is intended to serve as a final
telny, exhaustive argument in the system of his
evidence.

The burden of derogatory assessments of the personality of V. Suvorov and his book weighs heavily on the Israeli historian. Otherwise, one cannot understand why he resorts to methods that are not accepted in the scientific community. You can read about two examples of this kind at once on the same page of the "Controversy" section that opens his book.

G. Gorodetsky writes: "The assertion that Nazi Germany "has more reason to be considered neutral in 1939-1940" is absurd" (p. 10). We open the 48th page of V. Suvorov's "Ledo Cola" indicated by him, on which the argument is given - *in*

1 The solid work of the English co-authors A. Reid and D. Fisher
Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
1939-1941" (Read A., Fisher D. The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939-1941. London. 1988.) is dismissed as a manifestation of "the persistence of this myth". // The myth of the "Icebreaker". S. 70.

a number of others opposed the official thesis of Soviet neutrality in those years. When through threats and violence—a joint attack with Germany on Poland, a "winter war" with Finland, ultimatums to the Baltic states and Romania—the Soviet Union annexed a number of states and territories along its western borders.

In this so-called pre-war period, we read from V. Suvorov, the Red Army suffered more losses in battles than the German army in battles in Western Europe. Which was the basis for him to conclude: "*Judging by the losses*, then Germany had more reason to be considered neutral in 1939-1940." The critic V. Suvorov omitted the words that I have put in italics.

Whether intentionally or not, it doesn't matter, G. Gorodetsky avoids raising the question whether the Soviet Union, given its partnership with Nazi Germany in 1939-1941 and its military actions against neighboring countries, can be considered a neutral country. For V. Suvorov, as well as for "other historians", these are significant events inscribed in the annals of the world war. For the Israeli historian who argues for giving priority to "actual events", there is no such question.

The second example: "The statement that the head of the Soviet military intelligence, General Golikov, was not punished by Stalin for belittling the data on the build-up of the German armed forces on June 21, is also unfounded, since he reported the truth to Stalin. Hitler really did not prepare for war against the Soviet Union. Not so again. V. Suvorov on page 312 (G. Gorodetsky refers to it) *has no mention* of June 21. This refers to an earlier period, when

Soviet intelligence tried to judge preparations for war against the Soviet Union by whether the German army was preparing for a military campaign in the conditions of the Russian winter: whether the Germans were stocking up on winter equipment and

whether the relevant military-technical preparation.

In the light of this accusation against V. Suvorov, it is amusing to read in *The Myth of the Icebreaker* the author's commentary on Hitler's July 1940 order to prepare an attack on the USSR. Referring to the fact that this order was oral, he concludes: "The attack on Russia should not therefore be considered a predetermined issue because it took place" (p. 98). The reader is clearly forced to think that the whole thing was in the prevailing (it is not clear how) circumstances: the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union could not have taken place, and even the configuration of the participants in the world war could have looked different. For this, wordings such as: "a confused international situation" (p. 22), London and Moscow are "potential enemies" (ch. 4), the "mystery" of Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union (p. 94), there is no "concrete evidence of a connection" between the ideology and politics of Hitler and Stalin (p. 94), historians "underestimate the complexity of the strategic and political situation" (p. 98)

and so on.

In search of evidence, G. Gorodetsky questions the usefulness of V. Suvorov's book on the grounds that it uses exclusively open, accessible sources (pp. 14, 17, 28, 116). But one should pay tribute to the one who managed to recycle such a body of historical material that envious critics of *The Icebreaker* express doubts about the ability of one person to do such a wonderful job. Unless, they say, he succeeded with the help of people from the British intelligence services. V. Suvorov's book clearly proves that no archival materials, for all their value, can cancel the historical events that have already taken place, as well as their refraction in the official documents of their time. Meanwhile, the text of the "Myth of the Icebreaker" just lacks such documents in order, in the language of its author, to see the events he describes "exactly

as they were" and "not to judge them from today's standpoint" (p. 4, 12).

G. Gorodetsky contrasts the book of V. Suvorov

his narrative as based on many sources

kah, emphasizing the importance of archival documents. In one of his anti-Suvorov articles, he writes that he "carefully" studied the materials of the most important Russian archives: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Staff, the Intelligence Directorate and the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation¹. I, who was repeatedly denied access to secret archival materials, is hard to believe. In the summer of 2005, while at the Department for Supporting the Activities of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (in order to find out about the answer to his request), when mentioning the name of G. Gorodetsky, it was stated that he had never worked in their archive.

About one more *very, very strange* statement of the Israeli historian. In his interpretation, V. Suvorov "portrayed the Soviet Union not as a victim, but as a perpetrator of the war", arguing that "in June 1941, Stalin was ready for a surprise attack on Nazi Germany, and Hitler only got ahead of him" (p. 7) . There is a clear substitution of one question - about the responsibility for the Second World War by another - about the circumstances of the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. It is amazing how the critics of V. Suvorov do not see the main meaning of his book point-blank, replacing the question about the concept of the book, reflected in the expansion of the book's title - "Who unleashed the Second World War? " attack on Hitler in June 1941. The same with the sequel to The Icebreaker, M-Day, subtitled When World War II Started. The essence of both books is to prove that Stalin, like Git

ler, is also responsible for unleashing mi
moat war. Here one can argue only about the degree of guilt of each of the dictators. Stalin had an auxiliary

¹ Gorodetsky G. "Icebreaker"? Stalin and the path to war. // War and by litika. 1939-1941. M., 1999. S. 247.

compared with Hitler, the role. The role is inflammatory, provocative, which, as we will see later, Stalin himself took credit for.

Undoubtedly, the beginning of the World War in September 1939 and the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 are interrelated events: if there had been no world war, there would have been no Hitler attack. But I repeat: the main idea of "Icebreaker" (as well as its sequel "M Day") is that the Stalinist Soviet Union also bears its share of responsibility for the world war. I personally dispute with V! Suvorov, his critics seem to be unproductive, since he is reduced to the timing of the start of the war between the USSR and Germany - in 1941 or a little later. And no one disputes that an attack, ahead of the enemy, is the best means of defense.

It seems that it makes no sense to list all the oddities of the Icebreaker Myth. They are conditioned by the very purpose of its author, otherwise unattainable. Let us further note only those historical plots when what could be considered a banal mistake (with whom this does not happen) is used by the author as an argument to justify his case.

3. "Russia under siege"

Stalin's theses of the pamphlet "Falsifiers of History" found a clear continuation in G. Gorodetsky's interpretation of the pre-war course of Soviet foreign policy. The content of the section of his book "Russia Under Siege" (pp. 45-47), where it is presented most prominently, closely echoes the third chapter of the pamphlet "Isolation of the Soviet Union. Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

The materials of Stalin's archival fund, which became available to researchers, confirmed that he was at the same time the customer, co-author and editor of "Fal

¹Falsifiers of history. pp. 36-55. The title of the chapter of the pamphlet belongs to Stalin.

sificators of history." His hand made insertions, the most significant of which is the hostility of the countries of the democratic West justifying the conclusion of the pact with Hitler¹.

As is known, this pamphlet was prepared in opposition to the Western publication of archival documents of the German Foreign Ministry under the title "Nazi-Soviet Relations in 1939-1941", in order to refute the conclusion that the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR had anti-Western orientation. The veracity of the pamphlet can be judged by the fact that it does not contain even a hint of a secret additional protocol signed simultaneously with the pact, which reveals the background of the Soviet-German agreement. (G. Gorodetsky, in his own way, bypasses this moment, unacceptable for his historical construction, but more on that later.) Not without reason, after Stalin's death, few Soviet historians dared to refer to the "Falsifiers of History". G. Gorodetsky, on the contrary, took advantage of Stalin's developments, forgetting about the promise to say something fresh about the policy of the "Kremlin highlander".

Hence the provisions of the "Myth of the Icebreaker" about the strictly defensive nature of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, when even calls for a revolutionary war "had an exclusively defensive sound" (p. 15, 25, 95), about the adherence of the Stalinist leadership to the national interests of the country (p. 19), about the threat posed to the Soviet Union by all capitalist states without exception (pp. 46-47), about the fact that, having concluded a pact with Hitler, "Stalin chose the lesser of two evils" (p. .61), etc. and so on. All this is covered with an absolutely unsubstantiated message that the restoration of the whole truth about World War II

¹ Ibid. pp. 53-55.

² Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office. Ed. by RG Sontag, JS Beddie. Washington, 1948. It is clear that G. Gorodetsky did not need the documents of this collection.

war, including the disclosure of the far from unambiguous role of pre-war Stalinist foreign policy, allegedly leads to whitewashing of German Nazism and its aggression.

How, then, are proven (and are proven) as old as the world of the provisions of the "Falsifiers of History"? Or, to put it another way: why does G. Gorodetsky, in contrast to "other historians," believe that "Soviet policy was in no way determined by expansionist considerations" (p. 46)? Why does he deny the Stalinist Soviet Union the right to an active, offensive anti-capitalist strategy?

In the mentioned section "Russia under siege" we read: "A clear and consistent policy, with minor tactical deviations, was based on the awareness of the potential danger emanating from the *entire capitalist world*, be it fascist Germany or Western democracies. Seeking a balance in relations with the powers so alien to Marxist theory, which rejects the idea of supporting one capitalist power against another, Stalin sought to defend the Russian revolution. At first by cooperating with Weimar Germany, and with the advent of Hitler to power, through collective security" (pp. 46-47. *My italics.*).

Indeed, Stalin cannot be denied the definiteness of his pre-war foreign policy, truly "clear and consistent", but the pursuit of an expansionist class-imperial course. Yes, both "aggressive powers" and "so-called democratic states" were equally alien to him (to use the definitions from the "Short Course in the History of the CPSU (b)", repeated in Stalin's report at the party congress in March 1939). That is why the Marxist theory mentioned by the author, which saw the cause of world wars in "inter-imperialist contradictions", excluded a long-term orientation towards any of the hostile groups that had been formed since the mid-1930s - the fascist-militarist states of the Axis and the states of the democratic West. In by

The variable participation of the Soviet Union in the course of the World War in both capitalist coalitions, G. Gorodetsky, apparently, sees the manifestation of "a desire for balance in relations with the powers." But the Soviet leaders saw in this "balancing" the manifestation of the "wise Stalinist foreign policy", thanks to which, in their words, it was possible, as in the

military, and in the war years "correctly use contradictions within the camp of imperialism.

The delimitation of international relations carried out by the author of *The Myth of the Icebreaker—world capitalism versus revolutionary Russia*—does not interfere with it, in spite of logic, to deny the presence of class motives in political ke Stalinist leadership. Distancing himself from "other historians", he considers it superfluous, as already mentioned, to search for the deep, including class, causes of the Soviet-German conflict. But what is the task of the historian, if not to explore the range of questions of the chosen topic from all sides? Of course, and its context, covering both the "theoretical foundations" and the "ideological roots" of the policy of states that have decided to go to war with each other. And is it possible to judge Soviet foreign policy in a qualified manner, abstracting from the quite definite doctrinal foundations of this policy, conditioned by communist ideology, and even more so ignoring the totalitarian essence of the Soviet system? Is it even possible to imagine a work in which the methodology of studying the past is free from one or another general framework?

1Tov. Malenkov: Information report on the activities of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. // Meetings of the Cominform. 1947, 1948, 1949. Documents and materials. M., 1998. P. 81. As an example of the use of contradictions between the imperialists "to neutralize their aggressive plans", published in the early 1960s, the "Diplomatic Dictionary" contains a reference to the foreign policy strategy of the USSR both before and in years of World War II. // Diplomatic Dictionary. In 3 vols. M., 1960-1964; vol. 1, p. 467. For the authors of the official history of Soviet foreign policy, the Second World War was a confirmation of Lenin's prediction of the inevitability of "the most terrible clashes" between socialism and capitalism, i.e. was a natural continuation of the struggle between the two systems. // History of foreign policy of the USSR. 1917-1985. In 2 volumes. Ed. 5th. M., 1986. T. 1. S. 15.

such a study that reveals the purpose of the work? The author of *The Myth of the Icebreaker* confirms with his predilections that no, such works do not exist.

The essence, so to speak, of G. Gorodetsky's concept is that, on the eve of the world war, the hostile capitalist encirclement turned from words to deeds, placing the Soviet Union not only in a position of "international isolation" (as in the case of Comrade Stalin), but the life of a country that was "besieged" by many external enemies. Both Nazi Germany and

Western democracies.

But was the situation in the USSR as hopeless, hopeless, as G. Gorodetsky wants to present, developing the version of "Falsifiers of History"? What if, as he advises, "try to understand the moods of the people of that period and not judge them from the standpoint of today"?

Comrade Stalin saw the situation from the Kremlin by no means so bleak. In September 1938, he announced that "the second imperialist war has in fact already begun," and in March 1939 he confirmed: "a new imperialist war has become a fact," but it "has not yet become general, world war." Needless to say, the reader will not find these Stalinist definitions, which are so important for understanding the motives of pre-war Soviet policy, in *The Myth of the Icebreaker*. Otherwise, one would have to agree that the situation of the "second imperialist war" excluded the isolation, and even more so the "siege" of the Soviet Union, giving Stalin the long-awaited chance to break into world politics with a bang.

Nevertheless, G. Gorodetsky, contradicting himself, recognizes that such a *fundamental change* in the international position of the Soviet Union took place. But in his exposition, this happened in an accidental way - indirectly, contrary to Stalin's intentions.

1A short course in the history of the CPSU (b). M., 1938. S. 318; Comrade Stalin's report at the 18th Party Congress on the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. // XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). March 10-21 1939 Verbatim record. M., 1939. S. 12.

It happened because of the shortsightedness (not to say stupidity) of the British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain, who at the end of March 1939 provided security guarantees to Poland, which became Hitler's next target after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The British guarantees, he writes, "caused an unforeseen dramatic upheaval in international relations ... with its immediate and *tragic consequences*" (p. 51. *My italics.*). Not the capture of Czechoslovakia in direct violation of the Munich Agreement, but the British guarantees to Poland became the "first salvo of the Second World War", changing the entire international situation "with one blow" (*ibid.*).

Here is the course of his amazing conclusions.

By her guarantees to Poland, "England was actually challenging Germany, thereby completely abandoning her key role in the balance of power in Europe" (p.

51-52). This compelled the Nazis to "strive for the neutralization of the Soviet Union," which England itself needed to support (p. 52). "Thus, without any secret plans, the Soviet Union *became the basis*

balance of power in Europe" (*ibid.*). That is, it was not the failure of the Western policy of appeasement and the approach of a general armed conflict on the European continent that forced both warring capitalist coalitions to turn their gaze towards Moscow, but the pitiful efforts of N. Chamberlain. This is how the head of the British government outstripped the Fuhrer of Nazi Germany, who took aim at Poland, in whipping up international tension!

In the course of these arguments follow (in order to completely confuse the reader?) ritual attacks on V. Suvorov (although it was promised not to return to his person) for condemning the pact between Stalin and Hitler on the eve of their joint attack on Poland. Forgetting once again about his call to see events "exactly as they were", G. Gorodetsky rejects criticism of the Soviet-German pact, being careful, however, to challenge V. Suvorov's analysis of the facts and

documents. He blames the Cold War, which he says stimulated the resurgence of the "myths" of the 1920s, which were "based on a simplistic understanding of the events leading up to the pact" (p. 52). The point was, therefore, not in the strategy of the warring states, but in the events taking place, according to Gorodetsky, contrary to the policy of the European leaders. Who actually shows a "simplified understanding of events" is for the reader to judge.

It turns out that the true reason for the Soviet-German pact, and in general the outbreak of war in Europe - in England's anti-German demarche. It should not have given guarantees to Poland to renounce the role of an arbiter in the affairs of the continent, since this brought Hitler Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union closer together. Yes, not a trivial approach to history, except that the saying "an Englishwoman's craphouse" is missing ...

But what if the reader asks whether the situation was the way G. Gorodetsky draws it, drawing the reader's attention to the sinister role of English guarantees, and turns to already known materials?

A. Toynbee, a contemporary of the events described and, perhaps, the most famous British historian of the 20th century, agrees that then, in the first spring month of 1939, Europe entered the peak of the slide into general war. In the preface to the corresponding volume of the multi-volume Review of International Affairs in 1939-1946, of which he was editor-in-chief,

A. Toynbee wrote that, from many points of view, the Second World War actually began with the occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 15 by Nazi Germany and only formally with its attack on Poland on September 1. March 1939 was a turning point in international relations, not because of British guarantees, but because of Nazi violence against Czechoslovakia.

And what do the long-published official Soviet documents say (which G. Gorodets neglected

¹The World in March 1939. Ed. by A. Toynbee, F. T. Ashton-Gwatkin. London, etc. 1952. P. VII.

c) about how the Kremlin assessed the situation on the European continent after the provision of British guarantees to Poland in response to Nazi aggression? Did Comrade Stalin and his comrades feel the "tragic consequences" of the guarantees? According to these documents, it is easy to establish that the "actual events" did not develop as described in the "Myth of the Icebreaker".

In the opinion of the Stalinist leadership, "the most serious events that radically worsened the situation in Europe" were connected with the actions of Nazi Germany and its de facto ally, fascist Italy. As such events, which threatened many countries, it considered the termination by Hitler, who used as a pretext the provision of British guarantees to Poland, the Anglo-German naval agreement of June 18, 1935 and the declaration of friendship and non-aggression between Germany and Poland of January 26, 1934, as well as the announcement of the forthcoming conclusion of a military-political alliance between Germany and Italy. Finally, it was said in the cited Soviet document (dated May 11, 1939), on this basis "negotiations arose between Britain and France, on the one hand, and the USSR, on the other, on the organization of an effective peace front against aggression"¹.

So when did the "tragic consequences" of the British guarantees to Poland come into play - after they were given or decades later, when The Myth of the Icebreaker was written? Or one of the "tragic consequences" of the guarantees to Poland in Stalin's political and diplomatic rise? And this is the fruit of "an endless search for new information and materials" (p. 4)?

But is it by chance, as G. Gorodetsky claims, that Comrade Stalin found himself in the role of a third force in the imminent pan-European conflict? What then was the meaning of the constantly proclaimed by the Stalinist leadership

¹The editorial of the newspaper Izvestia "On the International Position". May 11, 1939 // USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Year of crisis. Documents and materials. In 2 vols. M., 1990. T. 1. S. 452. The editorial was perceived by Soviet diplomats abroad as an indication of Moscow.

the result of a *special line* in international affairs - the line of non- and supra-coalition policy, which it considered completely self-sufficient? Is it not to take advantage of the "second imperialist war" and its

expected social consequences in their own way -

in the interests of class-imperial? Western allies - "imperialists", recalled V.M. Molotov, Stalin's right hand in foreign affairs, counted on the weakening of the Soviet Union in a world war. But: "Here they miscalculated. Here they were not Marxists, but we were. When half of Europe moved away from them, they woke up. Here Churchill found himself, of course, in a very stupid position.

Nevertheless, the author of *The Myth of the Icebreaker* insists that he was successful, "especially in a *consistent* analysis of the Stalinist policy of these years"².

But I would not say that his book pays due attention to the words and deeds of the Stalinist leadership. The author's own criterion - "to try to understand the moods of the people of that period and not to judge them from the positions of today" - does not apply where it is most appropriate. To put it mildly, the documents of the Communist Party and the materials of its central organs—the Pravda newspaper and the Bolshevik magazine—are underestimated. Meanwhile, it is precisely the analysis of *party materials* that allows us to conclude that Stalin and his entourage regarded class motives as the basis of their international policy. It is not clear how one can judge the views and activities of the top Soviet leadership without such materials.

From Stalin's documents, I would draw the reader's attention (an Israeli historian is unlikely to be interested in this) to the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", which was published in September 1938. Comrade Stalin was

¹ Chuev F.M. Molotov: Semi-power ruler. M., 1999. S. 82.

² G. Gorodetsky's answers to the questions of the journal "New and Contemporary History". // "New and recent history". 1995, no. 3. S. 71 (*italics my*).

this book as his own work, in which *the movement of history depends solely on the irreconcilable struggle of ideas*. Party cadres, the Kremlin believed, "could freely navigate the domestic and international situation" only if they were politically and ideologically trained¹.

In the last chapter of the Short Course, her international native section published in Pravda in September 1938 - *even before Munich*, an independent, separate line of the USSR in international affairs was proclaimed *in opposition to the two warring capitalist groupings* that had practically taken shape. And one of them, the countries of the democratic West, was promised (with reference to the sad consequences for the Russian bourgeoisie of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917) "historical retribution"². The provisions of the section, it was said at the highest official level, gave a "Marxist explanation" to the changes in the world, which means that only one can "judge the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and all international events of recent times"³. These propositions were developed in Stalin's speech at a closed meeting in the Central Committee (see below) and were later included in his report at the party congress. The international sections of the history of the party and the Stalinist report at the party congress are phenomena of the same order, making it possible to judge the *tendencies* of Soviet foreign policy.

Something else is also significant. G. Gorodetsky, defending the right of the Stalinist leadership to protect the "Russian revolution" from external enemies, simply repeats the version of the "Falsifiers of History" about the identity of the situation of the revolutionary year of 1917 and the eve of World War II. In the Stalinist amendment mentioned above

¹Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 14, 1938 On the organization of party propaganda in connection with the publication of the Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. // "Is it true". November 15, 1938

² "Is it true". September 19, 1938

³ 21st anniversary of the October Revolution. Comrade's report V.M. Molotov at the solemn meeting of the Moscow Council on November 6 of this year. // Pravda, November 7, 1938

the text of the pamphlet explains the decision to conclude a pact with Nazi Germany as follows: "Just as in 1918, due to the hostile policy of the Western powers, the Soviet Union was forced to conclude the Brest Peace with the Germans, so now, in 1939, 20 years after the Brest Peace, the Soviet Union was forced to conclude a pact with the Germans in view of the same hostile policy of England and France. But is the approach that compares the foreign policy actions of the Bolshevik leaders separated by two decades justified? The answer is contained in the works of "other historians" rejected by G. Gorodetsky, who came to the conclusion, on the one hand, that Stalin overestimated the likelihood of the formation of an anti-Soviet front of the capitalist countries, and, on the other hand, that he underestimated the danger of fascism. Indeed, the global threat of fascism that arose in the 1930s was viewed by Stalin and his entourage not from general democratic, but from class positions and interests. They saw in fascism, first of all, "a sign of the weakness of capitalism" (Stalin), they considered fascism a manifestation of the so-called general crisis of capitalism and, thus, even closer to the death of the world capitalist system.

lisma.

It should be noted that in terms of *targeting* Soviet politicians before the World War, the positions of the majority of domestic authors practically coincide. D.M. The projector, who has studied the history of the world war extensively and fruitfully, explains Stalin's decision to make an "unprincipled and pernicious" agreement with Hitler by his strategy to take advantage of the weakening of enemies in the inter-imperialist war². In turn, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.N. Sakharov (who heads the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences) quite definitely - as "clear" - characterizes the line of Stalin's pre-war diplomacy. Line on something

¹ History falsifiers. S. 54.

² *Projector D.M.* Fascism: the path of aggression and death. M., 1989. S. 202.

in order to "work for the clash of their potential rivals in Europe, and in the long term to enter the war in order not only to consolidate the already achieved geopolitical advantages, but also to carry out revolutionary expansion"¹.

These are the opinions of "other historians" who follow the principle "try to understand the mood of the people of that period and not judge them from the standpoint of today." The adequacy of their judgments to historical realities is confirmed by the evidence of contemporaries. In his memoirs, the writer K.M. Simonov shared his thoughts, born of the Soviet-German pact: until the inevitable battle with fascism, "there will be a long war between Germany, France and England, and somewhere later, in the final, we will face fascism. The pact gave such a turn to our reflections.

Archival material says the same. Yes, such global anti-capitalist plans were not only hatched in the Kremlin, but were also accepted as a guide to action.

A week before Stalin's report at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) on March 10, 1939, A.A. Zhda nov³, whose criticism of Western policy, which received publicity at the congress, was brought to its logical end. One of the figures closest to Stalin was frank: "there is a party conference here, there is nothing to be ashamed of."

The world situation, the speaker said, is developing in such a way that fascist aggression "is directed chiefly against England and France." Although England "would very much like to balance the situation in such a way that Hitler unleashed a war with the Soviet Union. But Hitler understands in his own way and believes that

¹ Sakharov A.N. War and Soviet diplomacy: 1939-1945. // Questions of history. 1995. No. 7. S. 32.

² Simonov K.M. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections about I.V. Stalin. M., 1990. S. 86. See also: Vishnevsky Vs. "... We ourselves will go on the attack." From the diaries of 1939-1941. // M. 1995. No. 5. S. 104-105, 107-109.

³ RGASPI. F. 77, on. 1, d. 714, l. 33-54. Further references to individual sheets are not given. The document style has been saved. (*Italics mine.* - Auth.)

wives to start a war where it is weaker. And since he sees that it is weaker in the West, he rushes there, along with Musso line. Party listeners applauded and laughed.

"Comrades," continued A.A. Zhdanov, under the guise of peacefulness, under the guise of collective security, England is pitting one power against another, is not averse to inciting and organizing a war with us, using in this respect the actions, tactics, old traditions of bourgeois politicians - to rake in the heat with the wrong hands, to wait for the situation, when the enemies are weakened, and for taking. But this policy is designed for naive people. As for the Soviet Union, "in our country even pioneers can unravel this matter, it's too rude

case".

Since everything is so obvious to the Stalinist leadership, which is "hard to deceive", then the Soviet foreign policy has already been completely determined: " ... *We will save up our forces for the time when we will deal with Hitler and Mussolini, and at the same time, of course, and with Chamberlain.* It was greeted with applause.

The Israeli historian (as well as other critics of the Icebreaker, by the way) ignores the facts and documents that characterize the deep Stalinist plan to take advantage of Nazi Germany's aggression against England and France in order to achieve their weakening. Especially since this idea, correctly grasped by V. Suvorov - to use Germany, whether revolutionary or Nazi, as a battering ram against capitalism in Europe - is nothing new. Let us recall that the strategy of the Comintern, directed by the Kremlin, was based on initiating a proletarian revolution in Germany and thus making a decisive breach in the system of capitalism.

With Hitler coming to power in Germany, the goal of spreading socialism (in its Soviet model) to Europe did not change significantly. Germany, now Nazi Germany, remained the main instrument for achieving this goal.

1 See: The Comintern and the Idea of the World Revolution. Documentation. M., 1998.

promised new opportunities. For the Nazi movement, Stalin believed, was a natural reaction to the injustices of Versailles. Such a Germany, therefore, can be manipulated. Otherwise, it is difficult to assess the euphoria that seized Comrade Stalin after the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact: "Well, who will deceive whom? We will deceive Hitler!

Taking advantage of the situation of the "second imperialist war", the Kremlin activated long-standing expansionist plans. It is interesting how G. Gorodetsky would comment on the revelations of a member of the presidium and secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern D.Z. Manuilsky, who was called "the hand of Stalin" in this international communist organization. Already in the summer of 1939, even before the start of the World War, the fate of Poland, in his opinion, was sealed. Speaking to a closed audience, he predicted: "If instead of the USSR there were old tsarist Russia, we could say that in the event of a conflict, in essence, a new partition of Poland would take place." But Soviet Poland does not expect anything better from Russia either: "it is afraid that if it ties its fate with us, then socialism will come out of it on its territory (laughter)"².

V.M. __ Molotov Soviet seizures in Eastern Europe in pursuance of the Soviet-German agreement on a secret protocol³.

It must be assumed that G. Gorodetsky is aware of the assessments of Soviet foreign policy recorded in the documents of his time⁴. But he prefers not to stop

¹ Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. // "Questions of history". 1990, No. 8. S. 60.

² Transcript of Comrade's report. Manuilsky about international polo zheniya. July 14, 1939 // RGASPI. F. 523. Op. 1. D. 92. L. 16.

³ Foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Report of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Comrade. V.M. Molotov at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 1

1940 // Pravda, August 2, 1940

⁴ According to critic V. Suvorov, he studied, in addition to archival documents, "also a wide range of published documentary materials." // *Gorodetsky G. The myth of the "Icebreaker"*. S. 27.

to rely on them, does not rely on them for the analysis of the events described. It is obvious - once again - the actual refusal of the principle declared by him to see the events of the past "exactly as they were" and "not to judge them from the standpoint of this

today's day."

In other words, if we proceed from the interest of the Soviet Union in having its numerous

nye capitalist enemies "better torn apart"

(Stalin - see below), then following the undermining of the positions of the class alien largest states of Europe, it was necessary, of course, to take advantage of this for their own purposes. Only for G. Gorodetsky these goals are purely defensive, while for V. Suvorov and "other historians" they are expansionist, class-imperial. The differences between them are in the reconstruction of the course of events in accordance with different ideas about the criteria of objectivity.

So who follows the logic of the research search - V. Suvorov and "other historians" or G. Gorodetsky, if everyone proceeds from the premise that the leaders of the Soviet Union considered themselves surrounded by enemies? Who analyzes the pre-war Stalinist foreign policy with its strategy of taking advantage of the "imperialist contradictions" in the camp of the enemies of socialism in order to pit them against each other, break through the "hostile capitalist encirclement" and gain other advantages? Or someone who, not caring about the proper interpretation of "actual events", wants to be known as the discoverer of more than dubious historical truth in the spirit and style of Stalin's "Falsifiers of History"?

4. "Assessment" of Soviet foreign policy

As already emphasized, G. Gorodetsky avoids a more or less intelligible presentation of the events on the eve of the world war, so as not to take into account the totality of the circumstances of the transition, using Stalin's definitions, from the "second imperialist war" to

"general war, world war". And, according to the logic of things, one should ask what kind of refraction this Stalinist idea of the development of international relations found in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. That is, to try to identify what was the role of Comrade Stalin in unleashing the Second World War, which became the starting point for all subsequent fateful changes both in Europe and beyond. But the author of *The Myth of the Icebreaker*, carried away by his oddities, has little interest in the problem of the relationship between Stalin's foreign policy and the beginning of the world war. What is evidenced by his more than modest attention to such a landmark event for the world and for the Soviet Union itself, which was Stalin's report at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) on March 10, 1939.

Meanwhile, Stalin's report at the party congress is his only *public* speech in all the months preceding the world war. Naturally, historians give this speech the attention it deserves. G. Gorodetsky devotes only one paragraph to the Stalinist report:

"Most historians consider the watershed

Stalin's assessment of Soviet foreign policy XVIII Party Congress on March 10, 1939. At the same time, they often refer to Stalin's famous warning *to the Western democracies* that he is not going to "pull chestnuts out of the fire for them." Influenced by subsequent events, *historians* see this as Stalin's decision to move closer to Nazi Germany. However (?), even a superficial acquaintance with the full text of Stalin's speech is enough to make it clear that his anti-Nazi orientation is very strong. *If Suvorov had read this speech*, he would have noticed that Stalin abandoned Lenin's idea of a revolutionary war and warned that war was a threat to everyone. In addition (?), Hitler's rejection of the Munich Agreements, which resulted in the annexation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia a week later, gave rise to hopes for a revival of the idea of collective security. Actions

Hitler were denounced - at least publicly - by Chamberlain, and the opponents of appeasement strengthened their positions. It is against this background that Soviet

The government came up with a proposal to conclude agreement with England and France" (pp. 50-51. *My italics*).

In his own way - not like "most historians" - interpreting Stalin's speech, G. Gorodetsky directly connects it with a set of wonderful conclusions. In his opinion, historians underestimate "an

tinazi orientation" performances, and on their

The conclusion that Stalin's speech opened the way to rapprochement with Germany was influenced by events unrelated to the international consequences of the speech. And the report supposedly announced the rejection of the class strategy in international relations, which paved the way for the resumption of attempts to achieve collective security with the participation of Western countries. Anyone who has read the report will say that nothing of the kind can be found in its text.

In passing, we note once again: V. Suvorov's "ignorance", in this case in the interpretation of Stalin's report, is shared by "the majority of historians", and even all historians, *excluding* G. Gorodetsky himself. However, let's try to deal with the justification by the author of The Icebreaker Myth of his disagreement with the conclusion of "the majority of historians" that Stalin's speech at the party congress was a "watershed" for pre-war Soviet foreign policy.

Let us take the question of the alleged "anti-Nazi orientation" of the report. So one can only imagine in the event that we do not reckon with pro-German accents of the speech, which attracted the attention of "other historians".

With Stalin's statement that Germany is a country "*seriously affected* as a result of the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles"¹ (confirmation

¹ Comrade Stalin's report... // XVIII Congress... P. 11 (*italics mine. - Auth.*).

popular belief that Stalin viewed the Nazi movement as primarily revanchist). With his statement that the Western countries failed to "raise the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany (in connection with the propaganda hype in the foreign press around Carpathian Ukraine. - D.N.), poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany without *visible grounds for that.*"

With another statement that "the areas of Czechoslovakia were given to the Germans (meaning the Czech Courts. - D.N.), as the price for the obligation to start a war with the Soviet Union, *and the Germans are now refusing pay the bill, sending them* (Western countries. — D.N.) *somewhere far away*"².

Stalin completed his analysis of the international situation with a list of the principles of his foreign policy. The main ones are: "We stand for peace and the strengthening of business ties with all countries ... since they will not try to violate the interests of our country ... they will not try to violate directly or indirectly the interests of the integrity and inviolability of the borders of the Soviet state." This is addressed to Nazi Germany, from which the only threat to the Soviet borders could come. They were supplemented by the words that served as the basis for characterizing Stalin's speech abroad as a "speech about roasted chestnuts": "Be careful not to let our country be drawn into conflicts by war provocateurs who are accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands"³. And this is for Western countries.

It seems that G. Gorodetsky deliberately refused to analyze the text of Stalin's report with its provisions, which make it possible to objectively judge the international strategy of the Soviet leadership. If he stops, say, at the Stalinist position on the absence of "visible for that reason" for an armed conflict with Germany

1 Comrade Stalin's report... // XVIII Congress... P. 13 (italics mine. - *Auth.*).

2 Ibid. P. 14 (italics mine. - *Auth.*).

3 Comrade Stalin's report... // XVIII Congress... P. 15.

ny", one would have to ask questions that require answers.

For example, what were the grounds for such a statement, that is, to delve into the past of Soviet-German relations and into Stalin's ideas about Nazism. Ask yourself what connection existed between this statement and his own, Stalin's, criticism of the policy of the Western countries. Also try to compare the statement about the absence of grounds for the Soviet-German armed conflict, made on the eve of the occupation of Czechoslovakia from the rostrum of the party congress, with the official protest expressed through diplomatic lines on March 18 by M.M. Litvinov¹

(who, by the way, was not given the floor to speak at the party congress), and ask himself: which of these "actual events" was of greater importance? In a word, follow your call to try to "understand the moods of the people of that period and not judge them from the positions of today."

Let's see how Stalin's speech was assessed by contemporaries - foreign diplomats in Moscow, whose reports to their governments, one must think, are more more important for understanding the policy of the then world leaders than the way these days this performance is given to the historian.

Foreign diplomats accredited in the Soviet capital, Stalin's speech at the party congress was perceived unequivocally - as pro-German and anti-Western. German Ambassador F. Schulenburg, in a report to Berlin, drew attention to the fact that "Stalin's irony and criticism in a much sharper form was directed against Britain, i.e. against the reactionary forces in power there than about

against the so-called aggressive countries, in particular Germany" 2. Chargé d'Affaires a.i. in

1 Note of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov to the German Ambassador to the USSR F. Schulenburg. March 18, 1939 // DVP of the USSR. T. 22. Book. 1. S. 202-204.

2 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945). Vol. 6. P. 1.

USSR A. Kerk compared Stalin's statement about the West's desire to provoke a Soviet-German conflict "for no apparent reason" with the task he formulated "to prevent our country from being drawn into conflicts by provocateurs of war." And he concluded: "judging by the words of Stalin, it is publicly proclaimed that if Germany does not directly threaten the Soviet borders, then she can count on Soviet neutrality in the event of a war against the Western powers"¹. The British Ambassador W. Seeds agreed with this. The ambassador concluded his detailed report to London with a recommendation to those "naïve people" in England who believe that the Soviet Union is only waiting for an invitation to join the Western democracies to reflect on the task set by Stalin "to be careful and not let yourself be drawn into conflicts about war vocateurs, accustomed to rake in the heat with the wrong hands"².

Soviet statements were in the same anti-Western and pro-German line. At a late dinner in the Kremlin in a narrow format, which ended the signing of the Soviet-German pact on August 23, 1939, V.M. Molotov, according to the German recording of the talks, "raised his glass to Stalin, noting that it was Stalin who, in his speech in March of this year, which is correct in Germany,

understood, *completely changed* political relations

between two countries." A week later, speaking at an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with a proposal to ratify the pact, Molotov repeated:

¹ Foreign Relations of the United States. diplomatic papers. The Soviet Union, 1933-1939. Washington, 1952. P. 748-749.

² Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939. 3rd Ser. Vol. 1-9. London, 1949-1955. Vol. 4. P. 419. Further - DBFP.

³ Recording of the conversation of the Imperial Foreign Minister with Stalin and Molotov. State secret. Office of the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 24, 1939 // USSR - Germany. In 2 books, Vilnius, 1989. Vol. 1. Documents and materials on Soviet-German relations from April to October 1939, p. 69.

tic conclusions"¹. According to him, "Soviet rule
The government had *previously* considered it desirable to take a further
step in improving political relations with Germany..."²

The reaction in Berlin to Stalin's speech can be read in the dying
memoirs of the German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop, who "acquainted"
Hitler with the speech "and urgently asked" for authority "for the required
steps." But at first Hitler took a wait-and-see attitude and hesitated.
Although, as is now known from documentary publications, explaining to
the German military leadership his decision to conclude a non-aggression
pact with the Soviet Union, Hitler said that in the autumn of 1938, not being
sure of the unconditional support of his plans by Italy and Japan, he
decided "be at one with Stalin. There is something to think about, isn't
it? Above, let's say, what gave Hitler grounds to count on agreements
with Stalin.

Now regarding the fact that at the party congress Stalin proclaimed a
renunciation of the revolutionary struggle and, in general, of an attack on
the positions of world capitalism. Although the "second imperialist war",
which threatened to develop into a "general, world war", created certain
opportunities for breaking through the "hostile capitalist encirclement". At
that time, according to the memoirs of N.S. Khrushchev, Stalin was
preparing party workers for the "big war" of the USSR with its enemies,
which was "inexorably advancing"⁵. Who is not enough of this representative
of the party elite,

evidence

¹ Speech by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
August 31, 1939 // The year of the crisis. T. 2. S. 348.

² Ibid. S. 350 (italics mine. - *Auth.*).

³ *Ribbentrop I. Between London and Moscow. Memories and
recent entries. From the legacy published by Anneliese von Ribbentrop. M.,
1996, p. 134.*

⁴ DBFPs. Vol. 7. R. 257-258.

⁵ Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev. // "Questions of history".
1990, no. 7. pp. 75, 80.

one must turn to the testimony of Comrade Stalin himself.

In Stalin's "Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", which did not interest G. Gorodetsky in any way, it is precisely the military side of the matter that is emphasized: since the "second imperialist war" posed a danger "above all" to the USSR, the answer was "further strengthening of the defense capability our borders and the combat readiness of the Red Army and the Red Navy.

Further more. In this book (published in September 1938) in the section "Theory and tactics of the Bolshevik party on questions of war, peace and revolution" it was said that during the First World War "the Bolsheviks were not against any war . " They recognized the legitimacy of just wars, referring to such wars not only "the protection of the people from external attacks and attempts to enslave them", but also "the liberation of the people from the slavery of capitalism", as well as "the liberation of the colonies and dependent countries from the oppression of the imperialists" 2. But haven't these provisions lost their relevance in the new conditions of the "second imperialist war"? Not at all, as can be judged from many "actual events".

Take the report at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) D.Z. Manuilsky, which, along with Stalin's report, became a reference point for foreign countries to draw conclusions about the course of Soviet foreign policy. Speaking on behalf of the delegation of the CPSU (b) in the Comintern, he declared that "the instructions of the "Short Course" on just and unjust wars are a *clear Marxist-Leninist line in connection with the imperialist war*"³. But party documents practically remained outside the research interest of G. Gorodetsky.

The Israeli historian did not pay attention to Po

¹ A short course in the history of the CPSU (b). S. 320.

² Ibid. S. 161 (*source italics*).

³ Report of the Delegation of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the ECCI at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Doc Manuilsky. // XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Verbatim report. S. 59 (*italics mine. - Auth.*).

Formation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 14, 1938, adopted on the occasion of the publication of a textbook on the history of the party. It resolutely rejected "the distortions of Marxist-Leninist views on the question of the nature of wars in the modern era, the misunderstanding of the difference between just and unjust wars, the wrong view of the Bolsheviks as a kind of" pacifists "1.

This provision of the Decree of the Central Committee, the draft of which was "corrected" by Stalin², was commented in the naked form by him in a speech at a *closed*

meeting on propaganda issues in the Central Committee on October 1

1938. Comrade Stalin ridiculed the notion of the Bolsheviks as people who "sigh for peace and then begin to take up arms only if they are attacked. This is not true." What is true? And that "there are cases when the Bolsheviks themselves will attack, if the war is just, if the situation is suitable, if the conditions are favorable, they themselves will begin to attack." Further, even more concretely, even more clearly: "They (the Bolsheviks. - D.N.) are not at all against an offensive, not against any war. The fact that we shout for defense is a veil, a veil. All states disguise themselves: "you live with wolves, you have to howl like a wolf." The party audience responded with laughter. And at the end of the passage: "It would be foolish to turn your gut inside out and put it on the table. They would say fools.

For G. Gorodetsky, such revelations of Stalin are from the category of evidence that can be neglected. "Other historians" do not consider themselves entitled to follow default acceptance.

¹Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 14, 1938 "On the organization of party propaganda in connection with the release of the Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" // Pravda. November 15, 1938

² Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the organization of party propaganda in connection with the release of the Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks". November 14, 1938 // Transcript of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - VKP (b). 1923-1938 In 3 volumes. Volume 3. 1928-1938 M., 2007. S. 756.

³ I.V. Stalin about the "Short course of the history of the CPSU (b)". Transcript you
I.V. Stalin at a meeting of propagandists. October 1
1938 // "Historical archive". 1994, No. 5. S. 5-29.

How were the instructions of the Soviet leader carried out to overcome the wrong view of the Bolsheviks "as a kind of pacifists", about agitational and propaganda preparations for a "just war"?

Let us dwell on the article "International situation second imperialist war," which appeared in the February 1939 issue of the Bolshevik magazine.

It was written by the deputy people's commissar foreign strange affairs V.P. Potemkin (under the pseudonym V. Galyanov), as one might assume, on the instructions of Stalin¹.

The author of the article proceeded from the main Stalinist directive - "a second imperialist war is going on"². On the most careful reading, it is impossible to detect in it even purely verbal statements about the need to stop the war, to prevent its escalation. On the contrary, the article welcomed the conflict development of events, for, it said, "humanity is heading for great battles that will unleash a world revolution"³. The propaganda of peace and collective security gave way to the Marxist enlightenment of people "with a philistine outlook", hoping that "everything will work out, everything will work out." Such reasoning was opposed by the position of the "conscious part of mankind", stated in the words that "for the disciples of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, the second imperialist war is the most important phenomenon in *people's* lives"⁴. And the article ended on the same lofty anti-capitalist note. Being "between two millstones": the Soviet Union, "menacingly rising in full

1 See: *Sheinis* Z.S. Maxim Maksimovich Litvinov: revolutionary, diplomat, man. M., 1989. S. 360. After the party congress, the same article was published in the series "To Help the Propagandist", opening the brochure "Materials for the study of the report of Comrade Stalin at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b)" (Novosibirsk. 1939).

2 *Galyanov* V. International situation of the Second World War. // Bolshevik. 1939, No. 4. S. 49.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. P. 50 (italics mine. - *Auth.*).

Linsky growth", and "with the indestructible wall of the revolutionary democracy that has risen to its aid, the last remnants of the capitalist system will be turned into ashes and dust"¹.

V.P. Potemkin was inspired by the conviction that the Soviet Union was "the world's strongest military power," and therefore without it "not a single common foreign policy issue can be resolved, not a single serious undertaking in the field of international life is conceivable"². Isn't it an exaggeration that the Soviet Union was the strongest military power? No, not an exaggeration. V. Suvorov in the "Icebreaker" gives enough proof on this score

evidence.

Curiously, confidence in the military capabilities of the Soviet Union was reinforced by faith in the revolutionary potential of the international proletariat. Here is what D.M. wrote about this. Projector: "The idea of the inevitability of revolution in the capitalist countries in the event of aggression against the Soviet Union entered deeply into the consciousness of Stalin and his entourage. They were reflected in one way or another in politics, and in military theory, and in military doctrine, and even in plans for a future war.

The materials of the former party archive (now RGASPI) say: yes, such were the "moods of the people of that time" in the Soviet Union.

In the report of D.Z. Manuilsky on international topics (with the heading "instructive"), with which he spoke in mid-July 1939, painted a rosy picture of the growing world anti-fascist movement, which was also spreading to the aggressor countries. Here

A few passages from his speech:

"I affirm that some time ago a portrait appeared in a Viennese barracks, hung

¹ *Golyanov V.* The international situation of the Second World War. // *Bolshevik*. 1939, No. 4. S. 65.

² *Ibid.* S. 65.

³ *Projector D. M.* Decree. op. S. 89.

soldiers, Comrade Stalin (stormy applause. Shouts of "Hurrah." Everyone stands up)"¹.

"I affirm ... that there are units in the German army that are under the influence of the communists. And in Czechoslovakia, the workers sang the Internationale together with the German soldiers. Speaker's commentary: "I'll tell you frankly - the position of the Führer, whose soldiers sing the Internationale, is unenviable ... the German people are waiting for the defeat of German fascism"².

Such views - on the one hand, we are "the most powerful military power", on the other hand - the anti-fascist movement has spread throughout the world in such a way that it leads to the disintegration of the armies of hostile states, were widely used. And it is not surprising, since they were not only divided in the Kremlin, but came from there, from the Stalinist leadership.

On the military-patriotic wave that swept the country³, with the book "First Strike. The Tale of the Future War" was made by N. Shpanov (a writer who later received notoriety for his novel "Firing the Body"). Initially, the book was rejected by Glavlit (censorship) as artistically "helpless"⁴. The trouble was not in the mediocrity of this story, the writer K. Simonov recalled, but in the fact that it was published in "half a million copies and was *firmly supported from above*"⁵. Is it necessary to say whose "firm hand" it was?

The story depicted the beginning of a victorious war for the USSR against Germany. Terrible for the enemy is the "first strike" - a retaliatory, already by the end of the first hour of the war, a strike by hundreds of the latest high-speed Soviet

¹ Transcript of Comrade's report. Manuisky about international polo zheniya. July 14, 1939 // RGASPI. F. 523, op. 1 file 92, l. 20.

² Ibid. L. 20-20v., 21.

³ See for more details: *Nevezhin V.A. Offensive War Syndrome. Soviet propaganda on the eve of the "holy battles", 1939-1941.* M., 1997.

⁴ Glavlit - correspondence with the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on censorship issues. January 4 - July 14, 1938 // State Archive of the Russian Federation. F. 9425s, op. 1, d. 6, l. 33.

⁵ *Simonov K.M. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. Reflections about I.V. Stalin.* M., 1990. S. 291 (italics mine. - *Auth.*).

bombers on the German rear military-industrial facilities. Anti-fascist workers help the Soviet air armada by giving light signals. When the Soviet armies enter the territory of the enemy "in agitated, rearing Europe," the anti-fascist masses begin to move. The "exciting scenes" of acts of proletarian fraternization are described. In the Bolshevik magazine, the writer Vs. Vishnevsky concluded his review of the story thus: "It speaks in a fascinating (!) way about what a just war of the Soviet people against the aggressors will be like, a war that is deadly for the enemies of socialism."¹ Why not a forerunner of the Le Dokol version of Stalin's preparations for an offensive war not against the capitalists of the whole world?!

It is indicative that Stalin's report at the party congress, which was anti-capitalist in spirit and letter, culminating in the proclaimed readiness "to retaliate with a double blow against the blow of warmongers who are trying to violate the inviolability of the Soviet borders"², inspired the delegates to belligerent actions³. However, G. Gorodetsky ignored not only Stalin's report at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, but also other materials of the congress, which made up a voluminous volume of verbatim records. Otherwise, he (let's assume with doubts, given the purpose of the "Myth of the Icebreaker") would not have been so sure of his discovery that Comrade Stalin had no geopolitical plans.

To be convinced that Stalin intended to take advantage of the mutual weakening of the capitalist enemies, it was enough to read the first, international section of his report at the congress. Fortunately it's a little reading, pages 9 to 15 of the transcript⁴. In this case, he might

¹ *Vishnevsky Sun*. A book about a future war. *Nick. Shpanov*. "First hit. A story about a future war. M., Military Publishing, 1939, 134 p. // "Bolshevik" 1939, No. 11-12. pp. 119-123.

² Comrade Stalin's Report... // XVIII Congress... P. 15.

³ See: *Gogun A.* Congress of the militants. // The truth of Viktor Suvorova - 2. Restoring the history of World War II. M., 2007. S. 23-32.

⁴ I. The international position of the Soviet Union. // Reporting Report of Comrade Stalin... // XVIII Congress... P. 9-15.

I doubted that Stalin had no "plans" (not secret, but transparent enough) to take advantage of the "second imperialist war" for his own purposes. This refers to the section of the report where Stalin explains the "systematic concessions" to the aggressors on the part of the Western countries, which, "taken together, are indisputably stronger than the fascist states both economically and militarily." One explanation lies in their feeling of "fear of revolution" in the event of another world imperialist war, which, according to the experience of the First World War, "may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or more

countries."

However, Stalin saw the main reason for the refusal of the Western countries from the policy of collective security in the fact that they, with their policy of non-intervention and neutrality, provoke a world war in order to then "dictate their conditions to the weakened participants in the war," summing up, "Both cheap and nice! 1 At the same time, he emphasized the desire of the "war provocateurs" in the West to push the USSR and Germany against each other "for no apparent reason." Under the conditions of the "new imperialist war", that is, the armed conflict within the "hostile capitalist encirclement", it was precisely the Stalinist Soviet Union that had the opportunity to use the "golden rule" of diplomacy.

matii - to remain on the sidelines for the time being, while his numerous enemies sort themselves out among themselves, weakening each other. To be "both cheap and cute!"

So who is right in assessing Stalin's report at the party congress:

V. Suvorov and "other historians", who consider this speech as a turning point in Soviet foreign policy, or G. Gorodetsky denying this, and not bothering to prove it?

1 Ibid. S. 13.

5. "Only an agreement on neutrality"

G. Gorodetsky's interpretation of the historical significance of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and its consequences raises no less questions.

We read on page 45 of the "Myth of the Icebreaker":

"Late on the night of August 23, 1939, in the Kremlin, Soviet Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov signed a non-aggression pact with German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop. *Although it was only a contract about her*

tralite, it is usually considered historically

rikami as the most obvious, immediate

cause of World War II. This event led to hostilities and therefore deserves careful consideration. To what extent does the Soviet Union share the blame for the outbreak of the war with Nazi Germany? *Some historians go in their*

arguments further. They prioritize

attention to the top secret protocols signed a month later that divided Eastern Europe

to spheres of influence. It is the secret protocols, they argue, and not the non-aggression pact, that reflect the true aims of Soviet foreign policy. *The treaty laid the foundations for a lasting alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union.* There is also an on-duty reference to V. Suvorov, who, they say, "in his arguments still comes

further", linking the conclusion of the pact with the old intentions

Stalin's ideas, having unleashed a world war, create "favorable conditions" for achieving foreign policy goals.

The mention of the name of V. Suvorov (as in previous cases) in itself, G. Gorodetsky believes, puts

called into question the interpretation of "other historians" of the reasons the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact and its consequences, as if releasing from the obligation to prove anything in particular. Still, let's dwell on the author's conclusions, which I have highlighted in italics.

What does it mean "although it was only an agreement on neutrality", but historians, "as a rule", consider the agreement

"the most obvious, immediate cause of World War II"? "As a rule" means, again, the majority of historians. Consequently, G. Gorodetsky (again and again) does not share the point of view not only of the "ignorant" V. Suvorov, but also of "other historians".

Of course, the Soviet-German pact was by no means "only a treaty of neutrality", as it is stubbornly called in the "Myth of the Icebreaker". Here the author either corrects or develops The Falsifiers of History, where the pact is called the way it was - the non-aggression pact. And not only formally - by name. There is no mention of neutrality in the text of the agreement itself. *The main thing* in it was the obligation of the parties *under no circumstances* to oppose each other if one of them "becomes the object of hostilities by a third power" (Articles I and II). Neutrality agreements usually included a clause releasing one of the parties from obligations if the other side itself committed an act of unprovoked aggression. However, there was no such clause in the Soviet-German pact. A classic case of preparation for aggression, about which M.M. Litvinov, who turned out to be objectionable to Stalin with the acceleration of his course towards rapprochement with Hitler: "This means that the states that have secured their rear or flank with such a non-aggression pact reserve the possibility of attacking third states with impunity"¹.

The immediate entry into force of the pact, even before ratification, indicated that everything was ready to attack the already intended victim. A few days later, On September 1, 1939, Hitler attacked Poland, and on September 17, as agreed upon at the conclusion of the pact, the Red Army invaded Poland from the east. In a joint communiqué on the tasks of the Soviet and German

¹Speech by the Chairman of the Soviet delegation M.M. Litvinov at a meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations. Geneva, September 14, 1935 // Documents of foreign policy of the USSR. M., 1957 - T. 18. S. 510-511.

troops in Poland, it was said that their actions corresponded to the "spirit and letter of the non-aggression pact"¹. *About non-aggression, not about neutrality.*

More evidence is needed why historians "as a rule" consider the Soviet-German pact in the capacity that it was - as the most immediate cause of the emergence (not preparation - it began long before the conclusion of the pact) of the Second World War?!

I will draw the reader's attention to the negotiations in the Kremlin that led to the signing of the pact. There is a German recording of the negotiations, from which it is clear that the participants in the negotiations - I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and I. Ribbentrop did not speak about the preservation of world peace, but assessed the correlation of forces between the participants in the imminent armed conflict: Germany and its opponents, England and France. The people who plotted the deal were unanimous about the purpose of the pact. At the same time, Stalin did not hide his preference given to Germany².

When analyzing the historical and international significance of the pact, one should start from the definition of V.M. Molotov pact as "a turning point in the history of Europe, and not only Europe"³. Definitions of od

nosyllabic, indicating far-reaching intentions

of the parties to the pact that entered into a relationship, according to "other historians", *a strategic partnership*.

But G. Gorodetsky has to, in order not to undermine

its historical construction, again demarcate

from "other historians". Therefore, the words of V.M. Molotov (as well as a number of eloquent facts of the Soviet-German

¹ German-Soviet Communiqué. September 18, 1939 // Ibid. T. 22. Book. 2. S. 98.

² Recording of the conversation of the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs with Stalin and Molotov. State secret. Office of the Imperial Foreign Minister. August 24, 1939 // USSR - Germany. 1939-1941. In 2 books. Vilnius, 1989. Book. 1. Documents and materials on Soviet-German relations from April to October 1939, pp. 65-69.

³ Speech by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. August 31, 1939 // The year of the crisis. T. 2. S. 350.

cooperation, including the joint partition of Poland), he writes, "should not be taken at face value" (p. 74). Why shouldn't it? Didn't the Stalinist leadership, whose general opinion is reflected in Molotov's definition, know what they were doing? The explanation of the Israeli historian is remarkably simple: "these episodes (as if small, insignificant events. — D.N.) reflect the difficulties that the Russians faced after the conclusion of the pact" (ibid.). "Other historians", on the contrary, on the basis of the same facts, came to the conclusion that the Soviet-German pact, like the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), launched a series of events that visibly accelerated the dramatic denouement of world contradictions.

If the assessment of V.M. Molotov, the significance of the Soviet-German pact is devoid of content, what to do with

his own statement about mutual geopolitical benefits

data that the parties received thanks to military-political cooperation? With his statement that the conclusion of the pact "eliminated the possibility of friction in Soviet-German relations during the carrying out of Soviet measures along our western border and, at the same time, provided Germany with calm confidence in the East"?¹ This is about the territorial expansion of the Soviet Union at the expense of its small Eastern European neighbors and the victories of the German army in Western Europe.

In the document "On the Current Tasks of Propaganda" prepared in May 1941 by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as one of the two reasons for German success in the war against France and England - after the factor of Germany's military superiority - it was called that, preparing for war, she tried to establish "friendly relations with the USSR." France, which suffered defeat, on the contrary, showed, like England, "frivolous

¹Foreign policy of the USSR. Report of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on August 1, 1940 // Pravda. August 2, 1940

a different attitude to the question of the role and relative weight of the Soviet Union"1.

Are there not many official statements that "should not be taken at face value"? Did the "Stalinist onslaught on Europe"2, the capitulation of France (according to the English historian Reynolds, which influenced the situation all over the world)3, the liquidation of the independence of many small European states —these "real events" of 1939-1940 not lead to *dramatic geopolitical shifts* on the continent?

G. Gorodetsky convinces the reader not to trust only what the head of the Soviet government V.M. Molotov, but also to Comrade Stalin. He writes: "It would be a mistake *to take at face value* Stalin's own explanation that when he signed the pact, he knew that he would have to fight Germany, and he wanted only a respite" (p. 61. *My italics.*). And a few lines above say the exact opposite - that the pact "reflected the relative weakness of Russia and *the excellent understanding* that sooner or later Russia will have to meet Germany on the battlefield" (ibid. *My italics.*).

The refusal of G. Gorodetsky to recognize the significance of the generalizing self-assessments of Soviet policy by the Stalinist leadership, declaring them not worthy of being taken at face value (the matter is not limited to these two examples - see below), forces touch on his other research methods and whose properties. Thus, Stalin's words that "the actions of the Red Army are also the cause of the world revolution" are declared by him to be "an unsuccessful statement" (p. 78).

1 On the current tasks of propaganda (with comments by A.A. Zhdanov). // RGASPI. F. 77, op. 4, d. 13, l. 164-165, 167.

2 See: Raak RC Stalin's Drive to the West. 1938-1945. The Origins of the Cold War. Stanford (Cal.), 1995.

3 See *Reynolds D.* 1940 and its place in the history of the 20th century. // XX century: Main problems and trends in international relations. Based on the materials of the international conference November 21-23, 1989, Moscow. M., 1992. S. 49-95.

There are even more examples when an Israeli historian rejects important provisions on the grounds that, they say, this is just a verbal tribute to ideology.

The strange conclusions of G. Gorodetsky put the reader of his book in front of a dilemma. What to believe: the author's current ideas about the events of that time or how the world perceived these events?

ders, according to which they built their lytic? The reader would be spared such a choice if the author of The Icebreaker Myth followed his call "to try to understand the moods of the people of that period and not judge them from the positions of today." Indeed, how else to approach historical events?!

What follows is no less odd. Standing up for the military Stalinist foreign policy, G. Gorodetsky writes that it is in vain that historians "give priority to attention to the top secret protocols signed a month later," using them to reveal the true aims of Soviet policy (see italics in the above quote from The Myth of the Icebreaker). Why in vain? That is why, he argues, the secret protocols were signed a month later, and not immediately, not together with the pact. Therefore, secret protocols

ly did not have the importance that they attach to "other some historians." It comes to the point that on the following pages he argues with himself, proving the existence of a connection between the pact and the secret protocols (pp. 45-46). In light of what has already been said about the techniques used by the Israeli historian to reinforce the oddities of the Icebreaker Myth, it is difficult to suspect him of inattention when reading documentary publications with the text of the pact. He could not but know that together with the pact on the night of August 23-24, 1939, the secret additional protocol attached to it was signed - the first *and main* of the total number of six secret protocols adopted by the parties in 1939-1941. *taken over several*

years, not one month. Both documents, the pact and the secret protocol, according to which the parties "discussed in strict

confidentially the question of the delimitation of spheres of mutual interests in Eastern Europe", in the corresponding diplomatic publications follow one after another on adjacent pages¹. Agree, all this is more than strange.

Finally, does G. Gorodetsky really not know that it was not the pact itself, but the secret protocol supplementing it on the division of Eastern Europe that became the main subject of negotiations in the Kremlin? We are reading a note to the secret protocol published in the 22nd volume of Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR. A reservation about the absence of a record of the negotiations in the Kremlin (in fact, there is a German record of the negotiations mentioned above).

ditch; I think there is also a Soviet record of negotiations, only hidden far away) is accompanied by a note by the compilers of the volume that Stalin considered it necessary to begin his meeting with I. Ribbentrop on August 23 precisely with the question of delimiting "spheres of interest"². In his last speech at the Nuremberg trials, I. Ribbentrop said that when he came to Moscow to conclude a pact, Stalin "made it clear that if he did not get half of Poland and the Baltic countries, without Lithuania with the port of Libava, then I I can fly right back." Which was recorded in the secret protocol.

By the way, this most important volume (in two books) of the well-known series "Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR", dedicated to 1939, was not reflected in the "Myth of the Icebreaker". Meanwhile, in the documents of the volume, a counter movement of the parties to the pact is traced, the impetus to which was given by the demand of V.M. Molotov to bring "an appropriate political base" under

¹ See Volume 22, Book 1, Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR, published in 1992: 484. Nonaggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union. [August 23, 1939] - S. 630 - 632; 485. Secret Additional Protocol. [August 23, 1939] - S. 632.

² Ibid. S. 591 (note 178).

³ See: Recording of the conversation of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov with the German Ambassador to the USSR F. Schulenburg. May 20 1939 Secret. // DVP USSR. T. 22. Book. 1. S. 386-387.

relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. What he immediately began to achieve, replacing M.M. Litvinov in the NKID USSR¹. These are the methods used by the historian of Israel to get rid of deepening into international relations on the eve of the war and to avoid raising the question of Stalin's role in unleashing a world war.

In addition, by stating that the secret protocol was signed not simultaneously with the non-aggression pact, but a month later, G. Gorodetsky bypasses the old problem of Soviet foreign policy - how to keep the secret protocol to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939 . *Half a century*

Soviet leaders, from Comrade Stalin to M.S. Gorbachev, hid the secret of the secret protocol from our public. It lasted so long because the disclosure of the contents of the protocol removed the question of who, at what particular moment and for what purpose unleashed a world war. This also explains the "touching unity" in preserving the secret of the secret protocol, which was carried through the entire world war by the Nazi leaders and the Stalinist leadership. True, it is interesting, what turned out to be more significant than the battle of mortal enemies - Stalin and Hitler, since none of them dared to publish the secret protocol, blaming the opposite side for everything?

The fact that G. Gorodetsky follows the Soviet tradition of keeping the secret protocol secret (using a technique that none of the followers of the "Falsifiers of History" had thought of before him - they say that the pact and the secret protocol were signed at different times), is not could not affect his interpretation of the historical significance of the pact (and again: in striking contrast to "other historians"). It is also striking that, while justifying the foreign policy of the Stalinist leadership, he completely ignores the problem of the relationship between

¹History of diplomacy. Volume 3: Diplomacy during the preparation of the Second World War (1919-1939). Ed. Academician V.P. According to Temkin. M.; L., 1945. S. 679-686.

politics and morals in relation to international wearing 1939-1941. In his narrowly diplomatic narrative, all powers and their leaders are equalized as subjects of international relations. "Other historians" take a completely different approach.

Since the moral aspect of "actual events" is of little interest to the author of *The Myth of the Icebreaker*, he sees nothing wrong with the fact that the Stalinist leadership in the last pre-war months negotiated simultaneously with the countries of the democratic West and with Nazi Germany. For G. Gorodetsky, who develops his thesis about a hostile encirclement that "closed more and more around the Soviet Union", this is "realistic politics" (pp. 46, 57). In other words, there was nothing left to do but pursue "a policy that would best suit the security of the Soviet Union" (p. 60).

Thus was born Stalin's decision to make a pact with Nazi leader Hitler.

The final conclusion of the author of *The Icebreaker Myth* is that both in 1939 and in 1941 Stalin's actions are explained by the "hopelessness of political alternatives for the Soviet Union" (p. 344). Recognizing, however, that since the spring of 1939, with British guarantees to Poland, the Soviet Union "has been given the opportunity to choose", that is, it has gained freedom of maneuver, which is "the crown of success in any foreign policy" (pp. 52-53). But why does G. Gorodetsky say that there are no alternatives for the USSR? Only because he was never able to understand the motives of the Stalinist leadership, because it was guided in foreign policy *by exclusively* class-imperial goals. In the extremely favorable international conditions created for the USSR.

It is hard to believe that a historian with fifteen years of experience in studying the international events of that time is not aware that both the Western countries, democratic England and France, and Nazi Germany attached decisive importance to which side

the Soviet Union will find itself in an approaching general conflict. Therefore, along with the officially announced Soviet-Western negotiations, there were *secret* bilateral Soviet-German "conversations" (VM Molotov) and "conversations" (J. Ribbentrop).

In the political and diplomatic circles of Europe, there was a belief that a large-scale conflict on the continent would begin only after the Soviet Union had made its choice - the last unbiased great European power that could tip the scales in one direction or another. *But not before.*

Let us resort to the testimony of a direct participant in the prewar diplomatic negotiations on the Soviet side with representatives of both the West and Germany. To the testimony of V.P. Potemkin, in 1937-1940 the first deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs of the USSR. Later editor-in-chief of the third volume of The History of Diplomacy (first edition), devoted entirely to the diplomatic training of the Second World War and published three years before The Falsifiers of History appeared. In the chapter on pre-war

1939, and its co-author was V.P. Potemkin, highlighted the paragraph "The rivalry between the Anglo-French bloc and German fascist diplomacy because of the agreement with the USSR"¹. It turns out that the Soviet Union was not only not under siege, but was in a winning position when there was *rivalry*, a competitive struggle to win it over to its side. For - this is how a couple of graphs begin: "for both camps, *the exceptional importance*

acquired the question of which side the Soviet Union would be on in the coming clash. A high-ranking eyewitness testifies: Stalin's Soviet Union *was the master of the situation*, the choice was his. And it was made - in favor of Nazi Germany.

And what do the published Soviet and foreign diplomatic documents say? Which of the versions do they confirm: the early one in the "History of the Diploma

¹ Ibid. S. 679 (italics mine. - *Auth.*).

² *Najafov D.G.* USSR in post-Munich Europe. October 1938 - March 1939 // Patriotic history. 2000 No. 2. S. 67-88.

ty" or the later one in "The Falsifiers of History", which G. Gorodetsky is trying to revive and develop with his book?

I have already had to prove that the Soviet leaders in post-Munich Europe did not at all consider themselves in "international isolation", much less in a "siege". On the contrary, Stalin and his entourage believed that the time had come when they could follow the example of Tsarist Russia, which often determined the outcome of the conflict in intra-European conflicts.

G. Gorodetsky, digressing from the motives of the Stalinist leadership, argues that the choice of whether to support the Western countries or their enemy in the person of Germany, the Soviet Union was deprived of the intractability of the Western powers at the tripartite negotiations in Moscow and the fear of war with Germany as a result of its invasion of Poland (pp. 57-59). On these pages, referring to the secret intelligence data of May 7 and June 19, which fell on the table to Stalin and allegedly determined his policy "for the next two years", the Israeli historian again imposes on the reader the absolutely unsubstantiated conclusion that "Stalin's there was no alternative to signing the pact" (p. 61). As in "Falsify"

history", where the signing of the pact is given for "the best way out of all possible ways out" 2.

But what about the official Soviet statements, according to which things look completely different? For G. Gorodetsky, this is not a problem. Or, as already noted, he simply dismisses such statements, offering not to take them at face value. Or,

as in this case, again ignored the statements the Stalinist leadership, which was still confident that the aggression of Nazi Germany was primarily directed not against the Soviet Union, but against France and England. One of these statements

¹ History falsifiers. S. 54.

² Report of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the international situation and foreign policy of the USSR". May 31, 1939 // The year of the crisis. T. 1. S. 524 - 525.

niy V.M. Molotov did this at the end of May, commenting on the conclusion of the German-Italian military-political treaty on May 22. According to him, now the aggressors no longer need to hide behind the screen of the struggle against the Comintern to divert attention. Now "it is definitely said that this treaty is directed precisely against the main European democratic countries"¹. Even according to the intelligence information of June 19 (p. 59), about which G. Gorodetsky speaks so highly ("outstanding document", "brilliant intelligence information"), the German plans for the Soviet Union did not go beyond its temporary neutralization by "second Rapallo.

Comrade Stalin took full advantage of the possibilities of maneuvering in the unique situation that opened up for him. The Soviet leader, who supposedly had no other choice but to make "a choice in favor of

lesser of two evils" - that is, to conclude a pact with Hitler (p. 61), took advantage of the opportunity presented to him to advance in his class imperial plans.

After the outbreak of war between Germany and England and France, which acted in accordance with their obligations on the side of Poland, Stalin explained with the utmost frankness the motives for which he had concluded a non-aggression pact with Hitler. He did this on September 7, when he received G. Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, who applied for political guidelines for the Comintern. In the presence of V.M. Molotov and A.A. Zhdanov, the closest members of the Politburo to Stalin at that time.

Stalin's instructions became known from G. Dimitrov's diary, which was also used by G. Gorodets. But he acted selectively with this document, opus

tive the most essential part, revealing the village, pledged by Comrade Stalin in a pact with Hitler. Of course, after everything that has been said about the research methodology of the Israeli historian, it is hardly surprising

¹ Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Comintern. 1919 - 1943. Documents. M., 2004. S. 780.

Remarkably, in a similar way - all methods are good, just to support his version of events, he also dealt with the diary of G. Dimitrov, who recorded Stalin's statements.

G. Gorodetsky twice refers to the diaries of the leader of the Comintern (pp. 76-77).

For the first time, citing Stalin's words about the fate that was prepared for Poland: "The destruction of this state in the current conditions would mean one less bourgeois state! What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we extended the socialist] system to new territories and populations"1. G. Gorodetsky's comment: "As usual, he [Stalin] frankly defended the interests and priorities of the Soviet Union, slightly covering them with an ideological veil ... However, such statements should not be taken *at face value*." Like, "the interests of the USSR, and not Lenin's dogmas about the "imperialist war" prevailed (p. 77. *My italics*.). Well, yes, after all, the Stalinist Soviet Union has long abandoned the offensive against the positions of world capitalism ...

For the second time, the Israeli historian used Stalin's statements about the tripartite negotiations in Moscow. He cites (incompletely) another passage from Stalin's instructions to the Comintern that "we preferred an agreement with the so-called democratic countries and therefore negotiated. But the British and French wanted to have us as farmhands and, moreover, to pay nothing for it! We, of course, would not have gone to work as farm laborers and received even less nothing. Quoted without comment. But there is something to comment on.

It would seem that G. Gorodetsky should have been interested in what Stalin was trying to achieve in the negotiations with England and France, what kind of "payment" he demanded in exchange for "farming". And he demanded from them what he received from Hitler - control over the western border neighbors between the Baltic and Black Seas. But

1The conversation is reproduced according to the diary entry of G. Dimitrov. //

Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) - Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Comintern. S. 779 - 780.

England and France did not agree to this in any way, which Stalin could not help but take into account. One might wonder why, even while fighting as part of the anti-Hitler coalition, the Western allies did not recognize the right of the Soviet Union to the three Baltic states. They did not do this even after the end of the war. One more question could be asked: whether Stalin, by putting forward such territorial demands at the tripartite Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, did not want to convey to Hitler his conditions for reaching an agreement with him. After all, the course of the Moscow negotiations was no secret to the Germans.

And omitted by G. Gorodetsky, as already mentioned, is the most important of Stalin's "frank conversation" (p. 76) with G. Dimitrov. For reasons of scientific conscientiousness, let us restore that part of Stalin's statements in which an assessment of the Soviet-German pact is given *in the context* of the world war.

Describing the outbreak of the war as a fight

"between two groups of capitalist countries",

Stalin continued: "We are not averse to them having a good fight and weakening each other. It would not be bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) were shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler himself, without understanding or wanting to do so, shakes and undermines the capitalist system... We can maneuver, pushing one side against the other, so as to better tear ourselves apart. The non-aggression pact helps Germany to some extent. The next step is to push the other side."¹

As a reader of *The Myth of the Icebreaker*, I cannot help feeling embarrassed for the Israeli historian. Having cited, at the very least, two quotations from Stalin's instructions to G. Dimitrov, he hid from the reader the most fundamental part of them. That the Soviet-German pact helps Hitler, who, without realizing it

¹ See: *Belousova Z.S., Nadzhafov D.G. Challenge to Capitalism: The Soviet Factor in World Politics. // XX century. Diversity, contradiction, integrity. M., 1996. S. 83.*

first, the war with the Western countries undermines capitalism in Europe; that the belligerents should be further encouraged so that they "better torn apart." I am embarrassed that I cannot find an answer befitting a professional historian to the question why he did not dare to quote Stalin's key phrases about the purpose of the Soviet-German pact. Why did he so frankly renounce his promise to write, while maintaining objectivity, which, in his opinion, the "ignorant" V. Suvorov and "other historians" lack? What to do with his own call "to try to understand the moods of the people of that period and not to judge them from the standpoint of today". The revelations of Stalin, the central figure of the whole story, deserved to be reported in their entirety and expertly analyzed.

We have to state that G. Gorodetsky omitted the most important part of Stalin's testimonies because these revelations alone *prove* the concept of V. Suvorov's "Icebreaker". This is not only a rejection of the principle of objectivity, but a tacit recognition of the inconsistency of his "non-trivial" version of the Soviet foreign policy of 1939-1941.

Once the Israeli historian embarked on the path of concealing the most important Stalinist documents ("A Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks", a report at the 18th Congress, the most revealing part of the instructions to the Comintern), he continued it with respect to other historical evidence. Thus, in *The Myth of the Icebreaker* there was no place for diplomatic reports to Moscow from European capitals, which spoke of the panic that had seized the Western countries before the inevitable social consequences of the world war¹. Does it really seem to its author that the figures of that time acted

voila according to the prescriptions that he writes out to them retroactively?!

Speaking about the goals of Soviet foreign policy in connection with the World War, G. Gorodetsky completely abstracted

¹Stalin I. V. Economic problems of socialism in the USSR. M., 1952. S. 30.

comes from its geopolitical consequences—the expansion of Soviet control into Eastern and Central Europe all the way to Berlin. The successive "pushing" of the parties, supposedly equally hostile to the USSR, resulted in Soviet participation - *on a contractual basis!* in both warring coalitions. First, having concluded two agreements with Nazi Germany in August-September 1939 and entered into officially recognized

"friendly relations"; then, after the beginning of the Soviet German war, joining the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, announcing the unification of the efforts of their countries in the war against "Nazi tyranny". This is one of *the main*

events of the early stages of World War II. They cannot be bypassed or misinterpreted.

At the end of the war, Stalin again equalized the two coalitions, as he had done before the war, describing the Second World War as a clash between "two capitalist coalitions clinging to each other" in order to "achieve world domination"¹. And at the party congress of 1952, the historical significance of the world war (that is, its main result) was considered from the angle of the formation of a "camp of peace and democracy, opposing the camp of imperialism"². What more evidence is needed that the Stalinist leadership proceeded from the postulate of necessity in its foreign policy?

take advantage of "inter-imperialist contradictions" whose" in the interests of the "cause of socialism"?! More precisely, for the class-imperial purposes of the Stalinist Soviet Union.

Stalin's speech on March 10 with its pro-German accents; Litvinov, Stalin's instructions K.E. Voroshilov dated August 7, frankly aimed at disrupting the transitions that have not yet begun.

1 G. Malenkov. Reporting report to the XIX Party Congress on the work of Tsen Central Committee of the CPSU (b). October 5, 1952. M., 1952. S. 9.

2 See Instructions to the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K.E. Voroshilov, head of the Soviet delegation in negotiations with the military missions of Great Britain and France. August 7, 1939 Secret. // DVP USSR. T. 22. Book. 1. S. 584.

negotiations with the military missions of England and France¹, the decision of the Politburo of August 11 on the readiness to enter into official negotiations on issues already agreed with the German side (which constituted the content of the secret protocol)² - this is an incomplete list of documented facts of the spring-summer of 1939, speaking about the purposeful course of the Stalinist leadership towards reaching agreements with Nazi Germany.

Perhaps this series should be supplemented with another archival document on how Stalin's inner circle imagined the outcome of the parallel officially announced tripartite (USSR, England and France) and secret bilateral (USSR and Germany) negotiations.

This document is a transcript of the report by D.Z. Manuilsky in an audience consisting of representatives of the party and scientific elite. They spoke confidentially about the prospects for the Moscow tripartite talks: "We are well aware that now we are being looked after like a rich Moscow bride in their time (laughter), but we know the price of our beauty (applause) and if we make a marriage, then by calculation (laughter, applause). Marriage for love will not enter us (so in the text. - D.N.), but by calculation - you are welcome. And at the end of the speech, in response to questions: "I am not a great optimist, I will not say, like the English press, that the agreement between the USSR and Britain and France is already in her pocket. There may be a fig in your pocket. Apparently, having come to his senses, he continued: "This is a serious question, I won't say that." Nevertheless: "And I say, I am not an optimist, I do not think that the agreement is already in my pocket, I just, as a Soviet person, have a large share of skepticism." There was no place for documents of this kind in the Mi fe of the Icebreaker.

¹ Communication of the Commission for Political and Legal Evaluation of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. (Report of the chairman of the commission A.N. Yakovlev on December 23, 1989 at the II Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. // Pravda, December 24, 1989.

² Transcript of Comrade's report. Manuilsky about international polo zheniya. July 14, 1939 // RGASPI. F. 523, op. 1, d. 92, l. 18, 43, 44.

6. No dry residue

Why did V. Suvorov's "Icebreaker" find its many readers, and why did G. Gorodets' "The Myth of the Icebreaker" not? Therefore, it seems that not only the historical truth proclaimed by each of these authors is important, but also the path to this truth, which the reader travels together with the researcher. The path of evidence based on facts, documents, arguments. Whoever has it more convincingly has grateful readers.

Historical retrospective, reflected in the words and deeds of Comrade Stalin, convinces us that *the outcome* (yes, the outcome!) of his pre-war foreign policy, the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, was predetermined by the calculation of undermining the forces of the capitalist countries in a new world war. The pact was a practical application of the Marxist-Leninist idea of using "inter-imperialist contradictions" in the class-imperial interests of the Stalinist Soviet Union. Hence the Soviet rushing from cooperation with Germany (1939-1941) to joining the anti-Hitler coalition together with England, the USA and France (1941-1945). None of the main participants in the world war went through such profound military and political zigzags as the Soviet Union; all the other participants in the war—a *coalition* war on both sides—decided in advance on the choice of potential allies.

In general, the "Myth of the Icebreaker" by G. Gorodetsky is nothing but a *remake* of Stalin's "Falsifiers of History", the provisions of which have long been abandoned by historians who respect themselves and readers. By opposing himself to other historians, and not only to V. Suvorov, the author deprived himself of the opportunity to try to reveal the historical significance of the Second World War. Not to mention the fact that the general context remained out of his attention. The 20th century is a global confrontation between democracy and totalitarianism.

*Uri Milstein**

VOLUNTEER ASSISTANTS OF STALIN

Why they hate Viktor Suvorov

Having analyzed all the military moves of Adolf Hitler in my time - especially those relating to August / September 1939 - I came to the conclusions set forth in *The Collapse and Its Lessons* (1993)¹, which draws parallels between the Yom Kippur War²

1973 and the crossing of the Maas by the Wehrmacht in 1940.

German government in the late 1930s was not interested either in a world war, or even in a war against Poland. He was much more concerned - and with good reason - that the combined forces of Great Britain and France would reach the western borders of the German Reich, while the Soviet Union would attack the eastern borders at the same time. Hitler believed that he would need years more to arm and fortify himself before he could risk a general European war, and that if he risked war now, he would put at stake everything that had been created by his aggressive policy. Namely, the transformation of a defeated country into a great power in just seven years of successful all-in strategy. September 1

1939 Hitler was sure that his entry into Poland would not lead to war, since he still had before his eyes the peaceful annexation of the Sudetenland without firing a shot, and that Poland would accept it.

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demands without going to war. Hitler thought so also because Poland was weaker than Czechoslovakia, and because Stalin, by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, gave him a guarantee of non-aggression, and the secret protocol to it meant an unequivocal collapse in the future of Eastern Europe.

Hitler was wrong on all these points.

For Stalin, the strategic significance of the pact was that it created the Moscow-Berlin axis, which allowed the Reich - at first - to seize Western Europe.

ropa, but then allowing the destruction of German then comrades by pact and, as a third step, the subjugation of the whole world to Bolshevism.

Actually, even then it was clear that we were talking about a pact between enemies, ready at any moment to crush and destroy the enemy even before you ink dries on paper.

It is possible that Stalin signed the pact in the expectation that the Third Reich would develop its armed forces no faster than after 1933; in the middle of 1940, the Nazi army would not have been able to offer serious resistance to the attacking Red Army. Since the time of Peter the Great Germany

personified for the Russians the pinnacle of progress and the ideal for achievement. Therefore, just at that time, Stalin staked on a war between the capitalist countries of the West, which, according to his plans, were destined sooner or later to be included in the community of communist states.

Even at a time when I knew nothing about Viktor Suvorov and his grandiose work, it seemed clear to me that Stalin encouraged Hitler to attack Poland. If Stalin had attacked Poland at the same time as Hitler—as implied by the supplementary agreement to the non-aggression pact, or a day later, as Hitler demanded of him—then Great Britain and France would not have dared to declare war on the German-Soviet military alliance. This follows from the German

the call to the Soviet Union on September 3, 1939, to enter Poland in accordance with the agreement, that is, on the very day that Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. Stalin was extremely interested in the Western democracies declaring war on Germany, since this eliminated the threat of the USSR in the future and weakened all the countries involved in the war; this was to be the first step towards a future Soviet invasion.

The former Soviet secret service officer Viktor Suvorov, who turned his back on collapsing Soviet totalitarianism in 1978 and defected to the liberal West, devoted all his energies to uncovering Stalin's master plan: the Soviet leader sought world domination of Bolshevik totalitarianism and wanted to turn Bolshevik totalitarianism into his in favor of the German military potential. The goal of Stalin's intrigues was to unleash war with superior German forces under the command of the vicious and invincible "watch dog" (to use the expression of Suvorov himself)³ - Adolf Hitler.

Since the beginning of 1990, a "world war" has flared up among historians over the question of the main culprit. Today, everything speaks for the fact that there was one main culprit of the Second World War - and the catastrophe that overtook the Jewish people - and it was not the "chain dog" Adolf Hitler, but the one who set him on his neighbors: Joseph Stalin.

Suvorov's book "The Main Culprit"⁴, published in the USA in 2008, aims to finally confirm the thesis, which was first stated twenty years earlier in the book "Icebreaker".

Suvorov's concept is so simple and elegant, which seems surprising, why only in mid 1980s he was the first to consistently build it. This concept is based, among other things, on the contacts that arose between the Soviets and the NSDAP in 1923; forbidding the German Communists in 1933 to enter into a coalition with the Social Democrats, which could prevent

to support the rise of the Nazis to power; on the support that losing the war Germany secretly received from Soviet Russia, so that it could develop military products and train army officers in the Soviet

territory - which completely contradicted the prohibitions imposed on the Germans by the Treaty of Versailles.

It should be emphasized that "The Main Culprit" is by no means a reprint of Suvorov's classic work "The Icebreaker", published in 1989. In the new book, Suvorov masterfully uses numerous latest publications published in different countries (some - 2008) , while his first-born "Icebreaker" relied only on open sources of the Soviet era. In the new book, Suvorov examines in detail many important events that had previously been beyond his attention - the assassination of Trotsky, the war in Spain, the attack on Japan in August 1945.

With extremely unprofessional hostility for an educated person, the concept of Suvorov was considered by the famous American historian David Glantz in his 1998 book *The Stumbling Colossus*⁵ and by no less respectable Israeli historian of diplomacy Gabriel Gorodetsky in his book *Fatal Self-Deception* (1999). 6.

Both of them do not discuss the results of Suvorov's research at all, but simply declare that their own books of Suvorov have been refuted.

Most trained historians have followed the tick of an ostrich, sticking its head in the sand, in the hope that if Suvorov's works are hushed up, everyone will forget about them. Such a tactic only demonstrates the unreasonableness of these historians themselves - it is thanks to this silence that Suvorov's works become even more famous (I myself paid attention to Suvorov's works, because I heard that they were hushed up).

Glantz and Gorodetsky failed to refute Suvorov's arguments, they only made their own

own, extremely superficial understanding of what was happening in the USSR.

Their criticism, combined with the silence of others, says more about the nature of the Western "left," which is a product of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, slightly polished by the intellectual chatter of the Frankfurt School and its most famous representative in the West, the German-Jewish scholar Herbert Marcuse, than about Hitler and Stalin.

Both Soviet and Western historians justified the conclusion of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939 - the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - by the fact that it was allegedly concluded under the pressure of the situation and it cannot be condemned, because - as they say the USSR was very weak then. First of all, due to the fact that Soviet officers became victims of political purges, such as, for example, Marshal Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevsky. Therefore, Stalin wanted to win a couple of years in order to have time to arm himself for the decisive battle with Hitler.

Before Suvorov, there was a consensus on this issue: Soviet scientists were afraid for their lives, their Western colleagues were fascinated by the Soviet Union. And most importantly: the German Reich attacked the USSR in June 1941, and the Red Army was defeated. For everyone, this meant that the combat capabilities of the Red Army in 1941 were not in the best way. Consequently, in 1939 it must have been much weaker still.

However, Suvorov brilliantly refuted this argument in his new book and proved that the purges did not at all noticeably weaken the Red Army. Stalin, a master of disguise, perfectly aware of the high combat capability of the Red Army, carefully concealed it from the rest of the world. Suvorov, talking about Stalin's strategy secretly sti, writes, for example, that just in those days when the German-Soviet non-aggression pact was signed, the Red Army won a triumphant victory over

the Japanese in Mongolia, but this triumph was, at the direction of the Soviet higher authorities, "rolled up under the rug."

Since the destruction of the Spanish Armada in 1588 the Anglo-Saxons set the tone in the world, although many tried to challenge their superiority by force.

By the beginning of the 20th century, more than three hundred years later, the Anglo-Saxons had established a liberal political civilization, and American liberalism emerged victorious from World War I, in spite of US military weakness, but thanks to US industrial superiority.

Since then, it was American liberalism, in alliance with the European satellites of the United States, Great Britain and France, that set the tone in the world.

But even before this US victory, the Bolshevik revolutionary Vladimir Lenin wrote in his work *The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution* (1916/1917) that communist totalitarianism would use war as a means of conquering the world and that, if this goal was not achieved, more one world war to spread the Marxist utopia to the whole world. And before the messianic victory of this utopia, Lenin intended to build his dominion on the cruel Marxist idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." After the October Revolution of 1917, Lenin tried to prolong the world war by securing the support of the German Empire: in March 1918, the freshly minted Soviet Republic signed a peace treaty with Germany, which after that could continue to fight only on the Western Front. In addition, Germany received from Russia huge territories with industrial enterprises, agricultural production and important military raw materials.

Lenin believed that the capitalist states of the West would exhaust each other, that the exploited masses would rise up, and that revolutions would break out all over Europe, directly or indirectly to the advantage of the Bolsheviks. But Germany agreed in November 1918 to a cessation of hostilities, and the revolution,

cited by the Bolsheviks in some European countries, quickly died out. It soon became clear that communism in Europe in peacetime had no chance of winning.

Therefore, the Bolsheviks became secret warmongers.

According to Stalin's plan, Hitler - whose work "Mein Kampf" was very quickly translated into Russian and carefully studied by Stalin - was to break through the fairway like an "icebreaker" in the frozen ocean of liberal Western Europe. After that, the Red Army would be able to invade Europe without much resistance and bring joy to its peoples on bayonets.

munism.

Hitler, however, was not a very attentive reader of the works of Lenin and Stalin, and this was precisely one of the reasons for his last failure: Stalin surpassed him intellectually.

War is, first of all, a war of the spirit, even Frederick II of Prussia once instilled this in his generals.

In most Western countries - and in Israel as well - Suvorov is more than unloved by the academic historical community. However, in the same Israel, he has countless readers, especially among the million immigrants from the former USSR. The hatred of the academic community can be explained by the fact that it is almost entirely formed by the Frankfurt School, which strongly influenced Israeli culture. Dr. Gideon Ariel and I dealt with this problem in our book Dream Oasis.

However, scholars from the Civic Forum for the Study of Combat 8 found much in common between Suvorov's theses and their own research on the war between Israel, Egypt, and Syria in 1973.

According to Suvorov, Stalin was planning an attack on Germany, but Hitler preempted him with a preemptive attack on June 22, 1941. Asked why the Soviet

The Russian armed forces suffered such a crushing defeat immediately after the start of Operation Barbarossa, Glantz and Gorodetsky answer: Stalin interpreted the intelligence information received by Stalin in such a way that Hitler would not be able to dare to attack. Therefore, the Soviet dictator turned out to be

completely unprepared for an attack.

Suvorov answers the same question differently: the Red Army was defeated because it was preparing to attack
Denia.

Something similar happened during the Yom Kippur War. Israeli forces stationed along the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights were stunned that the Egyptians and Syrians seized the initiative in April 1973. Most researchers, both in Israel and elsewhere, see the reason for this confusion as a misinterpretation of intelligence information. Members of the Civil Forum group came across an unexpected fact: despite the defensive policy after the six day war in 1967, the Israeli army received only offensive weapons - aircraft and tanks, developed only offensive strategies and planned only offensive operations in a future war.

After it became clear at 3:30 in the morning of October 6 that war would begin on that day, Chief of the General Staff David Elazar and his officers were busy developing exclusively offensive plans, although they knew full well that Israel would be attacked by seven Egyptian and Syrian divisions. They were opposed by only three Israeli regiments, two of which were to be destroyed that day.

Just as exactly as Suvorov's concept, they were either ignored or met with hostility at the opening of the "Civil Forum". This is the reason for the "ruling madness" (*Torheit der Regierenden*) exposed by the American Jewish historian Barbara Tuchman in 1984 in the book of the same name. intellectual elite

clung to false dogmas, only to not admit that she was wrong.

Stalin was - and this is provable - not only the main culprit of the Second World War and the catastrophe that befell the Jews, but also - as Suvorov shows -

the next spread of Marxist influence on

sham-liberal West, a spread that took the form of such a "religion of prudence" that Maximilian Robespierre and his accomplices failed to impose on revolutionary France after 1791.

Karl Marx defined religion as "the opium of the people." He understood that the masses cannot live without religion. But since traditional, transcendental religion had suffered greatly under the skepticism of the eighteenth century, the leaders of the French Revolution decided to create an intellectual opium.

Marx succeeded where all of his predecessors: he created a religion based on an anti-capitalist utopia.

But Marx was wrong, because he did not understand that modern civilization is based on capital, on surplus value, and without it we will be plunged into an era of hunting and gathering. Marx's theses were molded by Lenin and later by Stalin into a dogma that has remained unshakable since the end of the First World War. Pseudo-liberal intellectuals have been infected with this dogma for nine decades, and that is why they play the role of inquisitors in relation to people like Viktor Suvorov, the latter who are able to prove the hopelessness of their religion. Stalin failed to conquer all of Europe, and what he managed to conquer has long since fallen apart again. Today, China, with its mixture of "Nazi" political totalitarianism and economic liberalism, is on the rise and reaching for world domination.

But in one respect, Stalin had an undoubted success - he harnessed Western intellectuals to his cart.

Notes

¹ Defeat and its Lessons, 1993.

² Doomsday War. 3

"When we commemorate with an unkind word the dog that bit half of Europe, let's not forget Stalin, who raised the dog. And then he let go of the chain. *Suvorov Victor*. Icebreaker. Moscow: ACT, 2001, p. 13.

⁴ Suworow Viktor The Chief Culprit (2008).

⁵ Glantz David. Stumbling Colossus, University Press of Kansas. 1998.

⁶ *Gorodetsky Gabriel*. Grand Delusion, 1999. Russian edition: Roco

howling self-deception. Moscow: Rosspen, 2001.

⁷ The Oasis of Dreams. Survival Press, 2006.

⁸ Ziviles Forum für die Untersuchung von Schlachten.

Andrey Burovsky

SUVOROV - REVISION DETONATOR

I dare to report - but the volunteer
this
mind!

A.I. Kuprin

An attack on a myth

In 1990, Viktor Suvorov's book *Ledo Kol* was published. A second boomed after her: "M-Day." The circulation of books instantly went off scale for a million, and from the territory of the then Soviet Union such

or that the volleys of thousands of Stalinists and "patriots"
"merged into a long howl."

17 years have passed, and Suvorov's books are all on the list of best sellers, and the debate around the burning problem does not subside: who attacked whom and when? Hitler against Stalin or Stalin against Hitler?

Probably, for posterity, the bitterness of these disputes
and their emotionality will seem strange.

More has been written about Suvorov and his books than the volume of his own books. And people don't calm down...

Showdown ancestors often seem like nonsense for later
cov.

It is difficult to understand like normal people who suddenly began to kill each other because of the most important question: to what extent and how exactly is the divine and human united in the person of Jesus Christ?

But they did kill. There are up to 15 million dead in Syria, Egypt, Asia Minor and Palestine.

It will probably be just as difficult for posterity to understand why the Suvorov-Rezun book caused such a mass hysteria. Why do people of the late XX - early XXI century

it was so important to "prove" one of the truths - who attacked and who attacked first?

The emotional charge of the controversy is no less striking than its scale. It would seem, well, what changes for the people of the 21st century from the fact that there was a Stalinist plan of attack on Europe? From whether Stalin planned to use Hitler as an "icebreaker of the revolution"? But it is clearly changing, and a lot.

People are fighting both "for" and "against" Suvorov, they accuse him in unheard of nasty things and put him on a pedestal almost with the same fury with which they performed patriotic deeds two generations earlier: they crushed each other with tanks, slashed with bayonets, finished off with rifle butts. The analogy is not lame at all. For a participant in the Second World War, pouring gasoline on and setting fire to the "enemy" wounded in a hospital or dropping bombs on a residential area of a "foreign" city meant defending "their own" and "their own" familiar, understandable world. Behind the controversy around Suvorov is the same desire to defend something familiar, native, understandable. In the war, as in the war, and they "wet" Suvorov-Rezun quite in a real way. Not in the order of discussion, but "for defeat", trying to destroy if not physically, then psychologically, spiritually, and most importantly - politically.

They also protect him seriously: they take out the wounded from the battlefield. Cover "their".

There is no polemic around the facts of history. There is a howl on, fortunately, so far only verbal.

It is immediately obvious: Suvorov encroached not on the historical knowledge.

The point is not at all in the facts and not even in their analysis. Not in concepts of historians or in the theories of political regimes. Suvorov encroached on something sacred. Something that is not allowed to be touched. Doubt about what causes an emotional reaction in the first place. tion.

The reaction is the same as if a Muslim in Rome lit a cigarette from a lamp or a Christian in Mecca rubbed under the pages of the Koran.

Suvorov encroached not on historical knowledge, but on historical myth. Not on facts, but on a warm, intimate attitude to historical facts.

Just do not consider historical myths as a purely Soviet phenomenon and some kind of attribute of Russia. World War II was a WORLD WAR. And the myths about it are also WORLDWIDE. The books of Viktor Suvorov - Vlady Mir Rezun caused the same hysterical reaction all over the world.

Historical knowledge as mythology

Often a myth is understood as any "wrong" statement. An opinion that contradicts the facts and is refuted by the facts. For example, the assertion that the Sun revolves around the Earth is declared a myth. But this is not a myth at all.

Ptolemy believed that the Earth is at the center of the Universe, around which the Sun revolves. Copernicus believed that the sun was at the center of the universe and that the earth revolved around the sun. Both are not myths, but scientific models. The model reflects the phenomenon. The model is always poorer than the reflected phenomenon, but it allows one to understand it. Ptolemy's model made it possible to understand the structure of the Universe worse than the Copernican model, but both of them in themselves did not carry an emotional charge.

Myth is both an explanation of the world and an attitude towards the world. It is knowledge and emotion together. Ptolemy and Copernicus did not say anything about whether it is good for the Earth and the Sun to rotate. And in the Book of Genesis, with which the Bible begins, it is said quite definitely: "And God saw that it was good"¹.

Being engaged in the structure of the Universe, scientists have little effect on the interests of people. There is enough mythology here, but it is much less than in history. historical sign

¹ Bible. Books of Holy Scripture and the Old Testament. Canonical. Moscow: Russian Bible Society, 1997. P. 7.

It is mythological in its very essence. Moreover, in history, a scientific theory without mythology will never become widely known, will not form the basis of the behavior of statesmen, will not be included in textbooks. This happens because the HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS of people is mythological.

Because the eternity and infinity of the universe is not are related to the interests of people and to their self-determination. And the history of countries and peoples has the most direct relation to national and cultural self-determination. Especially the history of countries and peoples that exist now. The history of Rome can be written "purely scientifically." The history of Germany and Russia - a lot harder.

The historical consciousness of man is mythological. Anytime and anywhere. With all socio-economic formations. People need more than just describing history and understanding it. They need to experience history together.

"A person cannot bear that he is left to his own forces, that he himself must give meaning to life, and not receive it from some higher power, therefore people need idols and myths," wrote Eric Fromm.

The modern social psychologist Serge Moscovici said even more briefly and harshly: "The masses cannot live in the open air."

The myth makes the mercilessly cold life warm and sincere, the cruelty of history is comprehended by the highest values, it includes a lonely person in the historical community. If something is wrong, "in the world and death is red." Especially in the name of higher eternal values.

The myth does not negate the facts at all. ... He "corrects" them in the "necessary" way. The myth does not interfere with the study of particular truths, it relies on them. And because the myth is always very similar to the truth. Only this truth is not an object

1 *Moskovichi S. Age of crowds. Moscow, 1996. S. 419.*

tive truth, but the private and subjective opinion of a group of people, and even the customer.

If a scientific study provoked an emotional reaction, it means that it encroached not on science, but on myth.

What myth was disputed by Viktor Suvorov?

The myth of the Great Patriotic War

The essence of the myth created by Stalinist propaganda during World War II is something like this: Soviet people worked peacefully in the 1930s. The industrial base for a new, happy life in the USSR was being created. The Soviet people did not want to conquer anyone and were not going to fight with anyone. They were happy with their work, under the guidance of their wise leaders. "Only the Soviet Union steadily pursued

the policy of peace, the policy of organizing a collective repulse the aggressors and support the peoples who have become victims of the aggressors"¹.

Nazi Germany invited the USSR to conclude a non-aggression pact. The Soviet Union was compelled to conclude this pact for the purpose of self-defence and in order to prevent the formation of a common front of the imperialist powers against the USSR.

¹ On September 1939, Nazi Germany attacked Poland, thus starting the Second World War. The Western powers betrayed Poland, and only the Soviet Union made a liberation campaign, liberated and annexed Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, and concluded mutual assistance pacts with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany suddenly and treacherously, without declaring war, attacked the Soviet Union. It had a colossal superiority in armaments and in technology, because Hitler had the resources of all of Europe at his disposal. In 1941, Veli began

¹ TSB. Second edition. T. 9. M., 1951. S. 358.

What Patriotic War. It was a war to save their homeland. Participation in the Great Patriotic War is a great feat and a colossal merit. If one of the Soviet people fought on the side of Hitler, then he is a disgusting traitor, and his behavior is

chenno "atypical".

Thanks to his military-technical superiority, Hitler was able to inflict a temporary defeat on the Soviet Union. But the Soviet people are patriots of their socialist homeland. They rallied even more closely around the Communist Party and, under the leadership of their brilliant leader and teacher, the greatest commander I.V. Stalin rose to the holy war of liberation and gave the enemy a crushing rebuff. The ingenious plan of the great Stalin, "Stalin's ten blows", led fascist Germany and all its allies to utter defeat.

The "fascists" were guided by the anti-scientific, reactionary doctrine of the inequality of the human races. They wanted to exterminate millions of innocent people on a national basis, and turn others into their slaves. The monstrous, unparalleled in the history of the crimes of the fascists condemned the deeply legal and progressive international Nuremberg Trials.

The victory of the "German fascist aggressors" would be the greatest misfortune for mankind. It would lead to the destruction of modern civilization, the enslavement and physical extermination of tens of millions of people.

In the USSR, the most advanced social theory of Karl Marx and V.I. Lenin, Marxism-Leninism. It has nothing in common with racial theory and the misanthropic teachings of the "fascists". With the help of this theory, Russia made the way from a wooden plow to an industrial civilization and thus showed the way to the whole world.

In the face of the USSR, progressive mankind defeated the "fascists" - obscurantists and scoundrels, stranglers of self

the best. The value of this victory is absolutely obvious and can never be questioned by anyone. "The Soviet people, by their selfless struggle, saved the civilization of Europe from the fascist pogromists. This is the great merit of the Soviet people before the history of mankind.

Why is this a myth?

The very name of the event is already mythological: the Great Patriotic War. From a grandiose event on a world scale, the Second World War of 1939-1945, a piece is arbitrarily cut out, which is given its own

independent meaning.

It turns out that the Great Patriotic War is the most important part of the Second World War. There is no Russian specificity in this. The Americans act in a similar way, proclaiming the military operations in the Pacific between the American and Japanese armies and navies as the most important events of the Second World War.

Soviet historians considered the battle of Stalingrad in 1942-1943 to be the main event of World War II. ("the most outstanding victory in the history of great wars")². American - the battle for the atoll Mi duei in 1942.

In the same way, English historians proclaim El Ala Maine in North Africa as the main battle of the Second World War.

From these comparisons it is already clear that the falsification of history is not the work of Soviet historians alone. Soviet falsification is grander in scale, but fundamentally the same in meaning.

But in this title - "The Great Patriotic War" there is an emotional, propagandistic charge. After all, the Americans had the conscience not to name the battle

1 *Stalin I. V.* About the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 5th ed.

2 TSB. T. 9. S. 359.

in the Pacific Ocean by the Great Patriotic War of the American people.

And Soviet propagandists had to separate the events of 1939-1941 from what happened after Hitler's attack. The name does just that.

Fascism was never the ideology of the Third Reich.

The very word "fascism" comes from the Italian "fasho" - that is, a bunch.

The Fascists in Italy and in Spain were conservatives. Their goal was to rally the nation in a fashion that is a bundle, and due to the growth of the corporate principle, curtailment of democratic freedoms to suppress the movement of socialists. After all, the socialists wanted to bring a utopia to life, to build an ideal society on principles invented by theoreticians. And the fascists wanted at all costs not to allow them to do this, to preserve the gains of the civilization of the 19th century.

There were almost no fascists in Germany, and they never were in power. Therefore, when captured German soldiers were called "fascists" in Russia, they, to put it mildly, saying they were surprised.

We are not fascists, we are Nazis! - they answered quite motivated, and the mind of the Soviet people finally went beyond reason.

The party founded by Hitler and which came to power in 1933¹ was called the Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP).

The ideology of this party was very similar to the communist one - the workers and all working people in general are oppressed by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary to make a socialist revolution, bring the real leaders of the working class to power, establish a state of social and political justice.

¹Another myth is about the "seizure" of power by Hitler. Unlike the Bolsheviks, the Nazis came to power in a legal, completely constitutional way.

Nazis are sometimes referred to as "browns" as opposed to reds. There is a difference, but what is its meaning? The color, which in Russia was designated as black, was seen in Germany as brown. The color of the fertile layer, humus, black soil, soil. Red and brown are the colors of blood and soil.

In Russia they said "black people", and from here - "black hundred"... In Germany it sounded like "brown people". The common people, the mass of the people. And the brown ones went into battle not under some, but under a red banner. They went in order to free the German workers from the power of the Jewish, French and Anglo-American bourgeoisie.

The ideology, psychology, and even symbolism of all socialists had much in common. During the Civil War in Russia, for a long time, not only stars, but also swastikas of different colors were red symbols. There are photographs of Red Army aviation squadrons, on the wings of which blue and white swastikas are clearly visible. The stars were also depicted in different colors.

The fierce confrontation between the red star and the brown swastika dates back to the late 1920s and early 1930s.

In the USSR, colossal efforts were made to disown kinship. Even their own name - National Socialists - was replaced in the USSR with "fascists". This name is used even in Germany. When I expressed bewilderment in a conversation with my German colleagues, they thought for a long time and finally said:

The Nazis were very cruel. Therefore they should be called that.

The power of reasoning is enchanting.

The racial theory, that is, the theory of the biological inequality of people, is by no means a peculiarity of Germany and the Germans. In the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the idea of racial inequality was quite widespread throughout the world of that time. Including, by the way, in the Jewish environment.

It was with a feeling of great perplexity that I read many years ago a book by a certain German Jew, Fritz Kahn, entitled "The Jews as a Race and a Civilized People." The book was published in Germany in 1921 and embellished with such pearls, for example: "Moses, Christ and Marx - three representatives of a specific race and racial characteristics"¹ and that "Trotsky and Lenin adorn our race"². I will leave aside the question - who should a person be in order to "decorate" himself with kinship with Trotsky and Lenin. I will draw the reader's attention to the sounded word "race" and to what the Jew uses it - and the Jew, who is quite loyal to the communists of various kinds. For the author, Jews are a race.

F. Kahn is an open and outspoken socialist, but his relative Benjamin Disraeli is a resolute conservative. From the point of view of the Commander of the Order of the Garter, Viscount of Hugenden, Earl of Beaconsfield (all these are titles of Disraeli), Jews join the socialists not from a good life, but under the pressure of a Christian society that does not recognize them. And then "... the chosen race gives a hand to the scum and the most contemptible parts of society."

As we can see, the word "race" sounds quite definite. And how definitely! "... the Jewish race connects modern peoples with ancient times.... They are a clear evidence of the falsity of the modern doctrine of the equality of people and cosmopolitan brotherhood, which, if implemented, would only contribute to the fall of the great races"³.

Who is this? Goebbels?! No, it's all Jew Disraeli. Although, of course, it is interesting, who is Fritz Kahn for Disraeli - "the dregs of society" or "a man of the chosen race"?

The author was no less surprised when he read V.V. Shulgin: he follows the reasoning that Mr. Shulgin would not inflict any insult on the Chinese, speaking of his saffron skin and narrow eyes ... But

¹ *Cap F. Die Juden als Hasse und Kulturfolk*. Berlin, Weltverlag, 1921. C. 199.

² *Ibid.* S. 202.

³ *Ibid.* S. 192

".... It is worth listing in the most academic tone several distinctive features of this race, as such, the description immediately begins to sound like a kind of mockery, mockery, contempt"¹.

V.V. Shulgin has always openly and honestly declared himself an anti-Semite. This Russian nobleman, who is proud of his origin, suddenly, in some way, is very much in solidarity with two Jews. And not only with a conservative and a monarchist, but also with a socialist. All three are
nye racists.

It remains to be assumed that at the time when these people lived and worked, this point of view was quite common.

Consistent use of racial theory
national socialism was indeed very different from international socialism. The communist internationalists did not attach much importance to the nationality of the oppressed and the oppressors. But the beliefs of both had the same intellectual and spiritual source - the work of intellectuals of evil

XIX century. After all, socialism, both in its nationalist, German, and in its internationalist, Soviet version, is in no way an invention of the common people and not a "belief of the illiterate masses." Nothing like this. All the theories that formed the basis of all socialist regimes were created in the offices of the most highbrow intellectuals.

In the 1850s in the most developed countries of Europe a scientific school was formed, which was called racial anthropological. The face of the school is determined by the French J.A. Gobineau and J. Lapouge, British F. Galston, K. Pearson, X. Chamberlain. It would be very, very difficult to call them all or individually "stupid" or "not intelligent enough". Perhaps that is why in the USSR the names of the creators of racial theory were hidden, and even more so nothing written by them

¹ *Shulgin V.V. What "we" don't like about "them"? SPB. Veche, 1993. P. 10.*

translated - even for historical departments or for professional historians.

Among the creators of racial theory are many cult names of socialists. The anarchist P. Proudhon believed that "the Jews are an anti-social, stubborn, diabolical race"; The Jew is the enemy of the human race. This people should be sent to Asia or destroyed

his".

Eugene Dühring called for the extermination of the Jews, this "an innately and irrevocably corrupted race."

The Russian Narodnaya Volya in 1881-1882 supported the pogroms.

K. Marx believed that the Jews are "the most disgusting of races." However, he also considered the Slavs a race and said an incredible amount of nasty things about them.

And Lassalle, the leader of the German workers, also declared that he despised the "Jewish race."

But this did not save him from the penetrating judgment of Karl Marx: "He comes, judging by the shape of his head, from Negroes who mixed with the Jews during the Exodus from Egypt."

The original racial doctrine or racial theory - "Rassenlehre" - is the term of the German philosopher of the 18th century K. Meiners. In the second half of the 19th century, with the rise of science, research began in various directions: "Rassenforschung" - racial studies, "Rassenkunde" - racial studies, "Rassengedanke" - ra

owl thinking.

But do not ... Do not consider the Germans here as some special and vicious. During the First World War, French doctors seriously tried to catch non-German spies by checking the composition of their urine: the Germans, it turns out, have "too" a lot of ammonia in their urine ... Another sign: the German race produces more excrements than the Gallic people race. I tracked who pooped more than others - and feel free to write to the valiant authorities: an obvious German spy.

And here is the British racist: Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855-1927) was born in England, where this surname is

where as well-known. The Chamberlain family of politicians, pa
pa and two sons, are his distant relatives
kami.

With Chamberlain, the racial enmity between the Aryans and the
Semites became the basis of the historical process! All that is proud
Xia team, made, of course, fair-skinned, light
hairy Aryans, tall and with long skulls. The unspeakably disgusting Semites with
round heads and curly hair badly spoiled the Aryans and parasitized on their
achievements.

Gradually, H.S. Chamberlain became so imbued with his own writings that
he even moved from his native Britain to Germany: to be closer to the Aryans.
Here, on the one hand, disappointment awaited him - not all Germans were in such
a hurry to become Aryans, and some simply twisted their fingers at their temples.
On the other hand, some people did get into it, including very influential people.
H.S. Chamberlain was well received even to Chancellor Wilhelm II and had long
conversations with him about turtles and cultures. In his last twilight years, a
certain new political figure, who, however, had no special chances, was already
visiting Chamberlain himself - Adolf Hitler. Chamberlain liked Hitler's political
program very much, but decidedly disliked it.

curled his skull and other racial signs.

They will object to me: you never know who was chatting ... Namely, in
In the Third Reich, racial theory became not a theory, but a guide to action!

Fair. But long before the emergence of the National Socialist Third Reich,
the liberal United States was a purely racist country.

The racial laws of Nazi Germany largely copied US legislation: since 1896,
blacks and whites in the US had to live separately. To have "the same thing" (at
least in theory), but separate!

Race inequality was maintained by practices such as lynching. In 1892, for
example, 226 Negroes were killed - mostly they were burned alive, and, according
to evidence

According to Mark Twain, white Americans were very worried - what if "the Negro dies too quickly"¹?

To abolish the slavery of the Negroes, the United States, as befits a true beacon of democracy, needed the Civil War of 1861-1865. During this war, a country with a population of 31 million people lost only 623 thousand killed. 290 thousand Negroes fought in the allied army, of which 38 thousand died. After this war, Congress passed a number of laws in defense of the rights of Negroes. An 1870 law made it a crime to deprive blacks of voting and other civil rights. An 1877 law made it illegal to discriminate against Negroes in hotels, theaters, railroads, and all public places. Special federal officials were supposed to oversee this. In the south they were called "carpetbaggers", because they came with empty bags, but for some reason they left with nabis

tymi..

In 1877, Southern Democrats conspired behind the backs of Northern Democrats with the Republican leaders. They promised to support the Republican presidential candidate, but on condition that the troops of the northern states be withdrawn from the south. The federal troops and all the officials who controlled the implementation of the laws were withdrawn. And it started...

Under the slogan "equal, but separate," an undisguised persecution of Negroes began. For them, special means of transport, special schools and special benches in parks were introduced. In 1896, Plessy, a Negro shoemaker in New Orleans, decided to find out by experiment whether the US constitution means the equality of people ... Having bought a ticket, he got into a carriage intended for whites. He was arrested and tried for breaking the law. The case went to the Supreme Court in Washington. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict. With this act, the US Supreme Court legalized racism and racial discrimination officially.

In 1901, several Negroes from Massachusetts wrote

¹ *Mark Twain. United Lynching States. // Mark Twain. Collected works in 12 vols. T. 11. M., Hudlit. S. 470.*

sent a letter to President McKinley. They accused the government of pandering to white supremacists. Like, the authorities know perfectly well what is happening, and have nothing against it. Negroes mentioned the pogrom that took place in the city of Wilmington, North Carolina, where Negroes were killed like dogs (expression of the authors of the letter),

hunted them like game - and the government did not did nothing but close her eyes. "We hoped in vain for the protection of the law," wrote the Negroes from Massachusetts.

"In 1921, 59 African Americans were lynched around Tulsa. A common motive for lynching was the concocted accusation, usually without investigation, that an African American wanted to rape a white girl. After the First World War, in which many African Americans participated, some participants in the war took it into their heads to protest. But this further embittered the Ku Klux Klan.

On the same occasion there was a pogrom in Tulsa in 1921. A certain African American, a young man, Richard Rowland, was supposed to go down in an elevator. The girl serving the elevator, seeing the black one, pressed the shutter before he entered the elevator. He hurried and fell under her feet.

The crowd fled to the screams of the girl. It was immediately concluded that the Negro was trying to attack the girl. Tolpa did not understand what had happened at all. The onlookers "knew exactly" what the young man was about to do, and was about to lynch him. The police also did not delve into the details, but the policemen were "all clear." They arrested Richard Rowland and took him to jail. "The press raised a howl that, they say, it's time to appease the blacks, that they allegedly became insolent, forgot their place. Journalists presented the girl as a 17-year-old poor orphan who earned pennies for her education. They described her suffering, "torn dress", scratches on her face. Later it was found that none of this happened, that

the girl was not a girl at all, but a woman

body behavior...

In the evening, a crowd of 500 people gathered near the courthouse, which also served as a prison, demanding the extradition of a black youth for reprisal. The African American population was alarmed. 25 blacks with weapons arrived at the courthouse. That, in fact, is the whole trigger mechanism of the beginning pogrom. Who was the first to shoot and who was the first to use the knife is still being investigated. There are very different versions. All these versions are put forward in a very large dependence on the color of the skin and the beliefs of the researcher. In any case, a fight broke out with the use of clubs and edged weapons, and revolver shots rang out. There were fewer blacks, about 75 people against 2 thousand whites, they retreated inside the black quarter.

"When the pogrom began, the chief of police sent a telegram to the governor of the state with a request to send reservists to the national army. The train with the soldiers arrived only in the morning, when everything was already over. The soldiers were in no hurry. And there was no point in interfering."²

In short, the Negro part of the city of Tulsa ceased to exist. The number of those killed is given differently - from 36, according to the official version of that time (but the authorities, most likely, tried to downplay the scale of the event), to 175 according to tabloid newspapers (but they could exaggerate). The most probable figure of one of the modern researchers is "about 100". It is known that the Red Cross helped about 1000 people, including women and children. It is known that trucks hired by the authorities took the corpses out of the city, and then these corpses were dumped into the river or into hastily dug mass graves.

Black youth and in general everyone who could have left th

¹ *Klimenko M. Ya. Another America. Dreams and reality. M., Posev, 2001. S. 192.*

² *Klimenko M. Ya. Another America. Dreams and reality. M., Posev, 2001. S. 193.*

kind. Those who could not leave or who had nowhere to go spent the winter in tents and were in great need of the bare necessities. The city authorities did their best to hush up the incident, prevented them from providing assistance to the victims, and prevented the Negroes from rebuilding their homes.

75 years later, in the summer of 1996, the city authorities officially apologized for the pogrom and erected a memorial wall on one of the streets of the former African American city with the inscription: "1921, Black Wall Street." Several of the victims who survived and survived to our time started talking about material compensation ... but did not receive a penny.

The pogrom in Tulsa is by no means an isolated occurrence. In St. Louis, a pogrom occurred in 1917, and 125 blacks were killed, in Chicago in 1919 - 36 people, in the city of Elaine (Arkansas) in 1919, 38 blacks were killed.

Racial segregation in the United States officially existed until the 1960s. Parts of the American army that fought during the First and Second World Wars were separate. This seems so wild to any sane European that amusing incidents arise.

For example, in the 1960s, the screens of all the countries of the Warsaw Pact showed the Polish film "The rate is greater than life" - about a heroic Polish officer who was introduced into the Wehrmacht and became almost a personal friend of Hitler. A kind of predecessor of Stirlitz.

One of the shots in the last episode of "More Than Life" shows a black man shining from the tank armor of "General Sherman" among the same shining whites. A frame that could not exist because it could never exist - the units of the American army were separate. Not gra separately, white separately.

Funny jokes jokes history! The film about the heroic Colonel Kloss was filmed in the 1960s. The world press howled about the anti-Semitism prevailing in Poland, and was divided only in one thing: some considered anti-Semitism to be the birthmark of the Soviet system, others

gie - a typical feature of the Poles, regardless of the political system. The howl also went to the USA.

And the Poles at that time were filming a historical film, not even suspecting the racial segregation that prevailed in the American army. Forgotten, probably. It probably didn't occur to the Poles that the zealous fighters against Nazism, the saviors of Europe from the horrors of National Socialism and the best friends of all the Jews and Negroes of the world could be vulgar racists. And besides, racists are not "in the soul," in private life, but official racists, according to their own laws.

Corrupted by Europe, some American blacks married European women. These blacks officially, by law, had no right to appear with their wives on the streets of their native cities. It was not until 1948 that President Truman, as Commander-in-Chief of the American Armed Forces, abolished segregation by special decree and created common white-black units.

What remains? Probably, we should wish the Americans a further heroic struggle for human rights throughout the world.

But if we are talking about racial theory - sorry, the Germans were not better both in its theory and in practice, but they were not worse than other Europeans either. At the very least, would it not be worse than the beacons of progress and democracy, American tsev.

The extermination of people on a national basis was widely practiced not only in the Third Reich, but also in the USSR and in many other countries participating in the Second World War.

After "perestroika" it became widely known about the genocide of "treacherous" peoples: Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Greeks, Karachays.

On December 27, 1943, the deportation of the entire Kalmyk people and the abolition of the Kalmyk ASSR were announced.

21 On August 1944, a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR was issued, which was not subject to publication.

(No. 619/3) on the renaming of Crimean village councils. On October 20, 1944, the decision of the Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was adopted: "to rename settlements, rivers and mountains, the names of which are associated with Tatar, Greek and German origin ..."

K. Paustovsky, who is difficult to declare an anti-Soviet element, believed: "this case of renaming testifies to the absence of elementary culture, disregard for the people, for the country ..." ¹ But who listened to him, Paustovsky?

On February 23, 1944, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council was read out on the eviction of both Chechens and Ingush for treason, for cooperation with the enemy. You are allowed to bring 20 kg of luggage per family. It took 40,200 wagons to deport the Chechens. What consequences this had for the conduct of hostilities and for the supply of the front is understandable. But the authorities went to these inconveniences to do what they love.

Chechens and Ingush were deported from other regions of the USSR, and from cities. Only in Moscow 2 Chechens survived.

At the same time, just like in the Crimea, a Decree was issued on the renaming of districts and regional centers. Even Elbrus was renamed Ialbuzi. At the same time, a mass resettlement of Russians, Ukrainians, Ossetians, Avars, and Dargins was carried out in Chechnya.

According to the memoirs of contemporaries, "2000 disobedient people remained in the mountains. They wandered from place to place. They hunted for them, they were killed, but they did not give up. The mountains have hidden many of them." There is a good story by A. Pristavkin ² about the fate of these "disobedient" and the fate of Russian settlers.

In 1944, Greeks were evicted from the Black Sea coast to Central Asia - also for "collaboration with the invaders." How can one separate vindictiveness, the ideology of collective responsibility, and the primitive

¹ *Paustovsky K.G.* Collection of Op. in b-ti tt. T. 5. M., Hudlit, 1968. S. 566.

² *Pristavkin A.* A golden cloud spent the night. L., Lenizdat, 1987.

the desire to "liberate" warm, fertile lands for "their own"?

After the war, large-scale deportations of "bad" peoples were also carried out, which in some way aroused the displeasure of the authorities. The evictions were organized by Beria's deputies, B. Kobulov and I. Serov.

In the late 1940s, several tens of thousands of Armenian repatriates - those who came from abroad to live in their historical homeland no, among other Armenians.

At the same time, Kurds were expelled from large cities, and in 1947 about 80,000 Muslim Georgians were deported to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Again - it turns out they "cleared" the land for the relatives of Stalin and Beria.

"Not only a Marxist-Leninist, but also a simply sane person cannot imagine how people can be made responsible, including women, children, old people, communists and Komsomol members, bring down massive repressions on them and doom them to destruction and suffering for hostile actions of individuals and groups of people," N.S. Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

If one could forget, Nikita Sergeevich himself organized the famine in Ukraine in 1931-1932 and was among the most cruel and merciless. Forget... But how can you forget such a thing?

We also mention the German genocide. By the beginning of the 20th century, about 1.2 million Germans lived in the Russian Empire, a little less than 1% of the total population. In addition to the Baltic Germans, there were still large colonies of settlers on the Volga and Altai.

In 1922, they created the Autonomous SSR of the Volga Germans, ASSR PN. And the names of the villages on the Volga sounded like this: Schafhausen, Glarus, Philipsfeld, Ernesti Nendorf, Gogerberg, Zurich, Basel.

An unpleasant topic in Soviet post-war times: the famine of 1921 did not pass by the Germans at all. In the village of Grimm

during the famine of 1921, out of 11 thousand inhabitants, 5 thousand survived.

The Russian Germans were the most ordinary, the most ordinary ethnic group of the Russian superethnos. Those Germans who chose Russia as their homeland.

The Russian Empire could be at war with Germany, but at the same time it was normal to interact with loyal Russian Germans. Petersburg was renamed Petrograd (leaving the "German" names of Yekaterinburg, Revel, Riga and Helsingfors-Helsinki), but when the Union of the Russian People tried to organize a German pogrom in August 1914, the Police Department "did not recommend" organizing something like that. There was no massacre.

From 1868, with the introduction of universal conscription, Germans began to be called up for military service. Russian Germans fought on the side of the Russian Empire in the First World War. My grandfather's brother, Kurt Schmidt, was gassed at the front and died of fulminant consumption in 1922, at the age of 28. And grandfather, Walter Schmidt, from 1914 to 1917 was deported away from the theater of operations, to Karelia - it's not even an hour, he will run over to the enemy.

The USSR declared its internationalism at every step, stigmatized the Russian Empire as a "prison of peoples", but it turned out to be completely incapable of fighting Germany and being loyal to its own German subjects. Somehow, mystically, the Germans, who were born in the Altai and the Volga region, were to blame for the fact that Stalin was not able to completely deceive and take advantage of Hitler.

One of the favorite tales of the Soviet era: that in the USSR there is not and cannot be national inequality, "we" do not offend anyone. So the whole film "Circus" was shot - exclusively on this topic. How they, in a terrible bourgeois society, offend blacks, and how blacks are loved in the USSR. It is difficult to judge Negroes, but how can the Decree of August 26 be combined with the idea of the "Circus"

1941? According to this Decree, the Germans were sent to Siberia in 24 hours, to the position of special settlers.

And well, if the special settlers! Innocent people, most often loyal to Russia, were exiled here, to the tundra. They were thrown onto the icy shores, without any means of subsistence - to die. Out of hundreds of people, only a few of the strongest men survived. Most of them didn't even have graves — it was impossible to bury them in winter, and in the spring hundreds of corpses began to rot, and the rest of them would not be able to bury them anyway. And these ... "lucky ones", living skeletons that survived until spring, fled from the corpses of relatives and relatives carrying the infection.

They were attached to the procurement office, felling the forest, became workers of various professions. And someone clung to the Nenets to live, fled from the "civilized" world that turned into hell; these learned to breed deer, to hunt wild beasts. From a mixture of Russians and Nenets, a whole people appeared - the Dolgans. From a mixture of Germans and tundra inhabitants, a whole reindeer clan arose. German became its language - yet more flexible and complex. Words reflecting the hunt

reindeer breeding, entered the language from the Nenets, and nothing more.

In 1990, 3,028 Germans lived in Taimyr.

In the army, the Germans were also removed from the front, turned off from combat units and exiled. Some managed to pass off as Jews, for Finns, and they finished the war. I happened to know a man by the name of Vogau, whose military ID was in the name of Vlasyev.

And after the war there was a new Decree of the Supreme Council USSR dated November 26, 1948, signed by N. Shvernik:

"In order to strengthen the settlement regime for Chechens, Karachays, Ingush, Balkars, Kalmyks, Germans, Crimean Tatars, etc., evicted by the Supreme Body of the USSR, and also due to the fact that during their resettlement were not identified the terms of their eviction, to establish that the resettlement to remote areas of the Soviet Union of the above persons has been carried out forever, without the right to return them to their former places of residence

1. According to the Decree, for unauthorized departure from the places of special settlements, 20 years of hard labor were supposed. For help in escaping, for registration at the former place of residence and other crimes of the same kind - 5 years.

At the same time, historical memory was destroyed: in places where the Germans had lived for centuries, all historical names were changed, archives were burned, and cemeteries were leveled with the ground.

The Germans, who had never lived in the USSR, were also subjected to monstrous terror. Many literary texts from the time of the Second World War directly call for the extermination of the Germans. Take, for example, a poem by K. Simonov, which is called: "So kill him, kill him!"

If your brother killed a German,
If a neighbor killed a German,
It's him, not you soldier
And you have no excuse!
So kill the German so that he,
And not you, lying on the ground.
Not in your house to moan,
And he stood dead in it.
So he wanted, his fault -
Let his house burn, not yours.
And let not your wife
And let him be a widow.
Let not yours cry
And his birth mother.
Not yours, but his
family Let him wait in vain. So kill
one!
So kill him quickly. How
many times you see him, so
many times and kill!

This is how Konstantin Mikhailovich wrote, explaining from different angles why it is necessary to kill "them".

But what is this! Here is Ilya Ehrenburg: "... You cannot convince a German, but you can and should bury a German. The more Germans each soldier kills, the sooner this

¹ *Fuchs F.* Fatal roads of the Volga Germans. Krasnoyarsk, 1993.

damn war. ...Kill the German, otherwise the German will kill you. There are still many Germans, but all the same, the end is visible to them: we will kill them. The Germans said they were a people without space. Okay, we will give each Fritz two arshins. Damned country that brought so much

grief to all mankind, which ruined and saddened

our people will get what they deserve: Germany will become a space without a people.

From theory to practice: in East Prussia, the Soviet Army and units of the NKVD exterminated several hundred thousand Germans by shooting and drowning in barges in the Baltic - all those who did not have time to escape. Cemeteries were smelling, historical memory was destroyed, archives burned or removed.

The Poles behaved in the same way in the western regions of Poland. The German population from Wroclaw-Breslau and Danzig-Gdansk was deported in such a way that many died.

Let me emphasize once again that there is no special Russian or Soviet specificity in this nightmare.

Capturing the territory of the USSR, the Finnish troops took "their own", Ingrian Finns, to Finland. For resistance they were shot. There were several executions and the Russian population: on the Karelian Isthmus captured by the USSR.

The Romanians did the same. Among other "feats" they exterminated the Moldovans who did not want to recognize themselves as Romanians.

The Hungarians pursued a policy of official anti-Semitism, and the blood of tens of thousands of people is on the hands of the Horthy government.

In Yugoslavia, the Croats unleashed the genocide of the Serbs and all other Orthodox peoples. The world knows the extermination camps of Auschwitz-Auschwitz and Buchenwald. Little is known about the Jasenovac camp, and more than 300,000 people, mostly Serbs, were killed in it. General

¹ *Fuchs F.* Fatal roads of the Volga Germans. Krasnoyarsk, 1993. S. 111.

the number of Orthodox South Slavs killed by other South Slavs is close to a million.

In 1938, hoping for the intercession of the great powers of the West, the Czechs staged a disgusting German pogrom. The Great Powers took position in Munich non-intervention and "appeasement of the aggressor". Thus, they untied the hands of Nazi Germany. The Nazis captured Czechoslovakia and, of course, settled scores with those who offend the "Aryans". But Poland also took advantage of the Munich Agreement. On October 2, 1938, it invaded Czechoslovakia and captured the Teszyn region there with a population of 237 thousand people, of which 33% were Poles. At the same time, many Czechs were killed or expelled, their property was plundered, and their property was transferred to the Poles.

In the United States, with the outbreak of war with Japan, 112,000 ethnic Japanese were deported. Most of them would They were completely loyal to the government and people of the United States and considered themselves Americans. After the war, the survivors (30% died from unbearable conditions) were released, but no one returned their property.

Let my words not be understood as an attempt to justify Babi Yar or Khatyn. The crimes of one of them do not justify the crimes of others. I show only - during the Second World War there were no angels in white clothes and black demons of the Nazis. Everyone committed heinous crimes. Everything. And talk about the "special cruelty" of non-German Nazis, to put it mildly, is untenable. This is a black myth designed to justify the crimes of the victors.

The Nuremberg trials of the main "war criminals" still enjoy great respect among the majority of Russians. How! From November 20, 1945 to October 1, 1946, the International Military Tribunal held 403 public hearings. In Nuremberg, the state and military elite of the Third Reich, its political elite, were tried. 116 witnesses were interrogated, and only written evidence

as many as 300,000 studies have been studied. Published seven volumes to documents!¹

... True, it is somehow not very clear how one can judge people for deeds that were not considered as crimes at the time they were committed? And the London Conference of the USSR, USA, Britain and France on July 26-August 8, 1945 created just such an International Tribunal: to punish crimes that were not crimes.

However, the Western powers did not even demand a trial: the execution of future defendants without trial or investigation. At the public and open process, the USSR was the most active in insisting.

Victor Suvorov believes that only the USSR needed such a Nuremberg trial: to capture and execute those who knew and could prove the aggressive plans of the Soviet Union and the fact that Germany had declared war on it.

This seems to be true, because the generals guilty of crimes on the Eastern Front were not tried or executed. But German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was "exposed" in the crime

captured and executed.

However, Suvorov's judgments are too often similar to the truth.

The trial passed sentences on the basis of witness statements alone or on the basis of the "confessions" of the accused. It was these people, intended for the show trial, who were not tortured. But in the course of preparations for the Nuremberg trials and for 12 subsequent trials of a smaller scale in 1945-1946. zafik

many cases have been reported in which military personnel Wehrmacht, especially SS officers, were tortured in order to squeeze "necessary" "confessions" out of them.

US Senator Joseph McCarthy, in a statement made on May 20, 1949, drew the attention of the American press to the following cases of torture in order to extract "confessions." SS division officers

¹ Nuremberg trials of major war criminals. Collection of materials. TT. 1-7. M., Jurisdat. 1957-1961.

"Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" were beaten with whips to the point that they were covered in blood, after which their genitals were stepped on while they lay on the floor. Those interrogated were hung up and beaten until they signed "confessions".

SS General Oswald Paul was beaten and smeared with filth until he signed what was from him demanded. On the basis of such "confessions" extorted from General Sepp Dietrich and Joachim Peiper, the "Leibstandarte ..." division was condemned as a "criminal organization" even though it was a normal front division.

"I have heard and even seen documentary evidence that the prisoners were mistreated, beaten beaten down and tortured by such methods as may come mother only perverts," wrote McCarthy. - The prisoners were subjected to measures such as impromptu sentences and executions, which were canceled at the last moment. They were told that food cards would be confiscated from their family members or even handed over to the Soviet zone. All this was carried out with the approval of the prosecutor in order to provide a psychological atmosphere designed to extort "confessions". By allowing itself such actions, the United States gives

reason for the rest of the world to criticize and doubt us in our motives and our morality."

Such methods also took place at the trials in Frankfurt and Dachau, and a significant number of Germans were convicted only on the basis of their "confessions".

As you can see, not only Stalin's falcons are venna this kind of practice.

The scale of the crimes was such that the Americans created the Army Simpson Commission, which investigated the methods of interrogation at the Dachau courts. One of the members of this commission, American judge Edward Van Roden, spoke about the methods used to extract "confessions".

Among the methods described were torture with burning matches, stuffing needles under the nails, single for

inclusion on a half-starved content. They beat the "criminals" so that they knocked out their teeth and broke their jaws.

According to Van Roden, 137 "accused" were struck in the groin with such force that the genitals atrophied. This was standard procedure for the American "investigators". A report on such activities of the "investigators" was published in the Washington Daily News on January 9, 1949, and also in the English newspaper Sunday Pictorial on January 23, 1949. But this did not prevent them from becoming prosecutors.

The testimonies given by former German officers such as Hess, Hoettl, Wisliceny, Hellriegel and others are completely implausible and often seem simply a mockery. The materials of the NKVD contain the testimony of a certain Odessa loader, who was accused of spying for several foreign states, including Greece... According to the loader, the spy data he collected was taken away under his black eyepatch by the Greek resident Philip of Macedon.

Well, German officers told, for example, about the execution of a hundred Jews in the Minsk ghetto, how Himmler was present at the same time and how he vomited right there on the ground. Everyone knows that Himmler could not have been in Minsk that day. he was at a conference in Zhitomir. This circumstance is noted in many books - for example, the book by K. Vowinkel "The Wehrmacht at War".

Moreover, in April 1959, one of the "witnesses" in Nuremberg, Bach-Zelewski publicly retracted his testimony made in Nuremberg in the West German court. According to him, these statements had nothing to do with the facts and that he did them in order to save his life. This story has been subjected to "prudent silence", and books are still being published that spread the myth of how Himmler nearly fainted at the sight of the people being shot. In Russia - at least "Seventeen Moments of Spring" by Y. Semenov.

The victors so blatantly falsified "proofs of guilt" that the American judge Wenersturm, who was president of one of the Nuremberg tribunals, was horrified by the organization of the process, resigned and fled back to the United States.

The judge left a press statement stating

waiting for:

- Members of the prosecutor's office, instead of formulating and trying to apply the legal rules of the process, were mainly engaged in the pursuit of personal ambitions and revenge.

- Ninety percent of the administration of the Nuremberg Tribunal consists of people with prejudiced opinions who, for political or racial reasons, supported the accusing side.

- The real purpose of the Nuremberg Trials was to show the Germans the crimes of their Fuhrer, and this purpose was also the pretext under which the Tribunal was created.

No less colorful facts are given in a book about this process, written by the eminent English lawyer Veal and emphatically titled *Progress in Barbarism* (1953).

As Field Marshal Montgomery put it, this process made losing the war a crime. According to Harvoord, this trial was the greatest legal farce in history.

Target? Self-justification!

But why do we need an obviously illegal and, moreover, falsified trial? In order to choose one defendant for all from many criminals! Loser of the war, of course!

During the Second World War, there were

¹ *Harvurd R.* Six million - lost and found. M., Vityaz, 1998. S. 23

fictitious crimes. Among other things, they were committed by the allies against the Germans. To "prove" at any cost that the Germans were scoundrels and criminals was a way for them to justify themselves. The bombing of the English city of Coventry by the "damned Teutons" claimed the lives of 30 thousand people. The bombing of German cities by Allied aircraft claimed the lives of three million people. The pilots carried out the order: not to bomb military facilities, but residential areas.

What would the Anglo-Saxons look like if an impartial court began to ask them uncomfortable questions? For example, about how necessary it was to bomb the residential areas of Dresden, Cologne, Hamburg, Leipzig, Berlin - without even trying to destroy the industrial and military facilities located in them?

The Anglo-Saxons risked appearing before the world not in the guise of noble saviors of mankind, but as dirty killers avenging Coventry according to the stinking laws of the times of the Great Migration and eating human flesh. To avoid such horrors, the Anglo-Saxons

were in dire need of the demonization of the Nazis, and, if possible, and of the entire German people.

During the First World War, English propaganda accused the Germans of eating (!) Belgian children, as well as that they allegedly threw children into the air and pierced them with bayonets. In addition to this, the British wrote that the Germans had a whole factory in which they extracted glycerin and other substances from the corpses of the dead. After the war, the head of the British Foreign Office apologized - they say, this was done for the purpose of military propaganda.

But after the Second World War there was no apology; moreover, instead of subsiding over the years, the propaganda about the cruelty of the Nazis rather intensified.

After the war, Germany was literally flooded with squads of avengers. Several cases are known when Poles, Czechs and Ukrainians found the killers of their loved ones and dealt with them. The Western press wrote, and now

writes about it quite freely, there is no secret. It happened that the avengers generally killed the first SS man who came to hand and, in general, any German who fought.

Why is almost nothing known about this until now?! Why are the criminals not exposed and punished?!

Yes, because the criminals took the necessary measures. Under the treaty establishing the Federal Republic of Germany, the government of Ade Nauer undertook not to conduct any investigations and trials of allied war crimes. Not only not to settle scores, but also never to study either the bombings, or the genocide of the Germans, or "acts of retaliation."

Stupid Germans who do not know how to live are still not on violated the law imposed on them.

But for self-justification, it is very "useful" to accuse one of the sides of the Second World War of the maximum number of crimes. And continue to accuse even a lot after the war - so that no one thinks.

It was not Russia and Germany that fought in World War II. Moreover, it was not the Russians who fought with him at all tsami.

The Third Reich and the USSR were deeply ideological, multinational states. Their inhabitants it was not origin that blew, but ideology and citizenship. They have a very indirect relation to historical Germany and historical Russia.

The Third Reich attacked the USSR not at all "treacherously" and not "without declaring war".

At about 3:30 am on June 22, 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, von Schulenburg, standing in front of Vyacheslav Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, read out the text of the German declaration on "military countermeasures against the USSR." On Hitler's instructions, the declaration was forbidden to mention the words "war" and "attack".

Molotov himself wrote in his memoirs that when Schulenburg read the text of the declaration, his voice trembled and his eyes were full of tears. After listening to the ambassador, the people's commissar was silent for a long time, and then quietly said: "Is this a war? Do you think we deserve it?" Barely restraining himself, the German ambassador added that he did not approve of the decision of his government.

At the same time, in Berlin, the Soviet Ambassador Dekanozov was received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Third Reich Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop handed Dekanozov a declaration of war. The astonished ambassador quickly recovered his senses and sharply declared: "You will regret having carried out this attack! You will pay dearly for this!" He got up, bowed and, without offering his hand to Ribbentrop, went to the door. Seeing off the ambassador, the minister whispered: "I was against this attack.

denia".

The tale of a "treacherous attack" was launched by Stalin during his famous speech on July 3, 1941. Then this lie was repeated many times, they repeat it to this day. Not only in Russia, but all over the world.

How to treat this place in Stalin's speech?!

It is necessary to treat it adequately: as a case of so-called lies. Stalin quite rarely spoke the truth, and this is just a typical case.

And all the Soviet historians who talked about the "treacherous German attack on Russia" are lying or in several points at once:

- not treacherous.
- not Germany.
- not to Russia.

Not alone served in the army of the Third Reich Germans.

The Wehrmacht was not drafted on a racial or national basis. And on the principle of citizenship. In particular, an ethnic Jew was recognized as such only in two cases: if he professed Judaism and if he was registered in the Jewish community. In all the rest

cases he was drafted into the army on a general basis, and there were more than 150 thousand "Jewish soldiers of Hitler".

Among the allies of Germany who participated in the Second World War are Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy and Finland. Spain sent an entire division to the Eastern Front.

In the very first weeks and months after June 22, 1941, from 3.5 to 4.5 million Soviet troops were captured by the advancing Nazis.

By 1944, 10% of the available armed forces of the Third Reich, the Wehrmacht, were residents of the Soviet Union.

Representatives of all 120 peoples of the Soviet Union, the French, British, Americans, Chinese and Germans from Germany (up to 100 thousand defectors) fought on the side of the USSR.

The allies of the Soviet Union, the greatest colonial powers of the time, France and Britain, mobilized representatives of up to 200 Asian and African peoples.

People of dozens of peoples fought on the side of the USA, including ethnic Indians and blacks.

Attempts to present the Second World War as the war of "Russians and Germans" are completely absurd.

imposing a myth

The Stalinist myth about the Great Patriotic War was not shared by either the people of the USA or the European peoples. But he agreed with the myths that were created in these countries. The victors in World War II did not need objective truth: there was too much blood on their hands.

There were not many who disagreed. In the West they had the right to speak, but their opinions were not popular and could not change public opinion. And the entire state propaganda machine worked to create a myth. In each country, the myth had its own characteristics: the role of "one's own" army and "one's" contribution to

common victory, suffering and loss of "their" people. These parts of the national myths were very similar to the Soviet myth about the Great Patriotic War.

In the USSR, even object to the myth of the Great Patriotic meant to pay with their lives for their inappropriate talkativeness. In addition, the myth was supported not only by the state. The people basically agreed with this myth, the anger of many people could come down

to those who disagree.

Colossal human losses "tied with blood" people. How can one not accept ideas that are supported not only by the living, but also by the dead?! Invading the myth?! Thus, you desecrate the memory of the soldiers of your country, who died for your life and your happiness. They gave their lives for you, and you spit on their graves. Such an accusation can stop the bravest man.

So Suvorov apologizes to the veterans of the Second world ... almost wrote: "Great Patriotic."

The same is true abroad.

How many in England are able to realize that the "silver wings" of the pilots of the Second World War are not the wings of heroes and patriots, but the wings of killers? Not many... Partly because it is dangerous not to share exactly this position of society. You can find yourself outside of this very society.

British society is tolerant, it appreciates eccentrics and originals. Are you into history? Do you have any unusual beliefs and opinions? You are entitled to support. But Darwin and his supporters were poisoned by British society: not to dare to destroy the comfortable caressing myth of divine origin!

So it is here: just try to say ... no, not only the WHOLE truth! Having told 5% of the truth about the monstrous bombings, you immediately become a traitor, a corrupted type, an enemy of society.

And Suvorov would not have been allowed into Britain if he spoke about the goals of the Nuremberg trials and about how much innocent blood is on the hands of the British Air Force.

Viktor Suvorov behaves politically correct: he carefully avoids the issues of Britain's participation in the war.

It is even easier with Germany: the myth was imposed on the Germans with the bayonets of the occupying armies. Post-war German governments, not having time to arise, are also *volochi*. It went into the head of the Germans that it was they who started the Second World War, committed unheard of crimes and were themselves to blame for everything. In the GDR, May 9 was even celebrated as the Day of the Liberation of Germany.

It became profitable for the German to repent and tear his shirt. Using the example of "perestroika", we see that whole crowds of people are running around Russia, who will willingly say any nasty things about their Fatherland, if they would show them at least a broken penny. And in Germany such scum *hwa* melts.

Screeching about terrible Nazis, vile Teutons with their sleeves rolled up, covered in human blood, can make a career. By asking uncomfortable questions, you run the risk of big trouble: from misunderstandings among colleagues to lawsuits and unwillingness to do business with you.

In 1964, German Chancellor Willy Brandt knelt in Auschwitz and officially repented of the crimes of the Germans and Germany. He himself belongs to a generation that remembered the war, but did not take part in it - due to childhood. From the entry into the active life of this generation, Germany is literally overwhelmed waves of true repentant psychosis.

V. Suvorov himself writes very well that for a German to admit that he is right, death is like: he simply falls out of the system. The grandfather or father of this German did not dare to deny that in the Third Reich 6 million Jews were exterminated in gas cars and made soap out of them all. These poor fellows could only say that they personally had nothing to do with it, they didn't kill anyone and didn't boil anything out of the dead Jews. In the same way, the son or grandson of these Germans cannot deny that Germany started the war. He can only conduct a study of some particulars, without encroaching on the fundamental concepts.

tions.

Destruction of the myth after Stalin

Some parts of the official Soviet myth were not accepted by all people from the very beginning. Self voe

the older generation could have its own opinion about some

individual events. But these were all separate

specific clarifications that did not claim to change the main thing in the myth. Yes, and unable to change it.

Immediately after Stalin's death, he began to change official myth. But he changed only in details.

Exposing the "cult of personality of Stalin", N.S. Khrushchev spoke about the "mistakes" and "excesses" of the leadership of the USSR and the command of the army, which led to unjustified losses. He called into question the meaningfulness of certain decisions.

The loss figure itself has been revised. Stalin called 7 million dead. Under Khrushchev, the official figure was 20 million dead Soviet people.

During the "perestroika" has changed even more.

They began to write even more frankly about the losses, including the losses of the civilian population. For example, they began to write about the famine in the USSR during the war. Previously, the topic was absolutely taboo.

They began to write about barrage detachments - also an absolutely forbidden topic.

They began to write that it was not the "fascists" who killed the Polish officers in Katyn, but the NKVD.

To be frank, it is still not very obvious that the Poles in Katyn were exterminated only by the Soviets. But here it is important that the topic has ceased to be taboo.

But the main theses remained unchanged:

- 1) About a treacherous attack without a declaration of war.
- 2) The participation of the USSR in World War II began in 1941.
- 3) On the military-technical weakness of the USSR.
- 4) On the military-technical advantage of the Wehrmacht.
- 5) About the moral correctness of the USSR in this war.

Whatever parts of the myth and no matter how they changed, the main thing remained in place: "they" planned the war, we did not want war. All "our" actions before 1941 are explained by forced self-defense. We fought with Finland, seized the Baltic states, Bukovina and part of the Commonwealth because the situation forced us to do so.

On June 22, 1941, "they" attacked "us" without warning. They were very strong, "we" were weaker than "them". At the cost of colossal losses, "we" managed to stop the enemy offensive. At the cost of the feat of the rear, "we" managed to create the required number of weapons and defeat the hated enemy.

No matter what crimes were committed by the Soviet side and no matter what outrageous things were happening, "we" were right, and "they" were wrong. "We" have achieved a great victory, and our glory will shine through the ages.

... And then came Viktor Suvorov.

The truth of Viktor Suvorov

Part of Suvorov's concept is indisputable simply because it is supported by documents. It was only in the USSR that "they knew nothing" about the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and about the preparations for an offensive war in the USSR. In the West, documents were also printed, and it was not forbidden to remember. For example, the British planned a bomb attack on Baku and the oil fields... Hitler managed to attack, the USSR turned from an enemy of Britain and an ally of Hitler into a dear and valuable ally... The raid on Baku did not take place, but it was remembered.

Suvorov relies on these and many other documents.

cops.

But even that part of the concept, which is not confirmed by documents, looks very convincing. Too much circumstantial evidence, data, information, testimonies. Different data fit into a harmonious picture, like assembled puzzles: Stalin considered Hitler an "icebreaker

scrap of revolution." It was he who raised Hitler so that he would bring as much confusion to Europe as possible. Stalin prepared a huge, well-armed army, stronger than any of the armies of Europe. This makes clear the nature of the armaments and training of the Red Army, even its ideology: "to fight with little bloodshed and on foreign territory."

The attack on Europe was to begin in July 1941. Hence the "oddities": cleared bridges in the border zone, vacations of officers on the eve of Hitler's attack, maps of foreign countries in the absence of maps of their own territory. It is understandable why no importance was attached to all the testimonies of both the defectors and their own intelligence. Stalin believed that Hitler's preparation for war no longer mattered: he would still be the first to succeed.

But Stalin miscalculated: Hitler got ahead of him!

This part of Suvorov's concept can hardly be refuted. That is, it causes a lot of hysterics, but the arguments are somehow not audible.

With this concept itself, Viktor Suvorov deconstructed two myths that are very significant.
for the national self-determination of both the Germans and the peoples of the USSR, especially the Russians.

Suvorov told the Germans that it was not they who started the war. Stalin prepared the war, and Hitler was only the "icebreaker of the revolution", whom Stalin tried to use
call.

He told the Soviet people that the USSR had no technical backlog. Vice versa! They had just a technical superiority!

The topic of this superiority, the quantity and quality of Soviet weapons is so important for Suvorov that it is difficult to even refer to any specific
place.

In general, this side of his research is quite convincing, although it does not do without the creation of new myths. Author's myths of Suvorov.

The first myth of Viktor Suvorov

Suvorov's first myth is that the Germans swindled by Stalin turn out to be poorly armed, unprepared for war, and very weak. Feels sorry for the poor things.

Even the supergun "Dora", it turns out, is such a worthless, useless invention. After all, a multi-ton projectile burrows into the ground and explodes deep in the thickness of the earth, without causing any harm.

... Well, yes ... And if the Dora gun is used against concrete fortifications? Against the enemy, sitting under the protection of thick armor and concrete? For example, the famous 30th battery, which defended Sevastopol, was swept off the face of the earth by the Dora. Apparently, it's still not completely useless? The question is where and how to apply?

It is even said about Soviet tanks "aggressor tank". You involuntarily smile: did the Nazis have purely peaceful tanks? And the French ... And the Anglo-Saxons? An old Soviet anecdote involuntarily comes to mind: "An enemy from abroad fired on a peacefully plowing Soviet tractor. The tractor destroyed the enemy with return fire.

It turns out that the Czechs made exclusively peacefully plowing tractors for the Wehrmacht. But the Soviets were aggressor tanks. These are for the offensive!

The myth of automata

Surprisingly, both the professional military Rezun-Suvorov and Weller, who constantly boasts of his knowledge of weapons, overlooked an elementary, in general, thing. I can explain only one thing: deeply Soviet people, they "bought" the turn of Stalin's military propaganda.

For Suvorov, the presence of submachine guns or machine guns in service is an unequivocal sign of a powerful military industry, high quality and modernity of weapons.

But the machine gun is not at all a symbol of a mighty military pro-mindset. Vice versa. The machine gun is a child of poverty.

The main armament of the infantry in World War II was a rifle, that is, a long-barreled automatic or semi-automatic rifle with rifling in the muzzle. The rifling gives the bullet rotation, the bullet flies far and retains its lethal force for a long time.

The Mosin rifles put into service in the USSR were produced in several modifications, with a barrel length of 800, 730, 729 mm. A 5-round magazine provided a rate of fire of up to 10 rounds per minute.

The maximum range of destruction is up to 2000 m. The range of aimed fire was estimated at 500 meters, but it no longer depended on the characteristics of the weapon, but on the qualities of a trained soldier. Snipers confidently hit the target at a distance of up to 800 meters¹.

"Contrary to popular belief about almost Wehrmacht was armed with submachine guns, the bulk of its weapons were magazine rifles and carbines of the Mauser system. As of September 1939, the Wehrmacht infantry division had 13,300 rifles and carbines and 3,700 submachine guns"².

Mauser G98 (Gewehr 98) (Mauser 98) is a German rifle created in 1898 by Mauser. This Mauser rifle turned out to be so successful that it served in the German army in a slightly modified form until the end of World War II. It is only in the films of the Dovzhenko film studio that the Nazis go into battle in horned helmets, with machine guns at their hips, and with strangled chickens attached to the trouser belt by their martyrically outstretched paws. Watching these films, the elderly Germans literally laugh to tears. Without saying anything else, the Wehrmacht fed well. Catching chickens was much less for Wehrmacht soldiers

¹ Handbook on shooting. Rifle arr. 1891/30 and carbines mod. 1938 and arr. 1944 M., Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. 1953.

² http://www.gewehr.ru/2006/12/22/mauzer_9_8.html

characteristic occupation than for the half-starved soldiers of many other states, and for many parts of the Red Army.

The characteristics of the Mauser rifle differ little from the Mosin rifle: five rounds, effective range up to 2000 meters, reliable shooting limit 400-600 meters, barrel length in various modifications from 1100 to 1250 mm.

So it's hard to make a rifle. For this many parts are needed, made with a high degree of precision on a milling machine. It is even more difficult to drill a long barrel and make accurate cuts in it. You need skilled workers, you need time and ore.

But the submachine gun consists mainly of parts that are prepared by stamping. Such is the submachine gun, made under a pistol cartridge. Such is the machine, made under an intermediate cartridge, the middle one between a pistol and a rifle.

And the barrel of the submachine gun is short. The German empy-40 ("Schmeisser") has 251 mm. The Soviet PPSH has 269 mm. Even the famous "Kalashnikov", made under the intermediate cartridge, has a barrel length of 414 mm - much smaller than even a cavalry carbine. Such a trunk is much easier to drill and cut. This requires a lot less skill.

But the firing range of a submachine gun is incomparably less than a rifle one. And the accuracy of shooting is much less. Wasteful firing in bursts helps, but the barrel quickly overheats from a large number of shots, and the accuracy of shooting becomes even lower. At a distance of even 100 meters, a submachine gun is not very effective. He is a cheap and bad weapon, which was not made from a good life.

Stalin put on a good face on a bad game, passing off the transition to automatic weapons as mighty steps of progress and

1 *Bolotin D.N.* History of Soviet small arms and cartridges. M., 1992

for the farsighted and wise policy of the Bolshevik Party
COV.

Showing the Nazis who race on motorcycles (across a plowed field) with machine guns at the ready or pizhonski scorching them from the hip, the Dovzhenko film studio wanted to show technically excellently trained and strong enemies. And if you look at it, "she worked for Suvorov": she showed poorly armed,

drunken, hungry soldiers chasing chickens
in clownish helmets with horns.

It is strange that Suvorov did not notice this.

The second and main myth of Viktor Suvorov

But something else is much more important: Suvorov writes incredibly much about armaments, equipment, military orders, fuel, types of troops, the time for extracting orders from an envelope, cleared bridges, and so on.

But he does not write at all about the social psychology of those who carried out orders and set weapons in motion.

And he also has his own explanations for victories and defeats.
go to logistical issues.

Where did the huge amount of weapons prepared in the USSR after the start of the war go? Suvorov Rezun answers with no hesitation: all prepared

The Nazis destroyed most of the equipment and weapons in the first days, almost the first hours of the war.

It was everything, it was! Stalin was preparing to take over Europe! But already driven into a corner by the "icebreaker of the revolution", Hitler at the last moment delivered a preemptive strike and destroyed, bombed and set fire to a fantastic amount of weapons, equipment and equipment.

Doesn't look very convincing. Even unusual
after the always convincing conclusions of Rezun.

In order to give a clearer explanation,
another person was needed.

Myths Mark Solonin

When you say "A", you have to say "B". Vladimir Rezun was the first to start the deconstruction of the myth - and honor to Rezun-Suvorov. Be glorious, Viktor Suvorov!

But a very big myth was created by too great forces, and for decades it grew into the public consciousness. Suvorov has just begun to disassemble the building of this myth, and nothing more. And others naturally followed Suvorov.

Mark Solonin has already come and has already said a little more about the Second World War than Suvorov, opened new "great" secrets.

Mark Solonin spoke about the "human factor". About the elementary truth that any military equipment is powered by people. What little use even from a huge number of the best aircraft, if pilots on them - with low qualifications.

Flight hours?!?!?!1

Any weapon, like absolutely any technique, requires qualification for use. The more complex the technique, the higher the qualification. The easiest way is to run on the attack with a degenerative scream "Urya-ya-ya !!!!!!!" and shoot from the hip into the white light, like a pretty penny, from Stalin's favorite submachine gun, a symbol of modern weapons. Already the rifle requires more serious handling and meaningful use. It is even more difficult to set in motion a tank, a machine-gun barrel, an artillery piece.

Solonin shows with many examples that the soldiers and officers of the Red Army simply did not have the necessary qualifications. In essence, they ruined the technology entrusted to them, or at best used it to an insignificant part of what was possible.

1 Solonin M. At peacefully sleeping airfields... June 22, 1941. M., 2008.

A very interesting topic: for all its declarative
nom "democracy" the Soviet system at no time
Mena was not able to work for a person and use his potential.
Stalin and his buzzards, nicknamed
"falcons", sincerely believed that the colossal
missions and a huge amount of weapons and equipment in itself
will make them invincible. And, as usual, they lost - precisely
because they did not take into account the "human factor".

While we will not develop this topic, we will return to Solonina.

Mark Solonin did not in the least deny everything Suvorov said... He relied on Suvorov. In this sense, Solonin is, of course, not a student of Suvorov, but his follower. "If I can see far, it is because I am standing on the shoulders of giants," Charles Darwin once said. From the shoulders of Suvorov, his follower was able to see further than the one who first entered this door.

He just takes the next step.

Mark Solonin showed that the Nazis did not destroy what was accumulated for the capture of Europe. And they did not destroy the Red Army. Everything is simpler: in 1941, the Red Army simply fled. The border units consisted of residents of the western regions of the USSR, "annexed" to the USSR in 1939. At the very first blows, they ran... And then they dispersed to their homes. In 1944-1945, there were 3 million "re-conscripts" in the Soviet Army: those whom the Soviet Army, which had again gone westward, called up for the second time.

Now, after Solonin, everything becomes completely clear!

What Suvorov and Solonin do not have

Not only Suvorov, who talks mainly about the caliber of guns and the running characteristics of tanks, but Solonin did not utter a seditious phrase ... He came close to it ... In fact, he gave many pieces of information ... But he did not dare to cross an important psychological prohibition .. .

I'll have to decide!

The fact is that the Second World War for the Russian people and all the peoples of the USSR was also the Second Civil War. It is worth understanding this - and the historical puzzles are finally assembled.

To begin with, the Civil War only in Soviet textbooks went from 1918 to November 1920. As if Wrangel had been defeated, and everyone, including the Soviet people, under the leadership of their native Bolshevik Party, went to build a happy peaceful life and prepare a classless society. This is wrong.

1) The fighting between the Red Army and the White Army (the Zemstvo army of the state of the Merkulov brothers) in the Far East continued until 1924.

Even formally, the Civil War continued at least until that time, even if not in European Russia.

2) In the USSR, military operations against peasant armies were described as "mutinies" and, at best, as uprisings. To some extent, rebellion can

count the events in St. Petersburg and throughout the North-West in 1921. This uprising went down in history as the "Kronstadt rebellion" - the communists tried to downplay the scale of the event.

But was the movement of peasants in the Tambov region an uprising? The "Greens" in the Tambov province from the very beginning of the Civil War existed autonomously. They weakly supported the Whites, but they fought with the Reds until the autumn of 1922. They didn't "revolt", they continued the war. And the communists, having finished with the white armies, intensified the war with the "green" militias

peasants.

Similarly, the peasants of Siberia have never been subjects of the Soviets. They could neither "change" Soviet power, nor "revolt" against it, even if
strong desire.

War with the Greens 1920-1924 was not a chain of uprisings, but a continuation of the Civil War. On

238,000 Red Army soldiers perished at this stage of the war¹ and about a million armed peasants and civilians, hostages and exterminated.

And the date of the end of hostilities is difficult to name. On Sakhalin, the last "green" partisans were defeated in 1925. In Crimea, the last "green" and Tatar nationalists surrendered in 1926. In Yakutia, the last "green" partisans were defeated only in 1929. Junaid Khan's "Army of Islam" last fought in 1934.

Already these data are enough to understand: and after 1920, and after 1922 the Civil War continued
lass.

3) In 1920, white armies went abroad: hundreds of thousands of armed people who took the oath. They all considered themselves Russians or Russians and were never hostile to Russia. But they were at war with the Soviets and were irreconcilable enemies of the Soviet power and the very idea of communism.

No one ever concluded a peace treaty with the leaders of the white camp and did not recognize their surrender. Formally, the armies of Wrangel, Yudenich, Ataman Semenov, the Zemsky army of the Merkulov government in Vladivostok, and the fighting squad of General Pepelyayev were at war with the Soviet republic.

People from the Russian General Military Union and the Brotherhood of Russian Truth, white soldiers and officers, penetrated the USSR, committed terrorist attacks, continued the White struggle by other means.

The communists also continued the war on the territory of other states. The war with the White armies was transferred to the territory of other countries, was waged by other means, but did not end at all.

In 1928, under very strange circumstances, Baron Wrangel died. In 1930, General Kutepov was killed in an attempt to kidnap him by agents of the NKVD.

¹ The seal of secrecy has been removed. M., 1993. S. 54.

In 1937, the new chairman of the Russian All-Military Union, General Miller, was kidnapped by agents of the NKVD and taken to Moscow. The kidnapping was carried out in order to promote the NKVD agent General N.V. Skoblin.

Going to a meeting and feeling the danger, Miller left a note to the staff indicating to whom he went with Skoblin. Therefore, the communists failed to capture the ROVS. General Miller was shot in Moscow on September 11, 1939, after the outbreak of World War II, on the eve of the entry of the Red Army into the territory of the Commonwealth.

With white emigrants who were captured during raids on the territory of Poland, Romania or China, and with those who returned to the Sovdepiya, believing red propaganda, they acted according to the laws of wartime.

And after World War II, too. All former Russian subjects caught in a Red Army raid in China in 1945 were exterminated or exiled. In particular, they dealt harshly with all social

active people: who spoke out in exile
anything political.

The civil war continued after World War II. Leaving the Russian land, the White Army took with it the ashes of its soldiers and officers: the Reds desecrated and destroyed the graves. In 1921, the ashes of V.O. Kappel, who died on the ice of Lake Baikal in 1920, was transferred from Chita to China and buried in the Iberian Church in the city of Harbin in Manchuria.

And in 1955, installed on the grave of V.O. Kappel monument was demolished at the request of the USSR: after the transfer of power from Chiang Kai-shek to Mao Zedong. The communists finished the war in 1955. In 1955 they completed what they could not do in 1921.

Already these data are enough to understand: and after 1920, and after 1922 the Civil War continued
lass.

It was not only a war of Russians with Russians

and not the war of the peoples of the Russian Empire with each other or their different parties. From the very beginning, the Civil War was considered a World War between the proletarians and the bourgeoisie. In fact, it was a war of utopia against the historically established real political, social and economic life. Such a war did not recognize any borders between states.

In every state and in every people the communists saw the oppressed proletariat and exploiters—the bourgeoisie. They believed that sooner or later a civil war would break out everywhere, in all states. A Zemshar Republic of Soviets is inevitable!

In Section One of the Constitution of the USSR of 1924, "the declaration on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics", it was directly written:

"The will of the peoples of the Soviet republics, who recently gathered at the congresses of their Soviets and unanimously decided to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, serves as a reliable guarantee that this Union is a voluntary association of peoples with equal rights, that each republic is guaranteed the right to free exit from the Union, that access to the Union is open to all socialist Soviet republics, both existing ones and those that will arise in the future, that the new union state will be a worthy crowning of the foundations of peaceful coexistence and fraternal cooperation of peoples laid back in October 1917, that it will serve a sure bulwark against world capitalism and a new decisive step towards the unification of the working people of all countries into the World Socialist Soviet Republic.

It remains to be amazed at either the blindness or the monstrous hypocrisy of those who deny that the USSR was preparing for war. Of course, I prepared. And not only in the late 1930s.

1 Fundamental Law (Constitution) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Adopted by the second session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of the first convocation on July 6, 1923 and in the final version by the II Congress of Soviets of the USSR on January 31, 1924. M., 1924.

The USSR ALWAYS prepared for war and waged war. It was created as a temporary military camp on the way to the Terrestrial Republic of Soviets.

The differences in the positions of Trotsky and Stalin are not so strong. Trotsky was too carried away by his own eloquence and the eloquence of his colleagues. He thought that the World Revolution could and should be spurred on by propaganda of Marxist ideas.

And Stalin (and certainly not he alone) believed that the aggression of a country already captured by the communists against others was the best way to organize this very World Revolution. That is, there may not be a revolution—an armed uprising of the masses—in this case. But there is a civil war: a war of armies for different political systems. First the Civil War, and only then, perhaps, the revolution, if the natives appreciate it. And he called Hitler precisely “the icebreaker Revo

lucia”, and not the “icebreaker of the empire” or “icebreaker

THE USSR”. In an effort to conquer the whole world, Stalin only continued what he started in October 1917. Only differently.

Here Viktor Suvorov convulsively proves the initial aggressiveness of the USSR in the late 1930s... And this makes the historian smile: what is breaking through the open door?! The USSR was created as a springboard for the conquest of world domination. Suvorov cites only individual, late examples, no more.

Experience of revolutionary wars

Having won, the revolution tries to spread itself to neighboring countries. The French Revolution tried to bring what it considered its highest achievement to Italy, Germany, Spain. Bring on the bayonets of the French army. The civil war became at the same time a national war.

The same is true of the Communists even before the coup.

¹ I hope the reader will excuse me if I do not call it the Great French Revolution? I'm squeamish.

Lin in 1929 were ready to invade other countries in order to bring Soviet power into them. The civil war created experience: Soviet power was brought to Central Asia, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova. Without the bayonets of the Red Army, there would be no Soviet power there. The national war was fought not for territory and resources, but for the right to establish a different political system in the country. The national war easily spilled over into civil war.

But no disease will ever enter a healthy body. No German money, no propaganda of Jewish and European wise men would ever topple the Russian Empire, plunge it into the Civil War, if the Russian Empire were a perfectly healthy organism.

Similarly, no military aggression by Soviet Russia or the USSR could have established Soviet power without the help of the populations of the occupied countries. Poland did not become Soviet, not because it is big and strong, but because even Polish communists and anarchists went against Soviet aggression. No one in Poland wanted to become part of a state centered in Moscow. Estonia is small, but it has also defended its independence. And Ukraine is big, but there were those who helped the Bolsheviks to conquer it. And in small Armenia there were enough of these lovers.

There would be no Soviet power in Armenia even if all Armenians rose up against the Soviet power in unison. But part of the Armenians were communists, they themselves wanted Soviet power. They helped the Red Army and established Soviet power together with the commissars from Moscow.

Civil wars broke out in European countries without any provocation from the USSR. The Red Two Anniversary in Italy, the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1938, the Great Strike of 1926 in Britain, the Civil War of 1926 in Poland, the fascist coups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia took place even without the introduction of Soviet troops. Moreover, without the "hand of Moscow", the Civil War began in Key

Tae, and China broke up into 8 warring states. The USSR had nothing to do with the many revolutions and putsches in the countries of Latin America.

Between 1914 and 1945 the world changed beyond recognition. The events in Russia were important, but they are only part of the events around the world. Since 1914, the world entered a period of wars and revolutions that lasted 21 years... He emerged from this bloody "stripe" completely different! Like the hero of a fairy tale, diving into boiling milk or into blood. There is not a single country in which the political system has not changed in these 21 years. In some countries it has not changed very much, in others everything has become completely different, but no one has remained the same as it was before 1914.

Against the background of this twenty years, the Second World War is only the final phase of the World Civil War.

Historians argue: did two World Wars thunder in the world, 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, or was there only one World War, but with a long, relatively peaceful, break between active phases?

But just as one asks about the number of World Wars, one can ask in another way... And how many Civil Wars would there be? Were there many of them in different countries, with different dates, or is it all one, stretched out in time, the grandiose World Civil War for 1914-1945? In this World Civil War, the Russian Civil War of 1917-1922 is only one of the episodes. World War II also

one of the episodes.

In my opinion, there is only one question: should the entire period of 1914-1945 or only 1939-1945 be considered the World Civil War?

Russia - the continuation of the Civil War

Probably the meanest and most deceitful of the theses of the official Soviet propaganda: about the political unity of the Soviet people.

By 1939, there were many people in the USSR who did not at all share the views of the communists, and were even hostile to these ideas. Let's not even say that up to a million active enemies of the Soviet regime lived abroad and that they willingly worked for Finnish, German, American, Chinese, Japanese intelligence and armies.

The number of Soviet defectors to Finland, China and Persia, Rumania and Poland is estimated at least in the tens of thousands.

In 1941, the Red Army partially fled - recruits from the western regions of the USSR. Partly, the Red Army surrendered in battalions, regiments, and almost divisions.

The number of those who surrendered is called differently: from 3-5 million to 4-5 million. The approximate figures prove one thing: no one really counted. It was on their occasion that Stalin uttered his famous: "There are no prisoners of war in the Soviet Union. There are traitors in the Soviet Union."

Note: Stalin did not deal with these people as a monarch, president, head of government. He acted according to the laws of the Civil War. And when he decided that the members of their families were responsible for those who had surrendered, he acted according to the laws of that seemingly long-standing Civil War of 1917-1924.

Both he and his entourage were shaped by the Civil War both as individuals and as political figures.

figures.

But their decisions and their political leanings absolutely not obliged to share all the Russians.

It is known that many residents of the Soviet Union served in the Wehrmacht: 310 thousand Russians, 53 thousand Cossacks, 250 thousand Ukrainians, 110 thousand people from the peoples of the North Caucasus, 40 thousand Volga Tatars, 20 thousand Crimean Tatars, and other Turkic peoples - 180 thousand people. This is at the beginning of 1945, and besides, this number does not include the Estonian, Latvian SS legions, several Lithuanian SS battalions.

If citizens of one country fight in warring armies - what is this, if not a civil war ?!

The Cossacks in 1941 split into pro-communist and pro-Nazi forces. The Cossack white emigration stood at the head of the Cossack collaborationism, and at the head of the Cossack units was SS Standartenführer, Cossack father Helmut von Pannwitz.

The Crimean Tatars and the peoples of the North Caucasus (Chechens, Karachays, Kalmyks) gave approximately the same number of volunteers to the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. If this is not a split of the people and not a civil war, then what is it?

As you can see, during the events of 1941-1945. between it was not only and not even so much national forces that fought against each other as political ones. Sat in the trenches friend Opposite each other, people of the same peoples fired at each other from cannons and rifles, people converged in hand-to-hand combat. And in the vast majority of cases, it was not about "individual renegades" - this is the latest propaganda duck, we are talking about the split of peoples according to political principle.

Whenever the national army entered the capital of a temporarily occupied country (Nazis or comedians, it doesn't matter), it was always about a certain political force! Which planned to use the acquisition of power to carry out its policies and reforms in accordance with its ideology.

Not only Wehrmacht servicemen, but also those driven away to work, working in special camps, wearing a special "Ost" sign on their clothes - and of these, no more than 15% wanted to return to the USSR. If the reader really wants to, he can consider that 85% of the former Soviet people were scoundrels and traitors in spirit. But even in this case, the Civil War is evident.

The number of "displaced persons" in Germany in 1945 is unknown. According to official Soviet statistics, in 1945 5,236,130 people "returned to their homeland". The statistics are certainly not complete: too many tried to hide, escape, hide from returning to the USSR. But their fate is already sealed.

Conspiracy in Yalta

The post-war system was born as a result of collusion between some of the most powerful countries on the globe. Each of them would gladly extend its political system to the entire globe. After all, the Civil War is on the World War. Not only Stalin would have willingly created the Zemsharny USSR. The Anglo-Saxons would gladly make the globe a solid mass of "democratic republics" economically dependent on the United States and Britain.

During the World Civil War, the most powerful powers cannot overcome each other and therefore treaty they wonder what the post-war world will be like. This is happening at the Crimean Conference, in Yalta, February 4-11, 1945. Meeting of W. Churchill, F.D. Roosevelt, I.V. Stalin, with the participation of foreign ministers and chiefs of staff: the three victors in the Second World War openly divided the booty.

The peoples fought and built, people hoped and believed that they were bringing "this day of victory" closer. That after Victory Day they will be able to somehow influence the structure of their lives. And everything has already been decided. And maybe, the most disgusting, the most mocking thing about this is that what they decided for other peoples, divided the world of power, proclaiming themselves to be the epitome of democracy and lights of progress.

In the Communiqué of the conference, the three powers decided that after the defeat of Germany, each of them would occupy a certain zone, and Greater Berlin would be under joint administration. Germany was to be under the joint administration of the three occupying powers, whose commanders-in-chief would be in Berlin. Future reparations were also divided.

The Germans are still dying on the fronts, they are still rising in insane attacks. German women spit blood, learn to burn tanks with faustpatrons on the streets of their own cities. Still going "Volkssturm": a hundred

small and small, under 16 and over 60 years old. They go to die under the caterpillars of Soviet tanks with a very cheerful folk song:

Wir - "neue Waffen",
Wir-alte Affen.

What does it mean in Russian:

We are the new weapon
We are old monkeys.

Somewhere else German communists, servicemen of the Soviet Army, are running along the front line. They run with horns in their hands, shouting calls across the trench line to surrender, to beat the Nazis, to go over to the side of the Soviets, to build a democratic Germany. Another German sniper, gritting his teeth, catches "traitors"

at the fly by ear, by voice.

And everything is already counted, divided. It is known how these people will live, in what conditions, how much they will pay and to whom.

In the "Declaration on a Liberated Europe", the powers unanimously declared that they would coordinate their actions in solving the political and economic problems of Europe after the war. At the Crimean Conference, it was declared that all the peoples of Europe would be able to "create democratic institutions of their own choice"¹. And if the choice of the people is fascism? What if it's National Socialism?

Oh! We still don't talk about such horrors!!!

The Allies agreed that the future state structure of Yugoslavia would be decided by the Provisional United Government, which would include all political forces, from communists to monarchists.

It was also decided that the government of the future Poland would also include Polish political emigrants - its legitimate government, which had fled abroad in 1939. The future border of Poland was determined, and decided

¹ TSB. T. 13. M., 1973. S. 514.

but it was necessary to give Poland the long Germanized lands in the north, for example, Gdansk-Danzig, and in the west - Shche qing.

But at the same time, it was decided that Vilna would become Lithuanian Vilnius, and Lvov would become a Ukrainian city. The Germans will be kicked out of their homes, beaten into boxcars with rifle butts, and forever taken away from Danzig, where more than twenty generations were born and raised. But in the same way, the Poles from Lvov and Vilnius will be faced with a simple choice - to flee their homeland or be exterminated.

It was also decided that no later than 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany, the USSR would go to war with Japan and receive South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Japanese settlers still live on these lands, they are still making some plans, counting on something and hoping - but they are already doomed.

The Ukrainians, Russians and Byelorussians driven to the east are dispersing across Europe... Most of the millions of "displaced persons" want little - to somehow settle down and relax, not to return to the Soviet Union. But their fate is also sealed: at the Yalta Conference, the robbers agreed that everyone who was a citizen of the USSR at the time the war began should return to the Soviet Union. Regardless of your desire. If Vlasov, Cossacks or Kabardians surrender

captured by the allies - they are also subject to extradition.

Great betrayal

In the spring of 1945, the Russian Liberation Army of General Vlasov, the ROA, is still pursuing some kind of independent policy. She is still entering the battle for Prague: the Nazis have mined the city, they want to blow it up, just like they blew up Warsaw. The Czechs raised an uprising, they call on help.

Many different fairy tales were written in textbooks on the history of the USSR; one of them is about how May 8

In 1945, the rebellious inhabitants of Prague threw a cry over the radio: "Red Army, help me out." In fact, the radio appeal was in three languages at once - in Russian, French and English. Why in Russian? And by the fact that the Czechs knew about the Russian parts of the Wehrmacht. They did not call the Red Army.

In the USSR, they concealed with all their might that Prague had been liberated from the Nazis by the forces of the Vlasov army. But what can you do? The fact remains that Vlasov's division was the first to come to the aid of the Czechs, ahead of both the Soviet troops and the Americans. It was she who actually saved the Czechs from the massacre, and Prague from the inevitable transformation into a stone desert. More than 300 Vlasovites paid for this with their lives, several times more were wounded. After 1989, a monument to soldiers and officers of the Vlasov army was erected in Prague.

But the fact is another thing - helping the Czechs, the Vlasovites lost several precious days when they could have gone deep into the American zone of occupation. They found themselves sandwiched between the battle formations of the 25th Soviet Tank Corps and the 3rd Tank American Army. The Americans refused to let Vlasov's 1st division through. Negotiations went on for several days.

Personally Vlasov

was and people around him were offered several times change into civilian clothes and run. He refused.

Many American officers belonged to Vlasov

I sympathize with the people, but - military men - they received an order, and they carried out the order. The commander of the third army, D. Patton, categorically refused to take the Vlasov army into American captivity and advised only to break through to the west in small groups. On May 12, the division was officially disbanded by the last order of Major General S.K. Bunyachenko. A massive unorganized flight of people began; the Americans reported that the "White Russians" were fleeing from the Red Army "like animals." The army leadership ordered to open fire on the fleeing Russians, ordered "to detain all white Russians and hand them over to the Red Army." 12-14

May there was a systematic destruction of the remnants of the division, the execution of unarmed people who had no place on earth. Of the 10 thousand saviors of Prague, a beech survived valno units.

What can I say? Probably so: long live the United States - Stalin's loyal allies! Hooray for American Democracy!

Among the survivors is the battalion commander of the 3rd regiment P.N. Kuchinsky - he gave out the location and identified A.A. Vlasov. For this military feat worthy a real Soviet man, he was awarded the rank of captain of the Soviet Army and was given the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree.

However, it is still unknown how fate would have turned out. Vlasov, and they surrender to the Americans. In 1945-1947, the British and Americans handed over to certain death several hundred thousand Russian people who did not want to return to the USSR.

The details are terrible. Russian people were deceived until the last moment, there were cases when sleeping pills were added to their coffee and they were given SMERSH sleeping. The English captain Denis swore in the name of the queen that he would arrange a meeting for the Russian Cossacks with Field Marshal Alexander, after which he took them directly to the location of the Soviet units.

Valiant Englishmen, natural knights, whose official The Churches were very proud of their gentlemanship, they themselves took part in the murders and tortures. On June 1, 1945, the 8th Argyle battalion defeated the Cossack camp with terrible cruelty. Mass suicides were accompanied by the extradition of Major General T.I. Domashevsky and the 15th Cossack of his cavalry corps of the three-divisional composition of G. von Pannwitz. Children, the elderly, women, and the wounded were beaten with their feet and rifle butts, and thrown by force into approaching trucks. The English soldiers had a lot of fun when the Cossacks killed their wives and children, leaving

the next bullet for yourself. It remains to be regretted that they did not leave the bullet for the British scum.

And in the American zone of occupation on January 19, 1946 in Dachau, 14 people committed suicide, 21 people tried to kill themselves. In Plattling on February 24, 1946, there were also mass suicides. The Americans and the British tried to save the suicides and always gave them away - sometimes even in bandages.

Major General V.I. Maltsev spent 11 months in the Ashkhabad prison in 1938-1939, where he was subjected to terrible tortures, but did not sign any "knowledge recognition". This man followed Vlasov quite consciously and ideologically. In American captivity, he wrote desperate letters to General Eisenhower, seeking to save his officers from extradition. He expressed his full readiness to appear before an international court.

At the time of the extradition, on August 16, 1945, Maltsev cut his throat with a rusty razor. The Americans placed him in a closed Soviet hospital, from there he was transferred to the Butyrka prison. At the trial, Maltsev behaved implacably.

The American military press was very amused about the suicides; many articles have been preserved, so it will not be easy for Americans to get away from the facts.

It is curious that already in the 1970s, A. Eden (Lord Avon), who was personally responsible for "carrying out all this policy," repeatedly wrote to Count N.D. Tolstoy, the author of the book *Victims of Yalta*, "tried to justify the repatriations, refusing at the same time to answer specific, and key questions"¹. Apparently, he believed that everything was correct. In 1995, the Anglo-Saxons and French celebrated the end of World War II with grandeur. And not a word of repentance. Everything is fine.

No less terrible is the fate of the Yugoslav Chetniks who fought against Tito's communists. The same captain Denis betrayed Lev Rupnik's Slovenian corps together

¹ Tolstoy N.D. *Victims of Yalta*. M., 1996. S. 12.

ste with the sick, wounded, disabled. Even disabled people in plaster and the blind were thrown into trucks, then nurses and doctors began to be driven with butts. Among the suicides were children aged 13 and 14, brother and sister. They were inept, did not finish the job, and the good English soldiers helped the teenagers, finished them off

with bayonets.

One of the eyewitnesses described how "I was running, or rather, galloping ... an invalid on crutches. Pushing off the ground with his props, the unfortunate man tried to hide in the forest with huge leaps. The English soldiers knelt down and began to beat him with carbines. They laughed. They had fun."

The Croatian Chetniks were promised that they would be taken to where King Peter II was waiting for them. With shouts of joy, the monarchists stormed the trucks - they were in a hurry to meet their king.

These Chetniks were handed over along with their family members. All 16,000 people were shot and thrown into the Kochevskaya abyss. Then they lowered explosives into the abyss, captured faustpatrons, and blew them up - so that no one would be saved for sure.

Strictly speaking, according to the Yalta agreements, neither Western Ukrainians and Byelorussians, nor citizens of the Baltic states, nor white emigration, including Shkuro, Krasnov, or Semyonov, were extraditable - after all, all of them had not been citizens of the USSR for a single day. Moreover, there were not and could not be any documents on the extradition of some citizens of Yugoslavia to others.

But of course, when it came to the "appeasement" of Stalin, all international agreements burned like a blue fire. Western democracies really needed Stalin to quarrel with him because of some kind of human rights or other nonsense.

As for Krasnov and Shkuro, the Reds have accumulated he had too many bills and really wanted to

1Alexandrov K.M. From the history of forced repatriations (1945-1946) // Russia and the West. SPB. Publishing House of St. Petersburg State University, 1996. S. 248.

drink their blood, including the blood of the writer and public figure Pyotr Nikolaevich Krasnov. On January 17, 1947, he was hanged in Moscow, before he reached 78

years eight months.

According to official data, P.N. Krasnov "was captured by Soviet troops." But this is a lie: the valiant allies of Stalin betrayed him and all the other people, up to a million and a half; people who sometimes trustingly expected to be saved by those who so enthusiastically praised their "democracy".

I know of only three cases when Western officials opposed these extraditions. Pope Pius XII officially spoke out against the extradition of people "regardless of their will and denial of the right of asylum."

The other is not even a cleric, he is a very bad person, the evil fascist General Franco. The Spanish "Blue Division" fought on the Eastern Front, and Franco was quite reasonably asked:

- And if one of your military gave
would Stalin Russian?

- I would hang it high and short! Franco barked. "Before that, I would have cut off the eggs!"

And then he spoke for a long time about the deportations in terms that do not allow them to be reproduced on paper.

The prime minister of this small state, A. Frick (the son of a peasant, unlike British gentlemen), did not extradite any of those interned in Liechtenstein. Soviet diplomats threatened him that if Liechtenstein did not hand over the soldiers and officers of the 1st Russian National Army interned on its territory, the USSR would never establish diplomatic or economic relations with Liechtenstein. "Your business," the Prime Minister replied, "but I don't want my grandchildren to ever be able to say that their grandfather was a murderer." Apparently, English aristocrats have nothing against this title.

German generals and officers repeatedly spoke out against the policy of extradition - but they spoke out in defense of fellow soldiers, and the attitude towards them was understandable: "What?! Is that Bosh pig still barking?!"

But here is a characteristic detail: when allies in Austria ki - British and Americans, began to issue Cossacks to the Stalinist secret police, the Cossack father and Major General of the Wehrmacht Helmut von Pannwitz himself went after his brother-soldiers and shared their fate - he was executed by the communists in Moscow in 1947. 144 officers of the Wehrmacht voluntarily went into captivity with their Russian fellow soldiers, 690 Cossack officers¹. Eternal glory heroes.

The translator R. Ressler voluntarily stayed with Vlasov, although at the time of Andrei Alekseevich's arrest, they tried to separate him from the boss. He returned to Germany in 1955 after serving 10 years in the Gulag.

Surprisingly, it is a fact - life in the Third Reich and service in the ranks of the Wehrmacht formed higher human qualities than life in a democracy and service in the ranks of the liberating armies.

It makes sense to emphasize once again - neither the Western peoples, boasting of "democracy", nor the rulers of these powers have any rights to "white clothes". I would even say that in some cases the Western peoples have less rights to white clothes than the Germans, and the rulers of Western countries have less rights to be called decent people than Hitler and Bormann.

What right do they have to condemn Oradur and Babi Yar English soldiers laughingly shooting at a fleeing cripple? Throwing a man in a plaster corset on both legs into trucks? Bayoneting two unfortunate teenage suicides?

Yes, none! It is only interesting in which commissions on human rights, who were taught to live, returning

¹ Tolstoy N.D. Victims of Yalta. M., 2000. S. 268.

Go back to your homeland, these joyfully laughing people, the murderers of the doomed cripple?

As for the leaders of the peoples, this raises a question... A very terrible... A very indecent question... It's even scary to say... Tell me, in what way do Roosevelt and Churchill fundamentally differ from their ally Stalin? And moreover, how are they fundamentally different from Hitler and Ribbentrop? Because they won the war, right? And what else?

The third myth of Suvorov, or the Unsuccessful manipulator

What else betrays Suvorov as a deeply Soviet person: he has great respect for citizen Dzhugashvili¹ ... In the sense of Joseph Stalin. Suvorov turns out that Hitler failed to "purify" his army and his state. That is why he had bad generals and bad politicians. Here Stalin carried out a cleansing - he shot down the "Leninist guard", the surviving revolutionaries, and therefore his state and his army were active, viable. His "cogs" of the state turned out to be stronger than those serving in the Wehrmacht. More reliable. He devoted a whole book to how Stalin purged and improved his army from Tukhachevsky and Yakir².

True, Suvorov himself is not very consistent: he sometimes writes about the "Stalinist falcons" in such a way that his hair stands on end. I walked around Marshal Zhukov in such a way that it becomes obvious: Zhukov has nothing in common with Moltke, von Brauchitsch and Guderian³. Tukhachevsky and Yakir have nothing in common with them - Suvorov convinced, convinced! But Zhukov and Konev and Guderian also have nothing about

¹ What is his name? mister? It's funny to think. Rishem tova? The rat in the garbage is his comrade. The protocol "citizen" remains.

² Suvorov V. Cleansing. M., 2005.

³ Suvorov V. I take back my words. M., 2007.

there is none. Including the efficiency of their activities. Any lieutenant of Guderian is worth three bugos out taken together.

Perhaps Suvorov did not want to show this. Perhaps he honestly tried to show that Zhukov and Konev were somehow better ... But he did this!

And most importantly, Suvorov's Stalin somehow does not deserve orgaistic awe. Suvorov either honestly experiences this thrill, or tries to imitate it so that everyone can see. And it turns out bad.

Stalin still turns out to be a rare not lucky one for him. Finish absolutely all Stalin's undertakings fail and lead to nothing good.

To begin with, Stalin realized the idea of the World Revolution through friendship with Hitler. He almost completely deceived him, but then the "icebreaker of the revolution" himself deceived Stalin: got out of control and attacked the leader himself the first state of workers and peasants.

Having unwittingly become an enemy of Hitler, Stalin again began to divide the world, this time with the rulers of the "decaying bourgeois pseudo-democracies." The method is the same - secret collusion.

In 1941, it was not so easy to disown the former ally and enter into friendship with new ones. "I had to" do a lot of not very respectable actions.

As early as June 1941, the government of the USSR "point-blank did not see" the diplomatic representatives of the countries captured by Hitler, but established diplomatic relations with the Vichy puppet government. Now it was necessary to recognize all the governments of the countries occupied by Hitler - and not the communist ma

rionettes, but just those forces that are not to be recognized
body: Polish government in exile
London, the government of General de Gaulle.

V

In 1943, the forces of the USSR are growing, and again Stalin calms the allies, holds the Tehran conference, begins to discuss the future boundaries of the occupation zones in Europe At the same time, he refuses

from the gloomy army symbols of the Civil War. He introduces epaulettes and an international system of military ranks, liquidates the Comintern in the summer of 1943, and in September holds a Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church.

That is, it seems to be obvious that the anti-Hitler colic exists only as long as Hitler exists. But Stalin is in no hurry to move on to confrontation—Germany is still strong, he wants to receive Lend-Lease supplies, he wants to achieve the opening of a Second Front... And he takes a number of steps that allow one to think—the USSR is ready to liberalize the internal regime after the war.

N.N. Krasnov Jr. left notes in which, among other things, he cites the words of the investigator V.N. Merkulova: "But that you believed the British is really stupid! After all, these are historicalorgasms! They will sell anyone and anything and not bat an eyelid. Their policy is a prostitute. Their Foreign Office is a brothel where the prime minister, the main diplomatic "madame", sits. They trade in other people's lives and their own death. We? We don't believe them, Colonel. So we took the reins into our own hands. They don't even know that we locked them in a corner on the chessboard and now made them dance to our tune like the last pawn. Sooner or later there will be a fight between the communist bear and the Western bulldog. Mercy to our sugar, honey,

reptiles and ingratiating allies - not will! All their kings will fly to hell by their traditions, lords, heralds, orders of Baths and Garters and white wigs. If an ordinary investigator said so, then what did the "father of peoples" think?

To what extent did those whom he called "our valiant allies" understand Stalin's game? Really

¹ *Krasnov N.N. Unforgettable. San Francisco, 1957, p. 145.*

intellectual Roosevelt, smart and cynical Churchill could not see through the naive prison-camp cunning of the mustachioed godfather? After all, everything was sewn with white thread!

Did they, the leaders of the Western world, understand what the Caucasian thief, who became the dictator of the Soviet Union, really thought of them? Did Roosevelt and Churchill still have the hope of outplaying Stalin, of deceiving the deceiver? Or were they counting on an economic stranglehold? To the fact that Stalin will not be able to exist without the import of cars and food, will he be obedient involuntarily? Or was the calculation on nuclear weapons? To be frank, I don't know. I'm not even sure that there was any calculation in general. Perhaps the extraditions in Lienz, the entire "Great Betrayal" can be explained simply - the usual colonial attitude towards Russians in general. Well, just think, they handed over several blacks to another native leader ... Delov!

But what is most interesting is that twice finding allies, twice starting to share the world with them, in both cases Stalin was deceived in his plans and forecasts. Great statesman? But every time he managed to make incredible efforts and get unjustifiably little for them. Including, it seems, because he did not understand the psychology of his allies at all, did not see that for them it was really a priority

but, for which they are ready to fight in earnest.

As a result, the same thing happened to Stalin that sooner or later happens to any manipulator: no matter how cunningly he spins a web, he still cannot calculate all the actions of another person. If he were honest in his relations with another, it would always be possible to come to an agreement... But the manipulator expects to get something that he does not agree on at all; he expects that his partner will give out a predictable and previously taken into account reaction, and it will be a win ... And he loses, because the partner gives out reactions that are not at all predictable (as one should expect).

Even Hitler, who is much closer and more understandable to Stal, did something unpredictable and unexpected. And "his valiant allies" ... Stalin never got even that piece of the world that the allies dumped him in Yalta - until the end of his life, he could not completely conquer even Western Ukraine and Lithuania, not to mention Hungary and Poland (of course, he also did not understand the psychology of Polish and Lithuanian patriots).

As for Germany, for power over the world ... is it worth repeating fairy tales for half-witted people who live not in the real world, but in the quirks of their own fantasies?

Of course, "many solutions of K.K. (Crimean Conference - A.B.) ... did not find their post-war implementation
leniya ... through the fault of the Western powers, which headed for fanning the "cold war" against the socialist countries, for the revival of West German militarism and revanchism"¹.

It turns out that even with the help of a secret division of the world, at the cost of exterminating millions of people, Stalin could not achieve not only power over the world ... He could not achieve much more modest things ... For example, he could not make Germany his satellite.

World Civil War

World War II was civil not only for the USSR. It was an explosion during which the political system changed in almost all states of Europe and the world.

Before the Great War of 1914-1918, we see one world. With the "five Great Powers", the absolute leadership of the countries of Europe, with a combination of monarchy and liberal democracy in domestic politics,

other powers.

¹ TSB. 3rd ed. T. 13. M., 1973. S. 514.

After 1945, a completely different one arises: with other leaders, other political, economic and social systems, other priorities.

In the fire of the First World War, the old world order collapsed, and the new one did not appear. All countries of the world are faced with a choice.

The Versailles system tied many knots of international tension. After the Revolution of 1917 and the Civil War of 1917-1922, the

the question of the political system ... in fact, in all countries of Europe. The world political system and the direction of development in all the states of Europe remained very uncertain. Period 1918-1939 on a global scale - a period of intermediateness, uncertainty, transition.

Italy has long rushed between socialism, democracy and fascism.

In Spain, fascism became a salvation from the communist and anarchist experiment, during the Civil War of 1935-1938.

France: the crisis of liberal democracy, the growth of the forces of the social democrats, the problem of authoritarianism, the restoration of the monarchy, the growth of communist forces.

Great Britain: agitation in favor of communism and national socialism. The growth of autocracy in power, the growth of the autonomy of the administrative apparatus from the democratically elected bodies of the representative authorities.

Eastern Europe since the end of World War I between Communism, Fascism, Social Democracy and National Socialism. Each country in Eastern Europe had its own specifics, but the struggle was between these forces. And almost all the countries of Eastern Europe (Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece) ultimately opted for fascism or autocracy close to fascism (Poland, Czechoslovakia).

Authoritarian regimes close to fascism were established in the Baltics.

In Austria, the tendencies to join Germany and remain independent fought, and in politics - social democracy, liberalism and the growing temptation national socialism.

In France, communists, fascists and liberals argued almost exclusively in the newspapers, but there was tension.

The nation-building of the USSR made it possible, through a system of subordinate "people's republics", to increase the size of the USSR in any way. The USSR conducted hostilities almost continuously, in 1923-1939. - in Central Asia, in the Caucasus, Western Ukraine. The Red Army remained the main instrument of territorial expansion.... But the need to wage a secret war in Europe and America turned the Cheka, an instrument of genocide, into one of the strongest special services in the world, the NKVD.

The USSR resisted the socialist Reich with a red banner, brown shirts and singing an anthem new, delightfully similar to the Soviet ones.

And all these forces ... Not the Germans, not Stalin, namely that EVERYTHING. Everyone was preparing a new war.

The Second World War completed what was not completed after the First World War. She brought certainty to the world situation. The Versailles division of the world and the activities of the League of Nations did not, in fact, satisfy anyone. The world post-war system lasted from 1945 to 1989 and suited almost all European

tsev.

During the Second World War, ABSOLUTELY ALL the countries of Europe, along with the national (or civilizational?) war, also waged civil wars - wars between citizens of the same country who had different political beliefs and different ideas about the desired future. In many countries (France, Poland, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain, Austria, Germany), the civil war was no less cruel than the national war.

Even in quiet Britain and the calm United States, the political system has changed: liberal democracy has been replaced in them by corporate ones, in which there is much less "you can".

None of the states that participated in World War II war, did not retain the old political system.

The "world revolution" that the Bolsheviks raved about did not take place. But the World Civil War took place. It lasted about 2 decades and covered the entire civilized world. As it began in 1914, it continued until 1945.

After the Second World War, not only the face of the world, borders and spheres of influence zones changed. The political map within all participating states has changed. Talking about it is still considered very indecent.

nym, but it is.

The victors in World War II created many myths. These myths have been studied in textbooks and promoted in novels and films. And to talk about real events and the actual state of affairs has become something unpatriotic and, as it were, hostile towards their own people. And therefore unsafe.

By the 1960s, the first generation had grown up to imagine World War II primarily in terms of these myths.

To the history of the World Civil

Suvorov began to demolish the building of these myths. He gave explanations for much of what had been lied to for decades. And the researcher was almost hurt by the indignant "patriots", and his happiness that he was in London: it's not so easy to get to Suvorov.

Corned beef continued and said even more than Su thieves. But the aggression against him was less... Probably, the enraged patriots were exhausted on Suvorov. Yes, and everyone is already used to it.

The myth began to crumble rapidly. Probably, new myths will appear (already have begun to appear) in its place, but it is already possible to reconstruct "how it was".

But to complete the reconstruction is difficult.

It is not only about propaganda and not only about state natural violence.

The fact is that the myth itself is warm and cozy.

As long as you live in this myth, you are surrounded by like-minded people. All around - benevolent views, around people who are ready to lend a shoulder. And you yourself realize this community as "correct" and "worthy". A community to be proud of.

To dismantle a myth is to rise above tribal, group ideas. The process is like climbing a mountainside somewhere in the Himalayas.

We must leave the warm valley where "everyone" lives. On there is less heat at the top, plants below, cold ones whistle, harsh winds. But from the slope you can already see more than from below... for example, you can see exactly who was preparing the Second World War. Even higher - around a patch of snow, cold tightens the face, the air is rarefied ... But you can already see with everything far away! It can be seen that your valley is only one of many, that your fellow tribesmen are no better than anyone.

the rest.

And you need to move to where you are completely alone, where you can't see your relatives and where none of them has yet risen. There, under the black-green sky, among the icy rocks, moss and piercing cold light, the truth will be revealed to you. What a war! This is a Civil War, and its purpose is to change the economic and political order... all over the world, if possible.

Scary. Unclear. Dangerous. It is not known whether they will want to believe you if you bring this truth down to the bottom of the warm valley to others.

Any myth is unpleasant to deconstruct. To see that the Earth revolves around the Sun, and that man descended from animal-like ancestors means to abandon

cozy community with grandfather and father. It is to start thinking differently from the way your recent ancestors thought and the way your relatives think.

"... Mark Solonin accomplished a scientific feat, and what he is doing is a golden brick in the foundation of the history of the war that will someday be written..." - this is how Victor Suvorov assessed the work of his colleague.

In my opinion, these words are more correctly attributed to the work of Viktor Suvorov himself. He made a scientific feat and moved the avalanche.

And the history of the war that needs to be written... This is the history of the World Civil War... Or 1914-1945. Whether all the same 1939-1945.

Yuri Tsurganov

THE IDEA OF THE "GREAT PATRIOTIC"

The basis of Soviet mythology of our days

In the late 1980s, an extremely difficult situation developed for Soviet patriots. It was akin to the one in which the heroes of their legend, the "Panfilovites", found themselves. The political leader of the "Panfilovites" is credited with the phrase: "Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat - behind Moscow." At the end of perestroika, the ideologists of Soviet patriotism also had nowhere to retreat - the history of the "Great Patriotic War" was behind them.

By that time, almost all the dogmas of the outgoing era had undergone reassessment in the public mind: "developed socialism", "peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR", "voluntary entry" of the Baltic countries into the "fraternal family of the peoples of the Soviet Union", "unprecedented flourishing of culture in the USSR", etc. . The cult of Lenin held on for the longest time, but he, in the end, fell under the onslaught of irrefutable evidence of the mass extermination of people during the Red Terror, that it was Lenin who laid the foundations of totalitarianism in our country.

The idea of the "Great Patriotic War" became the last stronghold of the ideology of the Soviet patriots. In the late 1980s (as, indeed, now), attempts to refute the theses of Soviet propaganda about the Second World War were perceived by officials with particular intolerance. Not surprising. After all, the collapse of the "last shrine" deprives the Bolsheviks of being in power of any historical justification.

Despite the opposition of officials, from the beginning of the 1990s to the present, it has been written

and many works have been published whose authors are free from ideological clichés. If the first of these books had come out five years earlier, the last bastion of Soviet propaganda would have collapsed.

Unfortunately, in the 1990s, the minds of many Russian citizens were no longer so receptive to new ideas related to the field of humanitarian knowledge. People were not busy with this - only with the creation of the original

capital, others looking for livelihoods

niyu, that is, "their own affairs." Therefore, the stereotypes of thinking in relation to the events of 1941-1945 remain

fell basically the same.

The "last bastion" of the Soviet patriots managed to almost defend and even use it as a springboard

for an ideological counteroffensive.

In the 1990s, many citizens became disillusioned with democratic reforms. The consequence of this was nostalgia for the USSR and the search for "bright sides" in its history. This was immediately noticed by those who dream of the restoration of the Soviet order. Today they are gradually turning the idea of the "Great Patriotic War" into a surrogate for the national idea of Russia. There was no national idea, and there is no, but the "Great Patriotic War

na" is presented as something sacred, not subject to rethinking. Any attempt to revise the history of the war is treated as an apostasy.

Based on the myth of the "Great Patriotic War", modern Soviet patriots are trying to rehabilitate many of the actions of the Bolsheviks since 1917. They are trying to convince us that, despite the harshness and even cruelty of the methods used by the Bolsheviks, it was these methods that ultimately ensured victory over Germany.

In this case, the following judgments are expressed:

—June 22, 1941, Nicholas II would have been 73 years old, his son, Tsarevich Alexei, would have been 37. Neither one nor the other, let alone Kerensky's political heirs, would have been able to organize an adequate rebuff to Hitler.

- A rebuff could not be organized because tsarist Russia was a backward country. Nicholas II suffered from paralysis of will, allowed himself to be misled by the court camarilla, unwittingly became a hostage to political intrigues. He made decisions that served the interests of those close to the court, and not the interests of the country. All this was quite clearly manifested during the First World War.

— By 1941, the situation could only worsen. First, old age is added to all other bad qualities of Nicholas II; secondly, Hitler was stronger and more dangerous than Kaiser Wilhelm. By the beginning of the new German invasion, Tsarevich Alexei could have already succeeded his father on the Russian throne. But he was a seriously ill person - he suffered from hemophilia. A liberal republican government would have been even more incapable of repulsing the German onslaught.

— Of course, certain positive changes could have taken place in non-Soviet Russia by 1941, including in the economy, but nothing like the industrialization carried out by the Bolsheviks could clearly be realized.

really.

- Since it would be impossible to give a proper rebuff to Hitler, destruction awaited Russia: the territory was dismembered, the peoples were partly exterminated, partly enslaved by the "Great German Reich".

- Only the Bolsheviks had the will to fight, were able to prepare the country for defense and thereby save it. During the three pre-war five-year plans, the country has covered in its industrial development the path that European countries have traveled in 50-100 years. Russia has turned from an agrarian country into an industrial giant. The developed heavy industry made it possible, albeit belatedly, to equip the Red Army with modern weapons and defeat the enemy.

— A high price has been paid for industrialization. But without it, there would have been no victory, and, consequently, no Russia itself. It was impossible to carry out industrialization without transferring funds from agriculture

economy into industry, and this transfer is impossible without collectivization. Collectivization was not possible without dispossession, because it inevitably led to resistance from the most prosperous

peasants.

— All this could not be done without the termination of the New Economic Policy, without the use of the free labor force of prisoners, without selling national wealth abroad. It was impossible not to lower the standard of living of citizens, and in order to avoid unrest, strikes and strikes, political repressions had to be carried out in the country according to the principle “not because”, but “not to”. It was inevitable to fight the opposition and dissent, and such a fight is not possible in the conditions of the existence of a multiparty system, parliamentarism and non-state mass media.

- Of course, all this could not have been carried out without the Bolsheviks taking power in October 1917 and without those methods of fighting the enemies of the revolution that took place during the Civil War.

- Yes, the Bolsheviks caused a lot of suffering to people, committed many injustices. But, if not for the Bolsheviks, Hitler would have destroyed us. The Bolsheviks sacrificed a part in order to ultimately save

whole.

- That is, if the Bolsheviks had not taken power in 1917, then the war in 1941 would have ended with the defeat of Russia.

The scheme is based on two postulates:

- Hitler's attack was inevitable;

Hitler posed a real biological threat

sky and cultural existence of the peoples of Russia.

However, these postulates are unsteady, and without them the whole scheme breaks.

How did Hitler become Hitler?

The answer to the question of how imminent Hitler's attack was depends on the answer to another question:

How inevitable was his rise to power in Germany?

What happened as a result? Let's figure it out.

None of the leaders of Bolshevism in 1917 considered the seizure of power in Russia to be the final point of the program. Lenin even argued that it would be more correct to speak not about the Russian revolution, but about the world revolution, which, due to historical circumstances, began in Russia.

In 1919, the Bolsheviks created in Moscow a transnational "proletarian" organization of a "new type" - the Communist International (Comintern). The organization set itself the task of establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat" on a global scale. The Communist International defined itself as the world communist party. The Charter of the Comintern read: "Being the leader and organizer of the world revolutionary movement of the proletariat, the bearer of the principles and goals of communism, the Communist International is fighting ... for the creation of the World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"² (which, in essence, was a declaration of war on the whole world, at least the Cold War). As a springboard for the implementation of this plan, the leaders of the Bolsheviks, who are also the leaders of the Comintern, intended to use the territory of the Russian state that they had already destroyed.

In the first years of their stay in power, the Bolsheviks made several unsuccessful attempts to carry out a revolutionary campaign in Europe with the help of the Red Army. The peoples of neighboring countries perceived these measures not as a mission of "liberation from the yoke of the landowners and capitalists", but as aggression. The Red Army was rebuffed. Attempts by the Bolsheviks to organize revolutions in European countries with the help of the Foreign Department of the OGPU
nah, that is, blow them up from the inside, also failed
success.

Then the Bolsheviks began to develop a new tactic for the world revolution. It consisted in helping to establish in one of the European

aggressive regime that will unleash a new world war and enslave the rest of the peoples of Europe. In this version, the forthcoming invasion of the Red Army certainly should have been perceived by these peoples as a mission of "liberation". (The Bolsheviks were to provide technical assistance to the future aggressive regime during its growth.)

Germany seemed to be the ideal state that could unleash a new world war in the future. Here were the most suitable conditions for potential aggressors to come to power, namely, revanchist moods in society.

The fact is that the powers that defeated Germany in the First World War punished her too cruelly. Under the Versailles Treaty of 1919, Germany had to pay multimillion-dollar reparations. This led to disastrous socio-economic consequences for the Germans. A characteristic indicator is brand hyperinflation. In 1922 in Germany prices changed 5-6 times a day, wages were paid twice a day. The terms of Versailles were also a blow to the national pride of the Germans. Germany lost 67.3 thousand square kilometers of its territory and all

colonies.

These two factors - poverty and national humiliation - contributed to the emergence and growth of revanchist sentiments in German society.

Under these conditions, Soviet-German military cooperation began - the first phase of the implementation of the new tactics of the world revolution.

According to the Versailles Treaty of 1919, the armed forces of Germany - the Reichswehr - were limited to 100 thousand people in 10 divisions: 3 cavalry and 7 infantry. The German army was forbidden to have a submarine fleet, large armored ships, aircraft, airships, tanks, armored cars, and chemical weapons. And in 1922, in Rapallo, Soviet and German representatives signed an agreement on cooperation, which did not have military articles, but it

the most important result was the interaction in the field of armaments. The Reichswehr received the right to create military installations on Soviet territory, secretly from the whole world. They were intended for testing military equipment, accumulating tactical experience, training personnel of those branches of the armed forces that Germany was forbidden to have.

In 1923, several agreements were signed, in particular with the Junkers firm, on the construction of an aircraft factory on the territory of the USSR. In 1924, Soviet industry received an order from the Reichswehr for the production of 400,000 shells. There were three main centers of cooperation between the Red Army and the Germans: the higher school for pilots in Lipetsk - "Lipetsk", the tank school in Kazan - "Kama" and the school of chemical warfare in Podosinki - "Tomka". In 1931, the following were trained in Moscow: V. Model, V. Brauchitsch, V. Keitel, E. Manstein and other future commanders of the Second World War. In 1933, cooperation came to naught, but the power of the German army by this time had already been largely recreated³. In any case, the available facts

indicate well-defined intentions advice on the other hand, the intention to help Germany maintain the military sphere at the modern level.

The next phase of the new tactics of the world revolution was the bringing to power in Germany of the main revanchist force - the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) - [Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei] [NSDAP] Adolf Hitler.

According to the charter of the Comintern, the communist parties of different countries were included in it as sections. The CPSU(b) was also one of the sections, but played a leading role: "The number of decisive votes of each section at the world congress is determined ... according to the number of members of a given party and the political significance of a given country"⁴. It is quite obvious that the VKP(b) was the most numerous of all communist parties, and the political significance of the USSR for the world commun

The political movement was decisive, since the Communist Party was in power only in the Soviet Union, moreover, there were no other parties in the USSR.

Thus, the Comintern was an instrument of the foreign policy of the USSR, and the foreign Communist Parties were the executors of the will of the leadership of the CPSU(b): "Decisions of the Executive Committee of the Communist International are obligatory for all sections of the Communist International and must be immediately implemented by them"⁵.

In 1928, the VI Congress of the Comintern took place. It proclaimed that the main enemy of the international native communist movement - the social democrats. By that time, three parties had real power in Germany: the National Socialists, the Social Democrats and the Communists. The Comintern (and in practice, the leadership of the USSR, and more precisely, Stalin) forbade the German communists to support the Social Democrats and form election blocs with them. As a result, the Nazis won in the 1932 Reichstag elections. A regularity has long been noted: the sum of votes cast for each of the politically close parties going to the polls separately is significantly less than the number of votes that could be cast for their single bloc. Nothing disappoints the voter more than the inability of those for whom he was going to vote to agree with politically close ones on joint coordinated actions. Stalin forbade the German Communist Party to negotiate.

German President Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Reich Chancellor (head of government) on January 30, 1933. Soviet books say that this post was literally bought by Hitler by large German industrialists. Their motive is that Hitler will prepare for revenge, therefore, the industry will receive military orders. That is, it was a profitable investment of money. This is true. But Hitler, in order to make a bet on him, had to have something of himself before

put. He represented the leader of the party that won the largest number of votes in the elections.

This is a brief history of the participation of the USSR in the creation of the Third Reich.

Consequences of the October Revolution

In Germany itself, the votes cast for the NSDAP began by no means only a desire for revenge for Versailles, and not only disappointment in the "ability" of the German Social Democrats and the German Communists to find a common language. They also signified the fear of Bolshevism. This fear was one of the natural consequences of the October upheaval in Russia and the subsequent attempts to spread Bolshevism to other countries: "Give Warsaw!"; "Give Berlin!".

In the 1930s, in Germany, as well as in other European states, it was widely believed that the Bolshevik regime could be successfully opposed only by a similar totalitarian regime, but with the opposite ideological sign: not international, but national.

Hitler, whose concept of a totalitarian state was borrowed from Lenin, and whose spearhead of Nazi totalitarianism was turned against an international brother-model, fully responded to such sentiments. Both Lenin and Hitler have one leader, one party, they have a powerful secret police in their hands. A complete "alignment" (Gleichschaltung) of cultural and social life is being carried out in the country. There is a liquidation of any public associations independent of the ruling party. But Hitler copies Bolshevism in order to repulse him. Even Hitler's anti-Semitism was dressed in the toga of struggle against "Judeo-Bolshevism".

So, without the Bolsheviks, Hitler would hardly have succeeded as a dictator. The "intrigues of Versailles" alone are not enough, especially since by the beginning of the 1930s, the most painful articles of the Versailles Treaty for Germany were canceled. Much more important is the situation in Russia. When saved in

before 1933 (and beyond) the Reichswehr would not have been able to maintain itself at the present level under a monarchical or republican system, the NSDAP would not have won the elections both because of the creation of a left bloc opposed to it, and because the German inhabitants did not would have reason to vote for the national extremists.

To create the Hitler regime, there would be no reasons, no patterns.

Two systems

For the sake of fairness, let's say that totalitarianism in Germany never acquired such finished forms as in the USSR. The political model created by Hitler has much in common with the model created by Lenin and Stalin, but there are also significant differences: the Bolsheviks carried out the demolition of the "old state machine" - the Nazis did not begin to break it; the Bolsheviks destroyed the aristocracy and the social elite - they saved it for the Nazis; the Bolsheviks liquidated private enterprise, private capital, private property

vengeance on the means of production - the Nazis all this left.

Accordingly, the way of life of people in the USSR and in the Reich was also different. In the absence of non-state enterprises in the USSR, the possibility of a citizen's emancipation from the state was ruled out. Simply put, no matter where a person goes to work, he will still work at a state enterprise. In addition, leaving a job, a Soviet citizen received a characteristic, without which he could not get a job in a new place. And in this characteristic they could write such that they would not be taken to the janitors. This system was crowned by a decree of June 26, 1940, according to which citizens were generally prohibited from arbitrarily moving from one enterprise to another. In the Reich, the emancipation of a citizen from the state was possible - through the transition to work in a private company.

In the USSR, there was a significantly lower standard of living than in the Reich, which was also due in the first case to the absence, in the second case, to the presence of a private sector in the economy. There were no communal apartments in Germany, while the vast majority of the citizens of the Soviet Union lived in them. There were no ration cards in Germany before the war. In the USSR, they appeared in April 1929 - for bread, so that by the end of the year they would spread to almost all food products, and then to industrial products. In 1931, additional warrants were introduced, since even with cards it was impossible to get the required ration. The Soviet people were suffocating from the shortage of goods. Mounted police units were used to disperse thousands of queues for an elementary set of consumer goods. The German countryside did not know famine; in the USSR, the famine of 1932-1933 claimed the lives of 6.5 million rural residents.

In the USSR, the policy of repression was carried out by the lottery method, the possibility of being repressed did not depend on the degree of loyalty to the regime. A person could be arbitrarily devoted to "the cause of the party and personally to Comrade Stalin", but this did not give grounds for confidently asserting that today he would spend the night at home, and not in a pre-trial detention cell. In the Reich there was a selective repression. In order to end up behind bars, a person had to come into conflict with the system - prove himself as a social democrat, communist, trade union activist, Austrian separatist, and so on, or belong to a certain social group, primarily to Jews.

Hence the comparatively greater scope of political repressions in the USSR, which were carried out mainly on the basis of denunciations, the fertile ground for which was again created by the low standard of living. The scope of repressions in the Reich was relatively smaller, since they were carried out mainly taking into account the citizen's belonging to a particular political

or social group, which are not numerous in themselves. Arrest by denunciation is a much rarer phenomenon among the Nazis than among the Bolsheviks.

Hitler allowed dissenters to remain silent, Stalin demanded from everyone an active manifestation of enthusiasm. In the USSR, unlike the Reich, active non-freedom was practiced. It was not enough to read and listen to official propaganda - everyone is obliged to conduct it himself, so that for the time being

express your "consciousness" and loyalty.

Finally, the atmosphere of social life in the two compared countries was very different. In the USSR, the cloth-tarpaulin style dominated, the squalor of external forms of life was ubiquitous, hypocrisy and the cult of asceticism were planted. Germany remained a secular country even under Hitler.

The myth of "backward Russia"

According to modern Soviet patriots, without the October Revolution, "weak, backward Russia" could not have resisted the enemy. And allegedly only industrialization, carried out by the Bolsheviks at any cost, could pull the country out of the economic hole.

However, the storming of the first five-year plans did not make up for the "backwardness" of tsarist Russia, but for the lag caused by the collapse of the country as a result of the coup d'état carried out by the Bolsheviks. In Soviet literature itself, much was written about the fact that during the years of the NEP, the level of production of pre-revolutionary Russia was approximately restored by 1927. That is, the October Revolution, the devastating experience of the immediate building of communism, and the resulting Civil War robbed the country of ten years of growth (and this is in addition to irreparable human losses, colossal moral trauma, and decimated national culture). It was these ten years that made up for the first five-year plans. Moreover, firstly, Soviet industry gave a pronounced flux in the direction of heavy industry, and that, in turn, in the direction of

arms production. The Russian pre-revolutionary industry was reasonably balanced, worked for the needs of society, since the Russian Empire did not seek to expand by force of arms to the extent of the entire globe. Second, the Soviet

industry developed by lowering the standard of living
no citizens, but the Russian one - for the sake of raising this level.

Before the First World War, during the Duma period (1906-1913), the national product of Russia increased at a rate of 6% per year, that is, it doubled every 12 years. Without the cataclysms of 1917-1921, Russia in 1941 would have been at least 4 times more powerful economically than in 1913. And without the "costs" that accompanied the policy of the Bolsheviks.

I foresee an objection: such development of the country could be slowed down by unforeseen force majeure circumstances. Yes, they could, and they slowed down. The October coup - this is the very force majeure

standing.

How dangerous was Hitler?

Stalin miscalculated with the new scheme of the world revolution - Hitler guessed his plans and attacked the USSR himself. The mere development of this scheme makes Stalin a criminal, and the CPSU(b) a criminal organization. But, if in 1941 a gigantic danger loomed over the country and the same Stalin managed to rectify the situation and achieve the victory of Soviet weapons, can this be considered as a rehabilitating factor?

It depends on the answer to a very important question - to what extent did Hitler pose a danger to the biological and cultural existence of the peoples of Russia?

Soviet propagandists made every effort to exaggerate the possibilities of the German economy and the armed forces. In the end, the wording was born: "The Red Army saved the world from the fascist plague." Obviously, if Hitler

foretold that after the victory he would extinguish the sun, Soviet propagandists would say: the Red Army saved the heavenly body for the world.

Hitler's plans really included partial extermination and partial enslavement of the peoples of Russia, depriving them of their cultural identity. You can cite a lot of relevant quotes from the leaders of the Reich.

However, intentions and opportunities do not always coincide. German marshals and generals wrote in their memoirs that they could not win World War II. Moreover, some of these works were published in the USSR in very old years, when the thesis about "saving the world" was being formed. One thing contradicts the other, but here we have a collection of memoirs by major German commanders under the general heading "Fatal Decisions". Issued in 1958 by the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR⁶.

Let us give the floor to Field Marshal G. von Rundstedt: "The war with Russia is a senseless undertaking, which, in my opinion, cannot have a happy ending"⁷. General G. Blumentritt: "Even with a glimpse of the world map, it was not difficult to understand that the small area in Central Europe occupied by Germany clearly could not put up forces capable of capturing and holding the entire European continent. Because of Hitler's policy, the German people and their armed forces were step by step further into a dead end.

And here is the testimony of Lieutenant General Z. Westfahl: "The Germans could not even hope for a long time with weapons in their hands to threaten the whole world. The world was simply too big.... The fundamental fatal decision was that based on Hitler's erroneous assumption that the Western powers would allow him to destroy Poland without standing up for his ally. As soon as the decision was made to invade Poland, our fate was also decided. Lessons 1914-1918 repeated again a quarter of a century later: Germany cannot win a war by fighting it on more than one front.

Many memoirs of German commanders have been published in modern Russia. Anyone can compile a large list of statements like content.

Yes, as a rule, these statements are the result of "correcting mistakes". The quoted texts were not written after the defeat of Germany. It is likely that in 1939 and 1941 the German generals and marshals thought differently, but so much the worse for them.

You can leave aside the sources of personal origin and turn to the scientific literature. There is no deficiency in it. Monographs and collective scientific works are written by both Russian and foreign scientists. The multitude of data cited testifies to the inevitable final defeat of Germany, regardless of how the course of individual battles could develop. It suffices to compare the combined military and economic potential of the Axis and the United Nations, and the size of the territories.

Hitler, who "needed to expand the living space," obviously unkindly left the southern part of France outside the occupation. The Germans could not fully control the occupied territories of the USSR, they did not have enough strength for everything. At the same time, it was planned to reach the Urals. And what to do with the territory beyond the Urals? Germany's main ally, Japan, instead of opening a second front against Stalin in the Far East, dragged Hitler into the war with the United States.

This picture is written with the broadest strokes. Anyone can add to it and refine it. In any case, the history of the Third Reich would have ended no later than August 1945, when the Americans completed work on the creation of the atomic bomb.

Thus, we can conclude:

- Hitler as the political leader of Germany was a product of Stalin;
- Hitler was not able to destroy the zakaba pour the peoples of Russia, although he really wanted to;
- the concept of the saving mission of Bolshevism for Russia's fate turns out to be completely unconvincing.

Notes

¹ A lot of serious scientific research is devoted to this topic. For example: *Felshtinsky Yu.* The collapse of the world revolution. Essay first. Brest peace. October 1917 - November 1918. London: OPI, 1991. 655 p.

² The Communist International in Documents. Decisions, theses and appeals of the Congresses of the Comintern and Plenums of the ECCI. 1919-1932 / Ed. Bela Kuna. M.: Party publishing house, 1933. S. 47.

³ The book by Yu.L. Dyakova and T.S. Bushueva "The fascist sword was forged in the USSR: the Red Army and the Reichswehr. Secret collaboration. 1922-1933. Unknown Documents. M.: Sov. Russia. 1992. 384 p. The authors introduced into scientific circulation a huge array of documents

Commodities, which reveal in detail the nature of Soviet-German military cooperation in the specified period.

⁴ The Communist International in Documents... S. 48. ⁵ Ibid.

⁶

Westphal Z., Kreipe W., Blumentrit G., Bayerlein F., Zeitzler K., Zimmerman B., Manteuffel H. Fatal Decisions / Ed. P.A. Zhilina. M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1958. 317 p. ⁷ Ibid. P. 76. ⁸ Ibid. P. 108.

⁹

Ibid. pp. 305-306.

Dmitry Khmel'nitsky
"ANTIRESUNISM" AS A SUBCULTURE

In the autumn of 2005, just starting to collect material for the first collection, *The Truth of Viktor Suvorov*, I immediately ran into problems with attracting German-speaking authors. Philip Hoffman, once one of the first to support Suvorov's concept, had died by that time, and no one could be found among the living who wanted to take part in the collection. A German historian of Stalinist repressions explained the situation to me this way: "Among the researchers who depend on grants, you will not find anyone who would openly take the side of Suvorov, regardless of what they themselves think about him. It could cost them dearly."

The prophecy turned out to be not entirely true, as the readers of the second and third collections, in which famous German researchers Heinz Magenheimer, Stefan Scheil, and Bogdan Musial took part, can easily be convinced.

But there really is a problem, and not even a scientific one in the literal sense of the word. In the scientific community of Germany, the role of the USSR in unleashing the Second World War is preferred not to be discussed at all. In this sense, it is customary to talk about the Soviet Union as if it were dead - either good or nothing. Well, this means, as suggested by Soviet propaganda, that the Soviet Union was the victim of Hitlerite aggression and the savior of Europe from fascism. Everything that goes beyond the scope of this formula is perceived, as a rule, as some kind of hooliganism, a violation of the rules of professional ethics. And automatically falls under suspicion of sim

pathy towards revanchism. At the same time, an absolutely not logically absurd, but traditional and popular conclusion is made: "If someone wants to say that more than one Hitler is to blame for the outbreak of a world war, then this someone is trying to justify Hitler." Such a formulation of the question, in principle, excludes attempts to understand the situation

tions.

One American historian, who often visits Germany, told me that when, in a conversation with German colleagues, it comes to the role of the USSR in preparing for war, their faces turn to stone, and the desire to develop the topic completely disappears. At the same time, it cannot be said that in Germany (and in the West in general) there is scientific opposition to Suvorov's concept of Stalin preparing an attack on Europe. Nothing more convincing than a retelling of the old, still Soviet theses, does not appear. And there is no more convincing criticism of Suvorov than the widely known and deservedly scolded for its low scientific level book by Gabriel Gorodetsky "The Myth of the Icebreaker" either. There is a taboo. There is a simple unwillingness to talk about this topic and unwillingness to explore it.

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But the situation is still changing, as can be judged according to the publication of books by the authors mentioned above, and also according to the content of television films traditionally released annually on various military historical dates, the tone of which in relation to the USSR is becoming increasingly
her apologetic.

When Suvorov's first books, *The Icebreaker* and *Den M*, were published in Russia, a very stormy controversy immediately flared up. Honored Soviet military historians A. and L. Mertsalov, Yu. Gorkov, V. Anfilov, M. Gareev spoke out against Suvorov ... M. Meltyukhov, V. Danilov, V. Nevezhin, Yu. Felshtinsky and etc. In the future, the old anti-Su thieves' guard left the game. In any case, they no longer take part in public discussions and do not publish works consistently refuting the Suvorov concept. Number of sides

At the same time, Suvorov's scientific community is constantly growing, which can be judged by at least the list of authors of three collections of "The Truth of Viktor Suvorov". The place of academic criticism of Suvorov in Russia was taken by a huge number (already about three dozen) of books of a purely propaganda nature, most often trying to stigmatize the "traitor Rezun" and compromise him in every possible way. As a rule, they are published under pseudonyms such as "Kadetov", "Grozun", "V. Surov", etc. And the place of scientific opposition is an extremely active and aggressive, but exclusively network, community of "anti-rezunists". Their amusing distinguishing feature, which catches the eye first of all, is their fundamental unwillingness to call Viktor Suvorov the name he signs his books with. Apparently, among them, the real name of Suvorov - Rezun is considered dissonant, and therefore offensive. However, this is not the only and, perhaps, the most harmless violation of the rules by them during

personal behaviour.

I had to get acquainted with this virtual the public after the release in the spring of 2006 of the first collection "The Truth of Viktor Suvorov" - first on one of the other pages of LiveJournal, and then on my own. Hundreds of remarks, usually arrogantly offensive and deliberately rude, feigned a discussion of a book that none of the anti-Rezunist participants had read. Many clearly did not even understand that this was not about the texts of Suvorov himself, but a collection of articles by completely different authors.

The reaction was very uniform - mockery, hatred for Suvorov, unwillingness to read the book and at the same time disbelief that other researchers support Suvorov's conclusions. Although the book is made up of just such articles. Immediate attempts to draw third-rate details into traditional discussions. Moreover, the disputants clearly did not distinguish between the key arguments of Suvorov's argumentation and not at all obligatory ones. It was clear that it was not inaccuracies in the

details, but the essence of the concept, i.e., conclusions about Stalin's policy and intentions. But there were no attempts to refute the key arguments. Ritual and apparently well-practiced dances were going on around details like the performance data of tanks and other military equipment in the naive belief that if inaccuracies in Suvorov's books could be proved, the idea that Stalin was preparing an attack on Europe would die out on its own. .

Criticism, in principle, is of two kinds - clarifying or refuting. Clarifying criticism disputes particulars and thereby helps the author to get rid of inaccuracies.

The paradoxical nature of the activity of the "anti-resunists" lies in the fact that all of it, at best, fits into the framework of clarifying criticism (successful or unsuccessful, it doesn't matter). But the cry at the same time is such, as if the crowds of people have long trampled on the concept of Suvorov and are now dancing on the bones. Although nothing on resembling a consistent refutation of his concept did not even come close. There is no refutation of key evidence, no alternative historical concept. There are attempts to "feel" the little things.

They demanded an immediate answer from me why Suvorov is mistaken in certain tactical and technical data, etc. On the whole, it turned out to be quite easy to deal with them; authors other than Suvorov. And the people withered. On the whole, the raid gave the impression of a well-worked out methodological action to persecute Suvorov's supporters, who happened to be in the field of view of this public. The participants had an "active-defensive", as cynologists say, reflex to the very name of Suvorov. But only for him. I do not remember a single attempt to hook or challenge other scientists who come to the same conclusions as Suvorov. Many speeches were so rude and absurd that they gave the impression of the activity of hired "clackers". Generally

these actions did not in the least resemble disputes on scientific topics, even at an amateur level.

A characteristic quotation from the book "Rodent" was given by the owner of the site on which the discussion took place, speaking under the network pseudonym u_96: Why do we consider Rezun a falsifier? Rezun, having swung at the most sacred thing in the history of his people (it doesn't matter who he considers himself to be, Russian or Ukrainian), accusing him of committing the most serious crime in the history of the 20th century, never once doubted his conclusions.

It was this "most sacred" thing that they defended by all available means. But for some reason only from Suvorov. Apparently, the stupid confidence worked that the easily mental style of his books allows you to stand on one with

them a board to anyone.

* * *

This community has an informal ideological center in the person of the historian Aleksey Isaev, who speaks online under the name "Doctor Guillotin", the author of the book Antisuvorov, published in 2006 and immediately becoming widely known. In the "anti-rezunist" environment, it is usually believed that Isaev is the only one who can oppose Suvorov on an equal footing.

In fact, by no means can it. Doesn't even try. He and Suvorov play completely different games and pursue completely different goals. If Suvorov is trying to solve a historical problem, then Isaev, under the guise of criticizing Suvorov, solves the problem of compromising Suvorov himself, leaving the essence

discussions aside, not even trying to propose together some alternative to the concept he rejects. Therefore, Isaev's book is an extremely curious and rather rare phenomenon from the point of view of the genre.

The book "Antisuvorov" has a subtitle, rendered

on the cover - "Big Lies of a Little Man." This trick alone takes Isaev out of the circle of people with whom it is permissible to have discussions, especially scientific ones. Although, of course, not from the point of view of his supporters, for whom such behavior is the norm.

There is a logic to conducting scientific discussions. In order to refute a certain scientific concept (including a historical one), you need to compose a text - a book or an article - according to certain rules.

1. State the concept of the criticized author.
2. Outline its main arguments (those without which the concept falls apart).
3. Refute these arguments. To show that the author's logic does not work, and from the information provided, completely different conclusions should be drawn, resulting in a different historical picture.
4. Draw this picture.

With regard to Suvorov, it looks like this. It must be proved that his main arguments in favor of Stalin preparing an attack on Europe in 1941 do not work. That the information he gives is more convincingly interpreted in the opposite way - in favor of preparing a defense (or any other course of action, if you can imagine it). It must also be proved that his arguments that Stalin's policy in the thirties was aimed at provoking a world war also do not work, and what is known about it points to a completely different way of thinking and acting of Stalin and the Soviet leadership. And to explain - on what. Strictly speaking, these two theses - a) Stalin's entire policy was originally aimed at provoking a world war, in which the USSR was supposed to remain the winner, and b) preparations for an attack on Europe were carried out and should have been completed by July 1941 - and constitute the essence of Suvorov's concept. All controversy revolves around them.

In 1996, shortly after the release of Icebreaker in Russia, Mikhail Meltyukhov published in the collection Co

Veteran historiography", published in the series "Russia in the 20th century", edited by academician Yu. The article is interesting not only for its balanced view of the work of Suvorov himself, but also for its harsh assessment of the speeches of his Russian critics. Meltyukhov considered the main issues raised by Suvorov in the context of traditional Soviet historiography and the first wave of criticism that hit Suvorov. Of the thirty-three pages of a journal article, eleven were occupied by related links (186 links). Meltyukhov's conclusions regarding the state of the then Russian (and, in fact, still Soviet) military historiography and the scientific level of Suvorov's critics are disappointing:

new concept, served as an impetus for its acceleration.

At the same time, the course of the discussion connected with the book indicates that Russian historiography is not yet ready for a radical change in established approaches. The discussion showed how weak the historiographic development of a large number of topics, how great is the need for large-scale problem studies of these issues. Only further development of the problems of the canon of war on the basis of a significant expansion of the source base and the rejection of any ideological narrow-mindedness will contribute to their deep study and verification on specific historical material"³.

In other words, at that time Soviet science could not do anything with Suvorov. In the fundamental study "Stalin's Lost Chance" published in 2000, Meltyukhov came to almost the same conclusions as Suvorov: "Germany and the USSR carefully prepared for war, and from the beginning of 1941 this process entered its final stage, which made the start of the Soviet-German war inevitable precisely in 1941, no matter who initiated it. Initially, the Wehrmacht intended to complete military preparations by May 16, and

The Red Army - by June 12, 1941. Then Berlin postponed the attack, postponing it to June 22, a month later Moscow did the same, setting a new tentative date - July 15, 1941. As is now known, both sides in their calculations proceeded from the fact that the war would start on their own initiative.

In the already mentioned series "Russia in the 20th century" in 1996, the collection "The Other War 1939-1945" was published, also under the general editorship of Yu. Afanasyev. The first part of the collection, nine articles, was entirely devoted to the controversy around the concept of Suvorov. A year earlier, in 1995, another collection of articles on the same topic, compiled by Vladimir Nevezhin, came out in Moscow: "Did Stalin prepare an offensive war against Hitler? Unplanned discussion" (12 authors). The positions of Suvorov's opponents in both collections looked, to put it mildly, weak.

Over the next ten years, a lot of new materials and new research on this topic appeared. Among them are fundamental ones, such as Vladimir Nevezhin's *Offensive War Syndrome* (1997), Irina Pavlova's *The Mechanism of Power and the Construction of Stalinist Socialism* (2001), and many others. Almost all serious studies confirm and deepen Suvorov's conclusions to one degree or another, and every year there are more and more of them.

The name of Nevezhin's collection should be noted. It accurately captures the essence of the problem. Criticism of the books of Viktor Suvorov himself is a secondary task from the point of view of historical science. Suvorov can be right in something, wrong in something. But the support of his ideas or the struggle against them can by no means be the main task of scientific research or scientific discussions. For Suvorov's servant in that he was the first to identify the most painful problem, and it makes sense to discuss this problem, which goes far beyond the relatively narrow scope of the topics of Suvorov's books. This problem, in its general form, is the question put forward in the title of V. Nevezhin's collection. More generally

In its sense, it can be formulated as follows: "What did Stalin achieve in the 1930s with his actions and his policy? What were his strategic goals?"

Any attempts to criticize Suvorov without analyzing the problem as a whole and without trying to answer the questions he posed in a different way are doomed to failure. Actually, no scientific discussion can be based on the criticism of one author without a critical consideration of the problem he is studying as a whole. Unless, of course, this is a clarifying criticism, when there are no fundamental claims against the author, but we are talking about correcting individual details.

Aleksei Isaev in his 2006 book claims to solve essentially the same problem as Mikhail Meltyukhov did in his 1996 article, namely, the analysis of Suvorov's concept. Moreover, the application is far-reaching and promising: "The claims against Vladimir Bogdanovich are not an indication of minor shortcomings, but a criticism of the very methodology for constructing evidence."

The last words are especially piquant, since Isaev criticizes Suvorov with methods that have nothing to do with science. And it's not just a matter of constant rudeness (for example, the introduction to the book is entitled "But why lie?")⁵.

In Isaev's book, there is no description at all of the state of the scientific problem. Not only is there no bibliography on the topic and references to other historians, there is no mention at all that someone other than him and Suvorov was engaged in research in this area. This scientific and informational sterility amusingly contrasts with the intentions of the author declared in the introduction: "The book offered to the reader is not only a mimic with Suvorov, it is an attempt to write a kind of encyclopedia of war, to give basic knowledge about the principles of warfare and the use of weapons and combat technology"⁶.

Maybe an "encyclopedia of war" can be written, not using scientific literature, but this trick definitely does not work with criticism of Suvorov. Although the way in which

the critic saved himself from the need to object to Suvorov's numerous colleagues and in general to give an overview of the problem under discussion, one cannot but recognize the wit
nym.

It should also be noted that Suvorov's books, although written by a military historian and a military specialist in general, leave the war proper behind the scenes. The course of hostilities and the analysis of the events of the Second World War from the point of view of military art, Suvorov is not interested. The problem he first raised, and in which dozens of other historians have become involved, is a problem of political rather than military history. It does not consist in how and by what means Stalin fought, but in how, by what means and for what strategic purpose he prepared for war. The defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 - from the point of view of Suvorov, the result is not a military, but a political miscalculation. With a different foreign policy planning of Stalin, with a different analysis of the political situation and, as a result, with different terms of action adopted, the same military measures could have led to the successes planned by Stalin.

Either Isaev really does not understand the essence of the problem he has swung at, or he is disingenuous. In the introduction, he writes: "Historical science, despite the absence of specific symbols, like mathematical ones ... is no less complex science, requiring a thoughtful and serious approach and certain professional skills. I made sure of this

venous experience, having spent several years studying
kons of operational art, methods of historical research, documents and books about that war"⁷.

Knowledge of the laws of operational art, of course, cannot prevent a correct analysis of the political history of the USSR in the 1930s, but the use of this knowledge alone makes the task of such an analysis insoluble, even if Isaev had bothered to set it up. This, however, is out of the question, which in itself puts under

doubt the author's confidence that he was able to study the methods of historical research.

In Isaev's book, his own analysis of the pre-war political situation and Stalin's intentions is completely absent. And the methods by which he tries to achieve his goal are quite exotic.

In the first chapter of the "Competition of Offensive Plans", Isaev takes aim at what seems to him one of the main theses of Suvorov: "He (Suvorov. - D.Kh.) claims that the USSR had only an offensive plan for a liberation campaign"8.

Isaev objects: "However, behind the scenes, the question remained, who had defensive ones. All war plans of the major powers participating in the two world wars of the twentieth century were offensive. Moreover, the offensive nature did not depend on who was the initiator of the war. For military planning, this was absolutely indifferent; the plans did not consider the question of the order in which war was declared. Only the plans of small countries were defensive; the main line of planning in this case was a stubborn defense in the hope that powerful allies would crush the opponents who attacked the dwarf country.

According to this scheme, it turns out that all the major European powers before the Second World War had only offensive plans, that is, they all equally (and not just the USSR and Germany, as Suvorov claims) prepared aggression against their neighbors and were equally guilty of inciting world war. And against this background, the military plans of the USSR did not stand out in any way. Version exotic and in need of proof

wah.

This statement is followed by five pages of a story about the actions of the world powers in the First World War, and then the author finally moves on to the Second.

He tells that the Polish commander-in-chief

the next marshal Rydz-Smigly, "despite the obvious fact that Germany is stronger than Poland and, perhaps, will strike the main blow not at Poland's ally France, but at Poland itself, laid in the plan not only a defensive element, holding the entire territory of Poland, but also an offensive element, a strike against the German grouping in East Prussia"¹⁰.

From what has been said, it does not follow at all that Poland and France was initially preparing an unprovoked attack on Germany, and it was precisely this idea that was subordinated (as it happened, according to Suvorov, in the USSR) to pre-war Polish military planning. Then follows the story that "on May 31, 1939, the French General Staff began to develop a plan of attack on the front between the Moselle and the Rhine, which was to become the basis of military operations against Germany"¹¹.

Well, if the military plan was dictated by the initial aggressive intentions of France against Germany, and was not an element of the plan to counter the threat from Germany, then yes, this fact can work for Isaev's thesis about equal aggressiveness of future participants in the world war. And if not, then no. To find this out, one must at least link the appearance of this plan (exactly two months before the German attack on Poland!) with the political situation of that time in Europe and with the political intentions of the French government. But Isaev has nothing to say about this.

words.

The following example concerns Finland: "You will laugh, but in the 1930s Finland also had an offensive plan: an offensive deep into the USSR was envisaged. According to these plans, the Mannerheim Line repelled an attack from the south, and the Finnish army advanced along the entire front to the east into Karelia. When the war was already on the threshold, prudence prevailed, and on October 9, 1939, the troops were instructed to prepare for defense, but with the proviso that, if necessary, it would be necessary to carry out

offensive operation in the Rebola region, pushing the border away from the narrowest part of Finland.

This is all very interesting, but it does not follow from what has been said that Finnish military planning has been initially aggressive in nature. On the contrary, it is quite obvious that all actions were dictated by defensive intentions and were conditioned by the threat from the USSR.

However, Isaev draws a general conclusion: "As we can see, nothing has fundamentally changed since the First World War - both the "bad guys" represented by Germany and the "good guys" represented by Poland, France, England and even Finland had offensive military plans. . Why should the USSR be an exception in this series?

Stop. And what, in fact, are we talking about? Isaev showed that the military plans of Poland, France and Finland assumed in certain cases going over to the offensive. At the same time, he did not give absolutely no arguments for the fact that the plans themselves were not a reaction to the threat from Germany and the USSR, but were initially aggressive in nature, that is, they assumed an unprovoked attack on Germany or the USSR. As arguments against Suvorov, the information cited by Isaev does not make any sense at all. Suvorov's concept substantiates the initially aggressive nature of Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet military planning resulting from it. Suvorov never stated in any of his books that any defensive plans could not include offensive elements.

The Soviet Union, like Germany, planned a world war as a way to extend its power to the territories of other states. This is what both of them differed from France, England, Poland, Finland and many other participants in the world war, who did not plan anything like this. You can disagree with this thesis, but then you have to argue on the merits of the dispute. Isaev's arguments are not just

untenable, they are generally directed to the side, without touching either Suvorov's concept or his arguments tation.

I can hardly imagine that Isaev really does not understand what the essence of the problem is and what methods it can be solved. Way too clever. Most likely this is a deliberate distortion. Suvorov talks about Stalin's political planning for the capture of Europe and the resulting military preparations for an attack on Germany in the summer of 1941, while Isaev talks about how the defensive plans of the countries - opponents of Germany and the USSR included offensive elements. And he passes it off as arguments refuting Suvorov. There is a base. Not a discussion, but a simulation of a scientific discussion.

Isaev further: "The Soviet Union was not a dwarf state that could only rely on selling its life dearly or waiting for the big kind uncles to beat the offender. Reply

military planning was carried out by the attacker character, at least since 1938"13.

It turns out that the USSR could only have two choices: either wait for someone to protect it, or defend oneself by preparing an attack on potential offender. Isaev does not substantiate this fantastic political situation in any way, declaring it as something self-evident. At the same time, Suvorov rightly draws a completely different picture - it was the USSR, along with Germany, that very offender that neighbors, both dwarf and non-dwarf, were afraid of. Soviet military planning was of an offensive nature in accordance with Soviet aggressive plans for neighbors, and not in accordance with Soviet fears of attack from some hypothetical offenders. And not since 1938, but almost always.

This thesis of Suvorov is actually the key, Isaev does not even try to offend. On the next 11 pages of the first chapter, filled with quotes from

scientific theorists and calculations about Soviet military planning in 1939-1941, there is not a word about Soviet foreign policy plans and intentions. Their goal is to lead the reader to the idea that "the sequence of actions of the USSR, the military planning of the Red Army did not have the character of something aggressive or out of the ordinary. Quite ordinary and generally accepted events, which in themselves do not testify to absolutely anything. Neither about aggressiveness, nor about whiteness

and fluffiness."

Since Isaev does not specify for what situation Soviet military preparations can be considered "beyond ordinary and generally accepted"—for preparing defense or preparing for aggression, the entire ideological construction hangs in the air. And since he does not say a word about the reasons for the delusions of Mikhail Meltyukhov and at least a couple of dozen Russian and foreign researchers who, independently of Suvorov, based on the same material, concluded that the Soviet military preparations were unambiguously aggressive just before June 22, 1941 g., then the scientific value of his reasoning, to put it mildly,

small.

For example, on pages 26-28, Isaev talks about the fact that in the 1930s European military theorists actively developed the theoretical aspects of the use of "cover armies" and "invading armies" and that the transformation of cover armies into invasion armies is not a Soviet invention. , as allegedly claimed by Suvorov, but foreign. And that even Charles de Gaulle, in his book *For a Professional Army*, points out the possibility of using it as an "invading army"¹⁴.

And further: "Some of the military theory was brought to practical implementation. In 1933, a war game was held in Poland, during which an invasion of the territory of the USSR was practiced in order to disrupt the mobilization and deploy its own armed forces. In 1934-1936. at exercises in Poland, Germany,

Italy, France worked out the actions of the invading armies. The possibilities of raids by mechanized formations and cavalry were studied in order to disrupt the deployment of enemy forces. The USSR did not remain aloof from these tendencies, and in 1934 the General Staff developed a draft "Instruction on the invasion operation"¹⁵.

From this, the reader should get an idea that since everyone was engaged in theoretical developments related to the "invading armies", then everyone was going to invade the territories of their neighbors and with the same goals. That is, the intentions of the USSR, which in reality had no enemies capable of aggression at all before the start of the world war, did not differ in any way from the intentions of, for example, Poland, which was under the threat of a real (and happened in 1939) attack from two sides.

The first chapter ends with a strange thesis that the "improvised" actions of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 were explained by the fact that, unlike the First World War, in 1941 there was no period before the start of the first operations, "during which the opponents mobilized armies and drove troops to the border". The USSR in 1941 did not have such an opportunity due to the lack of a period for the exchange of notes and ultimatums. By the beginning of the conflict, the Wehrmacht was fully mobilized and advanced to the border with the USSR in the composition in which it was supposed to conduct the first operation. The Red Army was not fully mobilized due to the late awareness of the danger of war. The troops that were supposed to take part in the above offensives were not brought to the border. Accordingly, the plan could be at least defensive, at least offensive. There was no grouping for its implementation. This provision is called "anticipatory deployment"¹⁶.

Stop. But after all, Suvorov writes about the same thing - On June 22, the grouping of Soviet troops was not yet ready for an offensive. But he also writes something else - she did not prepare for defense initially. Yes, Isaev is right - on June 22, the Red Army was unable to either defend or attack. But if Stalin had time to bring it to

readiness, and Hitler would still be ahead of him at least a day, then the rout would be even worse. Because, according to Suvorov (as well as Meltyukhov and many many others), Stalin was preparing an attack on her independent and not caused by a threat from Germany. He simply did not prepare for defense.

Isaev's phrase: "Accordingly, the plan could be at least defensive, at least offensive. There was no grouping for its implementation" - a trick characteristic of him, transferring the reader's attention from the main to the unimportant. It turns out that no matter what the plan of the Soviet command was, if at the time of the German attack the Red Army was still incapable of combat.

But that's exactly what matters. This is what Suvorov writes about. If the Soviet plan had been defensive, the Red Army grouping on the border would have looked completely different and would not have died in the first days of the war, having essentially failed to join the battle. A defensive Soviet plan would mean, in essence, the prevention of war. And as further experience showed, Stalin managed to organize an insurmountable defense for the Germans even after the loss in the summer of 1941 of almost the entire personnel of the Red Army. There would be a desire.

Strictly speaking, Isaev does not deny Suvorov's thesis that the Red Army was preparing to attack Germany and did not intend to defend itself against it. He believes that this is generally unimportant: "The problem in 1941 was not that the Red Army was preparing for an offensive. If she was preparing for defense, it would be the same. Neither the offensive nor the defensive grouping of troops simply had time to take shape.

Here the calculation is for a sudden clouding of the reader's mind. One gets the impression that this same grouping took shape on its own, spontaneously, and no one could know in advance how it would develop. But that's nonsense. An offensive grouping was formed, and no other. If the Red Army were preparing for the defense, it would not line up on the border in ledges-balconies, extremely vulnerable and doomed to encirclement in

in the event of a sudden strike (as it happened), would not have transferred airfields and huge stocks of equipment lost in the very first days of the war directly to the border. That is, it would have performed completely different actions, described in detail by Suvorov, as a result of which a defensive line would have been created, which the Germans would have to overcome in the conditions of the overwhelming numerical and technical superiority of the Red Army, if for some reason they had to do this madness

sewed.

Isaev is not able to prove that the Red Army was preparing for defense, so he takes a bold step, in fact declaring that there is no difference at all between preparing for defense from a neighboring country and preparing for an attack on it. Since they did not have time to prepare for an attack, then, therefore, they would not have been able to defend themselves.

The whole book of Isaev is built on the same method of rather skillful substitution of the subject of the dispute. Frankly absurd conclusions are supported by reasoning that has nothing to do with the essence of Suvorov's argumentation, and are drowned in a huge amount of technical information and critical remarks about secondary and tertiary aspects of Suvorov's concept.

In the chapter "Conclusion" Isaev listed Suvorov's theses refuted by him, accompanying them with brief summaries of his arguments. Here are the most important ones:

"The USSR had only an offensive plan for the 'liberation of Europe'. Throw away. Most of the participants in the two world wars had plans of an offensive nature, the Soviet plan was no different from them and from the plans of Russia in 1914. The nature of the military planning of the USSR is not an argument in favor of aggression"18.

The curious way in which Isaev tried to substantiate this highly fantastic conclusion was discussed earlier. In any case, he puts him face to face not only with Suvorov, but also with a huge number of other researchers, not mentioned by Isaev. And he puts it all alone; risking scientific reputation in such a frivolous way can only be decided by a person who, in this sense, has absolutely nothing to lose.

“As early as 1939, the USSR accumulated the energy of millions, and the army of 1941 was a peacetime army, there were no alternatives to starting a war.” We throw it in the wastebasket. The Red Army in 1941 until June 22 remained a peacetime army, the military reform of the summer of 1939 also did not provide for the creation of a peacetime army”¹⁹.

On this account, there are much more accurate than Suvorov's data on the size of the Red Army in 1941, cited by Mikhail Meltyukhov:

“On June 6, 1941, Stalin signed a number of resolutions, according to which the industrial people's commissariats were to carry out measures that made it possible to “prepare all enterprises ... for a possible transition from July 1, 1941 to work according to the mobilization plan” ²⁰ (emphasis mine . — MM.).

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR IN 1939-1941

	On 1.01.1939	On 06/22/1941	In % by 1939
Personnel (thousand people)	2485	5774	232.4
divisions	131.5	316.5	240.7
Guns and mortars	55 790	117 581	210.7
tanks	21 110	25 784	122.1
combat aircraft	7714	18 759	243.2

The Soviet armed forces, whose growth is shown in Table 1, surpassed the army of any other country in terms of the number of military equipment.

Isaev has the opportunity to challenge Meltyukhov's data or prove that the figures he cited correspond to the concept of "peacetime army". And at the same time to challenge another conclusion of Meltyukhov regarding the lack of alternatives to the start of the war: "Thus, both Germany and the USSR carefully prepared for war, and from the beginning of 1941 this process entered its final stage, which made the start of the Soviet-German war inevitable precisely in 1941, no matter who initiated it"²³.

If this fails, then, as an honest person, Isaev is simply obliged to bury his own work in the trash can.

In the USSR it was produced in huge quantities only "offensive weapons" to the detriment of "defensive" ones. Throw away. There are no purely offensive and purely defensive weapons; all technical means of combat are universal to one degree or another and can be used both in an aggressive war and in repulsing someone's aggression.

Of course, "all technical means of struggle are universal to one degree or another." The point is that they are universal to varying degrees. Infantry and cavalry are to varying degrees suitable for defense and offensive. Cavalry is completely unsuitable for defense; it is forced to dismount and turn into infantry. If Isaev agrees with this fact, which does not require special military knowledge for understanding, then his claims to Suvorov are meaningless.

As the main argument for his position, Isaev abundantly and in detail criticizes Suvorov's assumption that the development of fast wheeled-tracked tanks in the USSR in the 30s indicated Stalin's aggressive intentions, since it was impossible to use them on the territory of the USSR. The assumption is quite controversial, although the converse statement is

that high-speed wheeled tanks were developed for defensive purposes, to put it mildly, is not obvious. The main thing is that the topic of highway tanks in the general system of Suvorov's argumentation occupies not even a secondary, but a third place. This whole tank theme can be easily removed from Suvorov's books without compromising the soundness of the concept. But Suvorov also has arguments of paramount importance concerning offensive weapons. For example, the formation of 10 airborne corps before the start of the war. And this is a purely offensive branch of the military, in no way applicable to defense. Its versatility is out of the question. When the war began, all already formed units (5 corps) were turned into ordinary ones. There is not a word about all this in Isaev's book.

Criticism of the opponent's secondary arguments, while ignoring the key ones, indicates either the critic's scientific dishonesty, or his initial lack of ideas about the rules of scientific discussions.

"Hitler launched Barbarossa in response to concentration of Soviet troops near the border. We throw out. This is the formal explanation for the start of hostilities in a note given to the Soviet government on 22 June. According to the available documents of the Third Reich, Hitler attacked the USSR in order to destroy the only potential ally of England on the continent and thereby force Great Britain to surrender.

The argument is remarkable for its absurdity. He does not refute, but supports and supplements Suvorov's thesis. Of course, Hitler attacked the USSR in order to destroy Britain's only potential ally on the continent. There are indeed many documents on this subject, including this in plain text in the diaries of Goebbels in the spring of 1941. But in 1939 the USSR was not in the eyes of the government of the Third Reich a potential ally of England. He became one as a result of a whole series of unfriendly

to Germany action since the summer of 1940. Among these actions were territorial claims in Europe not stipulated by the 1939 pact, violation of agreements, and - first of all! - the concentration of troops on the border, which did not allow Germany to transfer about 150 divisions from the east in order to successfully end the war with England. All these unfriendly actions are listed in the note of the German government on June 22, and there is no reason to consider them only a formal reason, and not an actual reason for the fall of Germany on the USSR. The text of the note fully supports Isaev's thesis that Germany, by attacking the USSR, tried to destroy a potential ally of England. But how Isaev's thesis can be used against Suvorov is completely incomprehensible. Before us is again a set-up. An argument that works for Isaev's opponent by suggestion is presented as a refuting one.

"The Red Army was defeated in the summer of 1941, because it was preparing to attack and the troops were concentrated for the offensive." The configuration and composition of the Red Army troops near the border did not correspond to either defense or offensive. The reason for the defeat was the low density of troops near the border due to the incompleteness of concentration, deployment and mobilization. These factors did not depend on the plans in any way. This happened as a result of a successful disinformation campaign and the use by the Germans of new technologies for conducting the initial period of the war"26.

Another completely absurd argument, partly parsed above. "The configuration and composition of the troops of the Red Army near the border did not correspond to either defense or offensive" for a completely obvious reason - the troops were not preparing for defense, they were in the process of preparing for the offensive. The insufficient density of Soviet troops near the border could in no way be the reason for the defeat. If the density of troops had been brought to the planned level, and the Germans would have attacked first anyway, the defeat would have been even more terrible, because

there would be more losses. The reason for the defeat was the very intention to attack in the complete absence of defensive measures. Which would simply rule out the concentration right on the border of an army unable to defend itself. If the army in the very first days of the war, without having time to enter the battle, finds itself surrounded, in boilers, with interrupted communications and lack of communication with the command, then the density of troops in the boilers has no special influence on the success of their military operations.
can not.

Suvorov's "Icebreaker" describes in detail how the measures to create the country's defense differ from the measures to prepare for an attack on a neighbor. And if Isaev, considering himself a specialist in the principles of warfare, believes that there is no fundamental difference between the one and the other, and that the army, in order to avoid defeat under the threat of an enemy attack, must not take any defensive measures, then he should begin to refute Suvo ditch from this place. As for Isaev's phrase about "the use by the Germans of new technologies for conducting the initial period of the war," this, apparently, means simply surprise. In any case, there is no reason to believe that the actions of the Red Army, had it attacked first, would have been technologically very different from the actions of the Wehrmacht.

Isaev ends the book with a beautiful metaphor: "The reproaches of the Red Army in 1941 are like the reproaches of a young boxer who trained at the regional Palace of Pioneers and was knocked down in the field in a fight with Mike Tyson in the 10th second of the first round"²⁷.

This means that the weak, inexperienced Red Army was unable to oppose anything to an experienced and strong enemy. This comparison is also a setup, and completely shameless. If we continue the metaphor, then it is the Red Army that should be compared with Mike Tyson, who was kicked in the face while still climbing over the ropes. He fell out of the ring

because he was weaker or more inexperienced than the enemy, but because he was not explained in time when to expect what and what to prepare for. It's not his fault, it's his fault ner.

If a gigantic army, far superior in number and technical equipment to its opponent, is defeated at the very beginning of the war, without being able to fight, and dies surrounded, this does not mean that it was weak or unfit for combat. It means she was framed. This means a strategic mistake by the High Command, which incorrectly assessed the political situation and gave the army wrong orders. She was not prepared for the situation in which she found herself. She did not have those 10 seconds of freedom of planned actions in the first round, which could prove her combat capability.

It is worth noting that Isaev's thesis about the weak and inexperienced Red Army, broken by the fists of the German "Tyson" after 10 seconds of battle, contradicts his thesis that the reason for the defeat is that "the configuration and composition of the Red Army troops near the border did not responded to neither defense nor offensive" and "the low density of troops near the border due to the incompleteness of concentration, deployment and mobilization."

One out of two. Either the Red Army entered the battle and was defeated due to weakness and inexperience, or, for organizational reasons, it was not ready to fight, and then its numbers and experience could not play any role at all.

Many, not without reason, reproach Suvorov's books for being unscientific in style and form. These shortcomings are optional! — are easily abolished by simple editing. Isaev's book is hopeless in the scientific sense. It is even pointless to reproach her for dishonesty; the author performs a task with exceptional conscientiousness that precludes a conscientious scientific approach. Not in form

nor, in fact, can it be listed under the category of scientific historical literature. Neither from the point of view of the relevance of the essence of the allegedly discussed problems, nor from the point of view of the methods and goals of argumentation.

She has a different task. This is a work that consolidates the ideological community. Something like a manifesto of a hundred Russian "anti-rezunism". And manifestos are rarely read even by their heralds. Their meaning is in the very fact of their existence. This is a symbol, a banner that unites the united believers.

This community is united, of course, not by indignation at the allegedly insufficient scientific nature of Suvorov's books, but by loyalty to the ideology that collapses if one recognizes that Suvorov is right. The most interesting thing about the anti-resistance movement is its positive program. That is, not boring, mediocre and fraudulent attacks on Suvorov, but their own ideas about Soviet history.

They turn out to be very bizarre and exotic. Then these guys talk about how the goal of industrialization was to create a self-sufficient, efficient and self-developing economy, just like in the West. Sometimes they convince each other that collectivization fed the USSR, and did not at all lead to mass starvation²⁸.

All this is a longing for the former Soviet possibilities of falsifications with impunity. They have nothing to rely on except Soviet textbooks and a small number of amateur charlatan books. Hence the hope for writings like Isaev's book. It seems that the most cunning of them will be able to travel around historical science on a goat.

In the network discussion already mentioned above of the collection "The Truth of Viktor Suvorov", two curious theses came up, against which none of the participants objected. Moreover, they were voiced by dr'guillotín, that is, Isaev himself.

First thesis. Preparations for an unprovoked attack on neighboring countries (that is, military attacks

patelnye plans) cannot be considered a preparation for aggression. For "offensive plans" is a military term, and "aggression" is a political one. Explanation of Isaev: "There is such a thing as "probable adversaries". Reply

the presence of an offensive plan with the intersection
the boundaries of these most likely adversaries are not yet clear.
initiates a political act of aggression in the near future. In 1941 Germany and its
satellites were the likely enemy"29.

In my opinion, this is a senseless and dishonest play on words. That is, of course, it has a meaning, but it is ideological and propagandistic. If a state prepares an attack on the territory of neighboring countries that do not threaten it, this is called preparation of aggression. Stalin began to prepare an attack on Europe for

long before the danger of attack arose

Germany on the USSR. Which he himself created, first provoking a world war, and then inadvertently letting Hitler know that he was preparing an attack on him. The neighbors of a country can be considered by this country as potential adversaries for two reasons: either they threaten it, or it itself plans to attack them for reasons independent of the external threat. Accordingly, the military-political activity in both cases is assumed to be different. In the first case, defensive measures aimed at preventing war; in the second case, preparations for aggression with the aim of territorial seizures. The Soviet Union always chose its "probable adversaries" itself and arbitrarily, that is, it acted according to the second option. Moreover, in the 20s and 30s, at least all the western neighbors of the USSR were among the "probable adversaries".

In itself, this topic arose from the complete impossibility of substantiating the defensive intentions of the USSR. And then, perhaps by Isaev himself, a saving terminological trick was invented, designed for the very simple-hearted: the preparation of a military offensive is not the preparation of aggression in the political sense.

In Isaev's statements, the presence of "probable

tivnikov" looks like a kind of given, independent of the political will of the USSR. Since there are neighbors, then there are potential opponents. Since there are opponents, it is necessary to prepare for war in order to defeat them. And to defeat your neighbors, you have to attack them. With such a turn of the topic, the question of whether this is aggression or not aggression is not even raised. As well as the question of the causes and instigators of the war.

In 2006, a live radio discussion took place between Isaev and Suvorov. Suvorov rather sarcastically remarked that his version of the preparation of the USSR for an attack on Germany, from a moral point of view, justifies the USSR, and does not compromise: "What happens? The Soviet Union in 1939, 1940, 1941 helped Hitler, helped him, helped him, drove strategic raw materials there, Hitler destroyed Europe. And gets

Xia: we did not want to attack him, that is, we wanted to tame the Nazis to the end? This is an immoral point of view."30

Isaev replies: "The USSR sought to enter the war delay its beginning as late as possible, get time to prepare the army for a simple, adequate entry into the war, so as not to suffer heavy defeats, so as not to suffer heavy losses. Naturally, entering the war when Germany is drained of blood is much better than entering the rather weak Red Army with a strong Wehrmacht. And from 1939 to 1941, they spent time bringing the Red Army to a normal, combat-ready state, getting, again, based on the experience of the war in Europe, some information about the latest combat technologies and putting it into practice. Therefore, we can say this: we were by no means going to become "Hitlerites", but were going to enter the war, approximately like the United States, which also actively prepared from 1939, increased the number of its formations and then entered already, based on the experience of those who were defeated by Hitler - Poland, France ... "31

So, it turns out that the USSR entered the world war

for the same reason as the USA. But the US political goals in the war, as well as their actions, are well known and looked a little different from those of the USSR. The United States sought to defeat the European aggressor - Germany - and restore democracy in Europe. The United States, building up its armaments, from the very beginning helped England and France to stand against Germany, while the USSR allegedly did the same thing, helping Germany to defeat England and France. It turns out that, according to Isaev, the "simple and adequate" entry of the USSR into the war was supposed when England and France were defeated by a bloodless Germany. Isaev considers such a strategy natural, correct, but does not stutter about what its goal is. Although the goal is clear - to remain the only winner in Europe and its master. This is the main Stalinist goal, about which, in fact, Suvorov wrote. Had the USSR had other political goals common with the USA, it would have acted like the USA - from the very beginning it would have helped not Germany, but its European opponents. The thesis that the USSR in every possible way delayed entry into the war in order to accumulate strength and only then save Europe is purely Stalinist and cannot be explained by any good intentions.

Another common "anti-rezunist" and also Stalinist thesis is that Soviet industrialization aimed only at bringing the country's economy up to the average European level. By the preparation of aggression from wearing did not have. One of Isaev's associates put it this way: "The meaning of industrialization was to create a self-sufficient industry that would lay the foundation not only for the future prosperity of the country, but also to ensure the production of all or almost the entire range of military products to support the army in the war."

Isaev himself spoke on this topic as follows: "The policy of the Soviet state was modest integration into world politics and economics, firstly exit, and the preservation of the country as an independent state gifts, secondly.

The thesis about Soviet industrialization as a means of securing the country's defense against enemies and raising its standard of living is also purely Stalinist. It is completely false and completely unprovable. Stalinist indu

ustrialization with its targeted reduction of

The destruction of the lives of the population, millions of victims, the total militarization of the country and exclusively military purposes had as little to do with "modest incorporation into the world economy" as the Stalinist foreign policy of the 1930s had with "modest incorporation into world politics" . Not to mention the fact that throughout the thirties and up to the world war provoked by Stalin, the independence of the USSR as a state was not threatened by anything.

These are not errors or ignorance. This is a characteristic and rather harmonious ideology. Moreover, the ideology
Linistic.

Here is Isaev's review of Meltyukhov's book Stalin's Liberation Campaign: "Ideologically, in my opinion, the text written by M. Meltyukhov is impeccable. "As a result of the actions of the Soviet Union in June 1940, The Soviet-Romanian border along the Prut and Danube rivers, established by the decision of the Berlin Congress of 1878, was **restored** . Bessarabia was **liberated** from the Romanian occupation and **reunited** with the USSR. As for Northern Bukovina, in this case, this territory was annexed to the USSR and a **new border was established** between the Prut and the Carpathians (p. 348, conclusion). The book ends with the phrase "Since the idea of Romania's "defensive mission" dates back to the second half of the 19th century, it is quite obvious that it was precisely these aggressive aspirations that pushed her towards an alliance with Germany, and not at all the solution of the Bessarabian issue in the summer of 1940." 33

A look at the territorial seizures of the USSR in Europe as liberation campaigns is a classic of Stalinist historiography.

May 10, 2007 on the Len website

ta.ru under the general heading "The Truth about Victory" Alexei Isaev's answers to readers' questions were published. Here are the most interesting ones.

Question: "The Second World War was started by Germany and the USSR with a joint (albeit two weeks apart) attack on Poland. Why, then, for most of our historians, the war began in June 1941, and not in September 1939? Isaev: "What kind of joint operation can we talk about when the USSR sent troops to Poland after the sudden death of the Polish army? By the time the Soviet troops crossed the border, Poland had already lost the war. Therefore, there is practically no resistance to Soviet troops.

called."

The question refers to a jointly planned, albeit timed, attack on Poland. Isaev shudders: since the Polish troops did not resist the Soviet ones, it means that there was allegedly no joint operation with Germany. Pure bluff.

Question: "Can it be argued that in September 1939 the USSR entered World War II on the side of Nazi Germany?" Isaev: "It is impossible. With the same success one can blame Poland, which took part in the division of Czechoslovakia together with Germany.

Bluff again. The situation with the coordinated Soviet-German armed attack on Poland in 1939 bore little resemblance to the situation with the partition of Czechoslovakia with the participation of Poland in 1938. If only because Poland did not conclude a pact with Germany on the armed division of Europe. The outbreak of World War II was planned jointly by the USSR and Germany in

within the framework of the union agreement concluded between them. So Isaev's analogy is completely wrong.

measured.

Question: "How do you explain the apparent contradiction:

the country was intensely preparing for war with Germany, but the German attack was a complete surprise?

Isaev: "The German attack in June 1941 was a surprise. Germany was considered as a likely enemy by the Soviet General Staff, both in 1938 and in 1940-1941. In 1939-1940, a large-scale reorganization of the army and an increase in military production were carried out. These measures made it possible to withstand, despite the successes of the Germans in the summer of 1941.

Explicit simulation of the answer with avoiding the question. The question was why the attack in June 1941 was not expected, although they had been preparing for war with Germany for a long time. Answer: Yes, they had been preparing for a long time, and the attack came as a surprise exactly in June. But this, one might say, is the most important question. After all, Isaev became famous as an opponent of Suvorov, all of whose books, in essence, answer this very question.

Question: "Do you think that the USSR was preparing an attack on Germany?" Isaev: No. Analysis of documents from Soviet military planning does not allow conclusion that there is a political decision to attack Germany.

Just a lie. Here it would be to explain in a nutshell, what exactly was the political decision behind the by the Red Army on the border with Germany in June 1941. There are few options. There is no such analysis in Isaev's books, but from studies in which such an analysis is available, a completely different picture emerges.

Question: "Is it true that Soviet soldiers did not always behave "correctly" in the occupied territory? That they killed and robbed no worse than the Nazis. Isaev: "In the Red Army there was a clear direction to maintain strict discipline. Therefore, the violators of discipline were persecuted and punished. This contributed to the general improvement of the moral climate among the troops in Germany.

Again, outright lies. There is an extensive literature about mass atrocities in the territory occupied by the Red Army.

Question: "Did the "Anschluss" of the Baltic States before the war and the attempt to "negotiate" with Finland by force bring any benefit?" Isaev: "The deployment of troops in the Baltic States moved the line of contact between the USSR and Germany away from Leningrad. The conflict with Finland did not contribute to the rise of the international prestige of the USSR, but pointed to a number of shortcomings in the construction of the army, which they tried to correct until 1941.

Really curious. For aggression against Finland, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. Isaev, however, believes that the annexation of the Baltic states and the war with Finland are justified by the resulting military-territorial advantages. Again, a purely Stalinist argument.

Question: "Is it possible, in your opinion, to say that both Hitler and Stalin and Daladier and Chamberlain are equally to blame for the outbreak of the Second World War?" Isaev: "I would not put Hitler and the leaders of the USSR, France and England on the same level. In one case, there was a clear desire to start a war; in another, there was a mistake in the desire to keep the peace.

Witty. This means that by concluding a pact with Nazi Germany, the USSR simply made a mistake in its desire to preserve peace. And exactly the same mistake as England and France, who opposed Germany. That is, in an effort to preserve peace, the USSR can, it turns out, be put on the same level with England and France. Again, a false, purely Stalinist thesis - the USSR, Britain and France fought together for peace in Europe.

In 1948, the USSR published a pamphlet called "The Falsifiers of History", which gave a Soviet interpretation of the political events in Europe in the 1930s. On

it was written, judging by the style, by Stalin himself. It described the relentless struggle for peace by the Soviet Union and its overcoming of the intrigues of warmongers. The official position of the Soviet, and then the Russian government historians, despite changes in vocabulary, never moved far from the fundamental provisions of this work. Historical views and assessments of Isaev also almost entirely fit into the framework of Stalinist historiography. This explains both the genre of his writings and the nature of the community he represents.

"Anti-rezunism" - the fight against Viktor Suvorov - is only the external and formal side of the movement. Behind this declarative negative program there is a much more serious positive one.

Worth a few kopecks

take a breath, and Stalinism crawls out from under "anti-rezunism".

The fighters with Suvorov are not lumped together by Suvorov, but by the national-patriotic - Stalinist! - A look at history. The "anti-rezunists" are the tip of the iceberg, the most active and noisy part of the subculture, which can be called neo-Stalinist, or "communist-shovinistic," or simply right-wing extremist.

This movement is extensive and has an abundance of nutrient medium in post-Soviet Russia. It feeds on classic Soviet prejudices and the imperial dream of former military greatness.

The only thing it is

lacking today is in propaganda literature. Ideologies of this kind can never

can rely on scientific literature, only on the ball

Latin. A charlatan is a person who feigns doing something in order to solve problems that are not related to it. In this case, it is required to simulate studies in Soviet political and military history. Once upon a time, entire areas of science, primarily historical, were falsified in Soviet times. In the absence of competition from real science, this was easy to do. Today's national patriots face a serious problem. Giant layers of former Soviet anti-scientific developments are not effective.

They are compromised and written in the wrong language. What is needed is something of the same content, but more modern and much more scientific in form, since in conditions of freedom of the press one has to compete with real research.

The activity of Alexei Isaev is an attempt to fill in the gap. His works have nothing to do with scientific disputes around the problems of the history of the Second World War and cannot participate in them. They have others dachas.

The purely scientific disputes around Suvorov's concept are actually over for today. His conclusions are broadly confirmed by numerous other studies³⁴.

Of course, one can theoretically assume that in the future there will be serious data confirming that
What:

- a) the deployment of the Red Army in June 1941 but the force is defensive rather than offensive;
- b) the Red Army was preparing not for an attack on Europe, but for defense against an external enemy;
- c) In the 1930s, Stalin did not plan to start a world war, but acted in the interests of maintaining peace in Europe.

In this case, the dispute on this topic may resume. But so far there is little chance of that.

Notes

¹ <http://u-96.livejournal.com/563128.html>.

² *Meltyukhov M.* Modern historiography and controversy around the book of V. Suvorov "Icebreaker". In: Soviet historiography. Moscow, 1996, pp. 488-521.

³ *Ibid.* S. 509.

⁴ *Meltyukhov M.* The threshold of the Great Patriotic War. 1939-1941: the rise of a great power / In: Pravda Viktor Suvorov. Moscow, 2006. S. 263.

⁵ The same kind of Internet-publicized joke by Isai Wa - made by him on his book, which was supposed to be passed on to Suwo

Rov, dedicatory inscription: "To the famous intelligence officer with a wish to return to his homeland as soon as possible." This refers to the wish that Su the thief be killed as soon as possible.

6 *Isaev A. Antisuvorov. Little man's big lie. Moscow, 2006, p. 10.*

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid. S. 11.

9 Ibid. pp. 11-12.

10 Ibid. S. 17.

11 Ibid. S. 18.

12 Ibid. S. 19.

13 Ibid. S. 20.

14 Ibid. S. 27.

15 Ibid. pp. 27-28.

16 Ibid. S. 33.

17 Ibid. S. 57.

18 Ibid. S. 344.

19 Ibid.

20 *Samuelson L. The Red Colossus. Formation of the military-industrial complex of the USSR. 1921-1941 / Per. from English. M., 2001. S. 225-226.*

21 Stalin's missed chance. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Europe: 1939-1941 (Documents, facts, judgments.) Ed. 2nd, corrected. and additional M., 2002. S. 269-271, 66, 284, 385, 393.

22 *Meltyukhov M.I. The eve of the Great Patriotic War ny. 1939-1941: the formation of a great power.*

23 Ibid.

24 *Isaev A. Antisuvorov. Little man's big lie. S. 345.*

25 Ibid. S. 346.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid. S. 349.

28 <http://dmitrij-sergeev.livejournal.com/11033.html?thread=79641#t79641>.
29 <http://dmitrij-sergeev.livejournal.com/11033.html?thread=66329#t66329>.

30 http://www.vif2ne.ru/nvk/forum/archive/1214/12144_99.html.

31 Ibid.

32 <http://gasper75.1ivejournal.com/25478.html?thread=280966#t280966>.

33 <http://dr-guillotin.livejournal.com/12013.html?mode=reply>.

34 Many authors of studies confirming the main conclusions of V. Suvorov took part in three issues of the collection *Pravda Viktor*

Suvorov": M. Meltyukhov, V. Nevezhin, V. Danilov, Yu. Felshtinsky,

A. Gogun, Albert L. Weeks, V. Doroshenko, I. Pavlova, R. Raack,

V. Stanilov, T. Titura, D. Najafov, X. Magenheimer, S. Shail, M. Markusha, K. Zakoretsky, Yu.

Tsurganov, M. Litovskaya, D. Gasanly, B. Povarnitsyn, B. Musial, V. Beshanov, D. Khmel'nitsky.

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Popular science edition

THE TRUTH OF VICTOR SUVOROV

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Solonin Mark

Weller Mikhail

Author-compiler

Khmelnitsky Dmitry

VICTOR SUVOROV:

MAIN BOOK ABOUT THE SECOND WORLD

Published in author's edition

Managing editor Art editor I. Petrovsky

Technical editor Computer P. Volkov

layout Proofreader O. V. Kulagina

L. Panina

Suprun

Illustration used for binding

artist

V. Nartova

ООО "Yauza-press"

109439, Moscow, Volgogradsky prospect, 120, bldg. 2.

Phone: (495)

745-58-23, fax: 411-68-86-2253.

Signed for publication on 01/19/2011. Format 84x108

1/32 - Typeface "Magazine". Offset printing. Conv. oven I. 28.56.

Circulation 4000 copies. Zach. No. 2352.

Printed at OAO Tula Printing House. 300600,

Tula, Lenin Ave., 109.

ISBN 978-5-9955-0242-5



9 785995 502425 >

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ISBN 978-5-9955-0242-5



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